Protection of privacy in Malaysia: A law for the future by Yusoff, Zuryati Mohamed
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
PROTECTION OF PRIVACY IN MALAYSIA: A 
LAW FOR THE FUTURE  
 
 
 
 
BY 
 
ZURYATI MOHAMED YUSOFF 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis 
submitted to the Victoria University of Wellington 
in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy  
 
 
 
 
Victoria University of Wellington  
2014 
2 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In Malaysia, the rights and liberties of the individual are recognised in the 
Federal Constitution of Malaysia. However, the right to privacy does not have 
the express constitutional recognition enjoyed by other rights such as the right 
to life and liberty and freedom of expression. This thesis identifies gaps in the 
protection of privacy interests in the current legal framework. 
 
There is no self-standing law on privacy in Malaysia, though there are several 
laws which provide limited rights to privacy such as the laws on data 
protection and criminal law. The existing laws are inadequate to protect 
private information and to protect against the intrusion of privacy. The 
importation of foreign principles through the reception of English Common 
Law offers only limited protection. Malaysia should, therefore, have a specific 
law to protect privacy. 
 
With a view to attaining that goal for Malaysia, this thesis undertakes a 
comparative analysis of two different experiences of the development of the 
law of privacy. They are the privacy law in England, which is largely based 
on the law of breach of confidence, and the privacy law in New Zealand, 
which has a distinct privacy tort recognised in its case law. The conclusion is 
that those countries’ experience can inform developments in Malaysia, and 
that the best way for Malaysia to develop its law now is by the enactment of a 
specific Privacy Act.  
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PART I: CONTEXT 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
I Overview 
 
Privacy is one of the values flowing from the principles of human dignity and 
autonomy.
1
 It goes to the heart of human rights and liberal philosophy and 
history.
2
 Although there are many definitions of privacy, the common feature 
is that privacy is a basic human right that warrants legal protection.  
 
This thesis examines the existing framework for the protection of privacy in 
Malaysia. Its central contention is that the laws currently available are 
inadequate to deal with breaches of privacy. It is argued that the development 
of privacy law in the United Kingdom (UK) and the recognition of privacy 
torts in New Zealand (NZ) can inform the development of a model law for 
Malaysia.  
 
To prove this contention, the thesis does four things: first, it analyses the 
constitutional and common law protection of privacy in Malaysia to illustrate 
its inadequacies to protect privacy; second, it examines the development of 
the law of privacy as a result of changes brought by the Human Rights Act 
1998 (HRA) and privacy cases in the UK; third, it evaluates the courts’ 
                                                          
1
Edward Bloustein “Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser” 
(1964) 39 NYULR 962 [“Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity”]. See also NA Moreham 
“Why is Privacy Important? Privacy, Dignity and Development of the New Zealand Breach of 
Privacy Tort” in Jeremy Finn and Stephen Todd (eds) Law, Liberty, Legislation (LexisNexis, 
Wellington, 2008). See also the discussion of the notion of privacy in Chapter Two.  
2
The human right to privacy has its contemporary international origins in art 12 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). See also Isaiah Berlin “Two Concepts of 
Liberty” (1958) in Isaiah Berlin (1969) Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford University Press, 
London, 1969). The right is also discussed by Hugh Collins “The Decline of Privacy in 
Private Law” (1987) 14 (1) Journal of Law and Society 91, where the author stated that the 
principle of privacy delineates a realm of conduct which the state cannot justifiably regulate. 
The principle plays a central role in liberal political theory, since it colours many liberals’ 
conception of personal freedom. 
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formulation of privacy torts in NZ; and fourth, it proposes a future law of 
privacy for Malaysia inspired by these developments. The possibility of a 
general tort of privacy, the introduction of specific legislation on privacy, and 
the recognition of the right to privacy in the Constitution are evaluated to 
better protect the right to privacy in the Malaysian context. 
 
II The problem  
 
Malaysia recognises the rights and liberties of the individual in the 
Constitution as part of human rights protected by the supreme law of the land. 
However, the right to privacy has not received the express constitutional 
recognition enjoyed by rights such as the right to life and liberty, the right to 
property, freedom of expression, movement and association, freedom of 
religion and equality. Further, there is no general right to privacy in Malaysia, 
though there are several laws which relate to privacy. The Personal Data 
Protection Act 2010 (PDPA) was passed to protect personal information but it 
has limited application. Thus, this thesis argues that the law is inadequate to 
protect privacy rights and particularly private information. The transplantation 
of foreign principles through the reception of the English common law of 
trespass, nuisance, defamation and breach of confidence are seen to be 
inadequate to protect privacy.  
 
The absence of specific law on privacy leads to a lack of remedies for victims 
whose private lives and personal information have been invaded. For 
example, on 20 August 2007, an 8 year old girl named Nurin, a student of one 
of the primary schools in Kuala Lumpur was reported missing after going out 
alone to a night market near her house. The case received wide media 
coverage when her body was found in a bag outside business premises on 17 
September 2007. A post-mortem report revealed that Nurin’s death was due to 
sexual abuse. Post-mortem photographs were circulated on the internet, thus 
available for public viewing. Two policemen were liable for the circulation of 
these photographs. The negligence suit was settled out of court when Jazimin 
16 
 
Abd Jalil, Nurin’s father agreed to withdraw his suit against the other four 
defendants. Although the case was withdrawn, the publication of distressing 
photographs was no doubt a great invasion of the victim’s family. The parties 
agreed not to disclose the terms of settlement to the media.
3
  
 
In most privacy cases in other jurisdictions, celebrities or entertainers are 
often the victims of breach of privacy, and Malaysia is no exception. The case 
of a local celebrity, Nasha Aziz, an actress and model, is one example. She 
complained that her privacy had been intruded upon when a closed-circuit 
camera (CCTV) was installed in her apartment and videotaped her daily 
routine, which included footage of her undressing. The Magistrate’s Court in 
2004 ruled that the man who installed the camera was guilty of two charges; 
trespassing into the celebrity’s apartment, and intruding upon her privacy by 
installing a closed circuit camera operating between April and July 2002. The 
man was sentenced to six month’s jail for each offence. The appeal against the 
conviction was dismissed. In upholding the sentence, the Court of Appeal 
found that the man’s actions were a great invasion which destroyed the 
actress’s privacy.4 
 
The victims of invasion of privacy cases may take an action against the 
intruder or trespasser for trespassing, but not against the publication of 
photographs. If they do wish to commence such an action, it must be under 
criminal law.
5
 For instance, in 2009, a video of Chua Soi Lek, a Malaysian 
Chinese Association (MCA) high council member having sex with an 
unknown woman, was circulated on the internet. The video was believed to be 
recorded by a hidden camera in the hotel where he was staying. After the 
circulation of the video, Chua Soi Lek admitted that he was the person in the 
                                                          
3
M Mageswari “Nurin’s dad reaches out-of-court settlement in negligence suit against 
government” The Star Online (Malaysia, 29 November, 2010).  
4“Nasha spy camera case: Supervisor loses appeal” The Star Online (Malaysia, 6 October 
2008); See also “Judges send man who fixed spy camera in model’s home to prison” The Star 
Online (Malaysia, 7 October 2008). 
5
For example s 292 of the Penal Code provides an offence relating to sale, distribution, hire or 
offer of obscene books etc. which carries a three year jail term or fine or both and s 509 of the 
same Code which provides penalties for intending to insult the modesty of any person.  
17 
 
video and resigned from his posts in the party after the circulation of the 
video. Police carried out an investigation and warned that it was an offence to 
possess and distribute copies of such DVDs, and that those found guilty of 
doing so would be charged under the obscenity provision of s 292 of the Penal 
Code.
6
 Punishment may deter the offender, but it is doubtful whether it 
compensates for the loss suffered by the subject of the videos. This kind of 
protection is lacking in Malaysia law. 
 
Because the right to privacy is hard to maintain, especially by public figures, 
it means that all aspects of their lives can be shared with the public. In 2008, 
photos of a member of the Bukit Lanjan State Assembly, Elizabeth Wong, 
sleeping naked, were publically circulated by mobile phone and internet. The 
photos were taken by her ex-boyfriend, Hilmi Malik who disappeared after 
the incident. As a result of the release of the photos by unknown persons, she 
resigned from all her posts in the party and state government. However, 
following the request that she remain in office, she revoked her decision and 
retained her positions.
7
 The public release of the photographs was a serious 
breach of her privacy, but even if the culprits were known, no civil action 
could have been taken against them. 
 
In 2010, Noor Haslina received a package containing nine A4-sized sheets of 
paper with information about her short messages services (SMS) exchanges 
and a pen drive recording her phone conversations. She filed a RM20 million 
claim against telecommunication company, Celcom Axiata Berhad for alleged 
breach of privacy involving her SMS exchanges and recordings of her 
telephone conversations, breach of confidence, contract and negligence. 
However, her case was dismissed by the High Court in 2012 because she 
failed to prove that Celcom had revealed her SMS and recordings of her 
                                                          
6
See “Police launch probe, warn of penalties for having video” The Star Online (Malaysia, 2 
January 2008). 
7Christina Tan “Eli Wong back at work” The Star Online (Malaysia, 16 April 2009) and 
“Elizabeth Wong just wants to get back to work” The Star Online (Malaysia, 17 April 2009). 
18 
 
mobile phone conversations to a third party.
8
 This case showed that although 
there was disclosure of private conversations, and that there was a breach of 
an individual’s privacy, she could not maintain any claim due to inadequate 
law in Malaysia.  
 
The above incidents illustrate that in the 21
st
 century, infringements of privacy 
such as disclosure of personal information, intrusion, wiretapping and 
surveillance have become extensive and Malaysia is no exception. These 
infringements are frequently the subject of newspaper headlines.
9
 Apart from 
the above examples, a person’s financial standing, sex life, sexual orientation, 
marital status, health and family and social relationships should not be a 
subject of public discussion. Such public exposure interferes with individual 
privacy and should be actionable unless the discussion is for the interest of the 
public as a whole. These problems are serious as are their consequences. 
Better law is needed to address these issues.  
 
III  The Scope of Research and Aims of Study 
 
This research focuses on the protection of privacy interests in Malaysia. It 
analyses general problems relating to public disclosure of private facts and 
protection against intrusions into for instance, physical space and bodily 
integrity.  Issues such as the adequacy of the existing laws and data protection 
legislation, the competing interests of freedom of expression and limits on 
privacy will be discussed. 
 
The situation in Malaysia is the core of this study, but the UK and New 
Zealand’s legal positions will also be examined. The UK’s position is relevant 
for two reasons. First, it is relevant because of the influence of the English 
                                                          
8M Mageswari “High Court dismisses breach of privacy claims against Celcom Axiata” The 
Star Online (Malaysia, 17 March 2012). 
9
See also Foong Cheng Leong “Right to privacy in Malaysia: Do we have it” The Malaysian 
Insider (Malaysia, 21 Februari 2011). The author gave examples of invasion of privacy 
occurrences in Malaysia.  
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Common Law on the Malaysian legal system before independence.
10
 Until 31 
December 1984 the Privy Council was the highest court of appeal in Malaysia 
pursuant to art 131 of the Federal Constitution (FC). After 1 January 1985, 
appeals to the Privy Council were abolished and the Federal Court became the 
highest court in Malaysia. Since then, reference to English law is made in 
deciding local cases, however, English law is not binding on local courts.
11
 
  
Second, the details of the UK cases are illuminating for Malaysia to develop 
its privacy law. This thesis will analyse the emergence of privacy protection in 
the UK which developed from an action for breach of confidence and examine 
how the UK courts introduced an action for misuse of private information as a 
tool for an action involving breach of privacy
12
. The introduction of the HRA 
has had a significant impact on the development of privacy in the UK. Though 
the right to privacy is recognised through the incorporation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the idea of the HRA creates a 
horizontal application of the right. English courts have not yet recognised an 
“over-arching, all-embracing cause of action for invasion of privacy”, but as 
Campbell v MGN Ltd
13
 and Douglas v Hello Ltd
14
 show, the HRA and the 
ECHR have provided the impetus for expansion of the action for breach of 
confidence to provide remedies to people who complain of wrongful 
publication of private matters. Thus, in spite of courts’ reliance on the HRA, 
the UK’s experience of formulating the element of the action for privacy 
provides useful guidance for Malaysia. 
 
The New Zealand law on privacy is referred to because Malaysia and New 
Zealand are both common law countries with similar legal structures and legal 
values. Each country has developed the law in a way which could be emulated 
in Malaysia but importantly each has taken a slightly different approach. 
Despite the route taken by the English courts in extending the action for 
                                                          
10
Malaysia was a British colony from 1824-1957. 
11
The applicability of English law in Malaysia is discussed in Chapter Three, Part II. 
12
This development is discussed in Chapter Five. 
13
[2004] UKHL 22 (HL) (Campbell). 
14
[2001] QB 967 (CA) (Douglas). 
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breach of confidence to cover misuse of private information, the New Zealand 
courts adopted a completely different approach when the Court of Appeal in 
Hosking v Runting
15
 recognised a tort of invasion of privacy.  It was held that 
the tort would be committed where a defendant published facts about the 
private life of a person, where giving publicity to such facts would be 
considered “highly offensive to an objective reasonable person”. The 
approach of expanding the duty of confidence was rejected on the basis that 
privacy and confidence are different concepts. Eight years later, in 2012, the 
High Court moved a step ahead when it recognised a tort of intrusion upon 
seclusion as part of New Zealand law.
16
 The New Zealand experience of 
judicial activism is practical for Malaysia based on recent Malaysian privacy 
cases that incline towards recognising privacy as a tort.  
 
Both the UK and NZ development in the area of privacy law inspire Malaysia 
to provide better protection in its privacy framework.  
 
This study aims to suggest ways and to develop the law on the protection of 
personal information and protection against intrusion so as to provide a 
comprehensive legislative framework for a privacy action. It assesses the 
existing protection available in the UK and New Zealand to measure its 
effectiveness to address privacy problems in the Malaysian context. It 
analyses what Malaysia can learn from both jurisdictions; they provide 
direction as to what kind of privacy protection should exist in Malaysia. In 
brief, the prime objective of the research is to establish that there are 
inadequacies of privacy protection in Malaysian laws which result in lack of 
remedies to victims in cases of invasion of privacy.  
 
This research will enhance the knowledge of all relevant parties concerning 
various aspects of privacy protection particularly disclosure of private 
information and the protection against intrusion. The outcome of the thesis 
                                                          
15
Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) (Hosking). 
16
See C v Holland [2012] NZLR 672 (HC) (Holland). The details of New Zealand law of 
privacy is discussed in Chapter Six.  
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will not only establish a cause of action in privacy but provide the victim with 
appropriate remedies for the breach. 
 
IV The Structure of Study 
 
This thesis is divided into four parts and contains eight chapters. Part I 
contains Chapters One and Two which introduce the thesis. Part II presents 
current protections in Malaysia which are discussed separately in Chapters 
Three and Four. Part III, Chapters Five and Six, examines comparative 
models for privacy protection in Malaysia. Part IV contains Chapters Seven 
and Eight which present the proposal and conclusion of the thesis. 
 
Chapter One highlights the area of study that focuses on the privacy problems 
in Malaysia and the need for protection in Malaysian law. It reviews general 
problems of privacy and clarifies the objectives of the study: the inadequacy 
of the existing legal framework for privacy protection in Malaysia. It explains 
that the development of the law of privacy in the United Kingdom and New 
Zealand will be examined as possible models for Malaysia.  
 
Chapter Two examines various definitions of privacy in order to establish a 
theoretical framework for privacy. It divides the discussion into a Western 
concept of privacy, an Islamic, and Malaysian perspectives. It also analyses 
categories of privacy and aspects of privacy protection. According to the 
review of the literature, the study defines privacy as unwanted access to a 
person or information about a person. 
 
Chapter Three presents the existing Malaysian legal landscape for privacy 
protection. It begins with a general discussion of the application of English 
common law in Malaysia. It also discusses constitutional protection of privacy 
derived from an entrenched right to life and personal liberty. The existing 
common law principles for privacy related interests such as private facts, 
reputation and proprietary interests are discussed to demonstrate the 
22 
 
inadequacies of current protection. The judicial developments of the right to 
privacy in Sivarasa v Badan Peguam Malaysia
17
 and other privacy cases
18
 are 
also analysed to ascertain the possibility of developing the right in the courts. 
 
Chapter Four examines all legislative protections for privacy in Malaysian 
law. It discusses criminal and other statutory protection that could be invoked 
to protect privacy. It discusses the Personal Data Protection Act 2010 (PDPA), 
the UK Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA), and the New Zealand Privacy Act 
1993 (PA), for the purpose of comparison and the possibility of remedying 
defects in the PDPA in Malaysia. Examination of the law confirms that the 
PDPA is not adequate to protect privacy as defined in Chapter Two. 
 
Chapter Five evaluates the state of privacy, its development and legal 
framework to accommodate privacy in the English law. It examines privacy 
protection through the doctrine of breach of confidence before and after the 
introduction of the HRA. The effect of the incorporation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights on the existing framework is examined. This 
chapter also analyses the development of the law of privacy as effected by 
Douglas
19
 and Campbell
20
 in particular, the tort of misuse of private 
information. It also discusses the utilisation of the test of reasonable 
expectation of privacy in subsequent cases.  
 
Chapter Six focuses on the development of privacy protection in New 
Zealand.  It examines the tort of public disclosure of private facts recognised 
in Hosking v Runting.
21
 The development and application of the tort in 
subsequent cases are analysed. The newly recognised action as highlighted in 
                                                          
17
[2010] 3 CLJ 507 (FC) (Sivarasa). 
18
There are a few cases which discussed privacy as a right in Malaysia, for example, Dr 
Bernadine Malini Martin v MPH Magazines Sdn Bhd & Ors [2006] 2 CLJ 1117 (HC), 
Maslinda Ishak v Mohd Tahir Osman & Ors [2009] 6 MLJ 826, [2009] 6 CLJ 653 (CA), and 
Lee Ewe Poh v Dr Lim Teik Man & Anor [2011] 1 MLJ 835 (HC), and Lew Cher Phow @ 
Lew Cha Paw & Ors v Pua Yong Yong & Anor [2011] MLJU 1195 (HC). 
19
Above n 14. 
20
Above n 13. 
21
[2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) (Hosking). 
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Holland
22
 which extends an aspect of privacy protection to intrusion upon 
seclusion will be examined as this development offers a comprehensive 
protection of privacy interests in current New Zealand law.  
 
Chapter Seven proposes the direction that Malaysia should take, and suggests 
the shape of privacy law for Malaysia as informed by the United Kingdom 
and New Zealand experiences. It concludes that specific legislation on privacy 
is desirable in order to provide adequate protection for privacy. The key part 
of the thesis, is the proposal of a draft Privacy Bill.  The proposed law will 
provide protection to both aspects of privacy, namely personal information 
and intrusions.   Detailed explanations for each clause of the proposed 
legislation are provided in Chapter Seven. The gaps in the Personal Data 
Protection Act 2010 are remedied through the reforms suggested.  
 
Chapter Eight summarises the main issues and presents the results of the 
thesis.  
 
V Summary 
 
The right to privacy is an important right. It needs protection similar to other 
fundamental rights accorded special recognition in the Constitution. The 
absence of a privacy right in the Constitution does not mean that it is totally 
disregarded, as legislation and common law principles are available to protect 
privacy-related interests. However, the availability of privacy related interests 
protection grounded in common law actions for trespass, breach of 
confidence, defamation, breach of contract and passing off have not 
adequately provided remedies for a breach of privacy in Malaysia. 
 
This legal structure is parallel to that of the UK and New Zealand as cases 
involving invasion of privacy have their basis in the common law principles 
for defamation, trespass, nuisance and breach of confidence. Judges often 
                                                          
22
C v Holland, above n 15. 
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refer to existing causes of action rather than formulate a new head of liability. 
However, with the development of case law in the UK and New Zealand 
respectively,
23
 the nature of privacy protection changed when the court 
recognised a tort of unjustified publication of private information and 
intrusion upon seclusion. This recognition has made the question of whether 
there is a right to privacy redundant. The focus is now on protection and the 
ability to provide remedies for cases involving invasion of privacy. The 
developments that have taken place in the UK and New Zealand can provide 
lessons for Malaysians seeking to make similar changes.  
 
The concept of privacy, its scope and the kind of protection Malaysia should 
have for invasion of privacy will be examined in the next chapter in which a 
definition of privacy for the purpose of the thesis will be formulated. 
                                                          
23
The development can be seen in Campbell, Hosking and, Holland. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
PRIVACY FROM DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES 
 
I Overview 
 
Privacy is an elastic concept and difficult to define.
1
 As outlined in Chapter 
One, the aim of this thesis is to offer suggestions for legislating against 
breaches of privacy. However, protection will be meaningless without 
defining what kind of interest is to be protected. The definition of privacy and 
its importance must be established. Western, Islamic and Malaysian concepts 
of privacy will greatly influence the formulation of the meaning of privacy for 
the thesis, and thus establish the shape of privacy protection for Malaysia. 
 
The Western perspective of privacy is useful for the definition of privacy 
developed in the thesis because it appears not to contradict either Islamic 
concepts of public and private affairs or Malaysian custom and tradition. 
Thus, this thesis does not offer a completely new theory of privacy; rather it 
develops what already exists within the Malaysian context. 
 
This chapter is divided into five parts. Part I outlines the subjects of 
discussion in Chapter Two. Part II sketches the general notion of privacy and 
its importance as a human right and a human value. Part III discusses the 
                                                          
1See Robert C Post “Three Concepts of Privacy” (2001) 89 Geo LJ 2087 [“Three Concepts of 
Privacy”]. Post said that “privacy is a value so complex, so entangled in competing and 
contradictory dimensions, so engorged with various and distinct meanings, that I sometimes 
despair whether it can be usefully addressed at all” at 2087; see also Eoin Carolan “The 
Concept of a Right to Privacy” (2011) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1889243>. Carolan 
expressed the view that privacy is a notoriously elastic and equivocal notion; the same was 
claimed by Allen, see Anita L Allen Uneasy Access: Privacy for Women in a Free Society 
(Random and Littlefield, Totowa, 1988); Miller has declared that privacy is “difficult to 
define because it is exasperatingly vague and evanescent”, see Arthur R Miller The assault on 
privacy: computers, data banks, and dossiers (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 
1971). This view was also stated by Daniel J Solove “Conceptualizing Privacy” (2002) 90(4) 
California Law Review 1087, at 1088.  
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Western conception of privacy from the point of view of well-known 
theoretical definitions of the right to be let alone and the right to control 
information and access to the self. It also examines privacy as a state and 
condition of inaccessibility and provides arguments of commentators against 
the “control definition” of privacy. Part IV considers the nature of privacy 
from the Islamic principles of public and private spheres. Part V touches 
generally on Malaysians’ perception of privacy especially from the 
perspective of the traditional Malay society.  Part VI concludes the overall 
discussion of the concept of privacy, provides a definition of privacy for the 
thesis and justifies its importance to every individual who needs protection in 
every aspect of privacy.  
 
II The Notion of Privacy and Its Importance 
 
The right to privacy is a fundamental human right and is recognised in 
numerous international covenants and declarations.
2
 However, Clayton and 
Tomlinson argue that, although most modern international human rights 
instruments protect the right of the individual to “privacy” and “private life”, 
there is no clear definition of the right available.
3
 This argument is well-
founded due to the breadth of the concept of privacy and the absence of a 
general right to privacy in English law. As far as privacy is concerned, 
protection depends on each jurisdiction’s treatment of the right to privacy.4  
                                                          
2
Art 12 of UDHR reads, “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has 
the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks” [Emphasis added]. 
Besides, international treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
1966 (ICCPR), the European Convention on Human Rights 1950, the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Council of Europe and EU Directives 
are the frameworks that provide protection for aspects of privacy rights.  
3
Richard Clayton and Hugh Tomlinson The Law of Human Rights (2
nd
 ed, Oxford University 
Press, 2009) [The Law of Human Rights] at 1005.  
4
For example, there are countries such as India which implicitly recognise the right to privacy 
in the Constitution though it is not specifically mentioned rather it is available through the 
protection of personal rights. On the other hand, the UK law extended the breach of 
confidence action to protect misuse of private information, and the New Zealand courts 
acknowledged privacy as a tort.  
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From a human rights perspective, privacy relates to the idea of liberty which 
is at the heart of freedom, but it is not well established compared to other civil 
rights such as life, liberty, property, religion or freedom from slavery.
5
 It is 
generally agreed by commentators that at the heart of the right to privacy lies 
the notion of personal liberty and autonomy.
6
 That notion offers various 
definitions of privacy and the scope of the right to privacy. In the context of 
human rights law, Clayton and Tomlinson categorise privacy issues under 
four headings:
7
 
 
(a) Misuse of personal information. A right to restrict the use of “personal” 
or “private” information about an individual is central to the right to 
privacy. The information which is held by public bodies is open to abuse. 
Privacy issues arise when the release of the information is uncontrolled. 
(b) Intrusion into the home. The right of the individual to respect for the 
home is fundamental to any notion of privacy. Unreasonable searches 
and seizures trigger privacy issues. 
(c) Photography, surveillance and telephone tapping. The “private sphere” is 
invaded not only by physical intrusion into the home. The right to 
privacy is generally understood to extend to private correspondence. 
(d) Other privacy rights. There is a range of other privacy rights which 
covers all forms of interference in the “private sphere” including 
appropriation of a person’s image, interference with private sexual 
behaviour and questions of the sexual identity of transsexuals. 
 
The above types of privacy concern are broad and require appropriate 
protection for every individual, provided that the privacy interests intended to 
be protected are not inconsistent with the interest of the public at large. This 
balancing of interests justifies the guarantee of freedom and liberty of every 
                                                          
5
Clayton and Tomlinson The Law of Human Rights, above n 3, at 1005. 
6
David Feldman Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales (2
nd
 ed, Oxford 
University Press, 2002), Chap 9; see also E Barendt “Privacy as a Constitutional Right and 
Value” in B Markesinis (ed) Protecting Privacy (Oxford University Press, 1999). See also 
James Q Whitman “The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty” (2004) 
113Yale LJ 1151.   
7
Clayton and Tomlinson The Law of Human Rights, above n 3, at 1007. 
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citizen by the state, and at the same time acknowledges privacy as an 
important human value.  
 
Appreciating the need for an appropriate protection of privacy relates to the 
importance of privacy as a human value with associated attributes of dignity 
and autonomy.
8
 Moreham views privacy as fundamentally connected with 
respect for human dignity and this is the principal reason that it should be 
protected.
9
 She argues that although privacy facilitates many valuable ends, its 
importance lies principally in the fact that it is integrally connected to a 
person’s fundamental entitlement to respect,10 and invasion takes place when 
there is a failure to show “proper regard for human dignity”. 11  The 
categorisation of a “dignitary tort” identified by Cane shows that violation of 
privacy is a violation of human dignity.
12
  
 
Most privacy authors agree that privacy is important because it supports other 
values essential for human flourishing.
13
 Bloustein perceives privacy as an 
aspect of human dignity where damage and loss suffered by invasions of 
privacy cannot be repaired by an award of damages. For him the harm 
resulting from infringement of privacy affects the individual and human 
dignity.
14
 
 
                                                          
8The term autonomy refers to each individual’s capacity to be self-determining, in the sense of 
being free to “live their life in accordance with their own particular ideas of the individual 
good.” Refer Beate Rossler  The Value of Privacy (Polity Press, Cambridge, 2005); see also 
Chris DL Hunt “Conceptualizing Privacy and Elucidating its Importance: Foundational 
Considerations for the Development of Canada’s Fledgling Privacy Tort” (2011) 37(1) 
Queen’s LJ 167 [“Conceptualizing Privacy and Elucidating its Importance”] at 205.  
9NA Moreham “Why is Privacy Important? Privacy, Dignity and Development of the New 
Zealand Breach of Privacy Tort” in Jeremy Finn and Stephen Todd (eds) Law, Liberty, 
Legislation (LexisNexis NZ Limited 2008) [“Why is Privacy Important?”] at 238. 
10
At 231. 
11
At 236. 
12
P Cane The Anatomy of Tort Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1997) at 71-74. 
13
Moreham, “Why is Privacy Important?” above n 9, at 233-234. The author refers to a 
number of commentators that have recognised the relationship between privacy and dignity. 
14
Bloustein “Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity”, above ch 1 n 1, at 1003. He said that 
all invasions of privacy are violations of human dignity.   
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Post regards violation of privacy as the injury of betrayal which comes from 
the violation of confidence. The harm or injury, according to him, derives 
from the rupture of mutual understandings of confidentiality between 
individuals to assumptions that private conversation will not be disclosed.
15
 
Thus, privacy and dignity are closely grounded in social forms of respect 
towards each other as members of a common community.
16
 
 
The importance of privacy has also been considered by courts before 
delivering judgments. For example in Campbell v MGN Ltd,
17
 Lord Hoffman 
acknowledged private information as something worth protecting and 
categorised it as an aspect of human autonomy and dignity:
18
 
 
The new approach...focuses upon the protection of human 
autonomy and dignity — the right to control the 
dissemination of information about one’s private life and the 
right to the esteem and respect of other people. 
  
In the same case, Lord Nicholls perceived privacy in a wider sense, as 
essential for the well-being and development of an individual.
19
 This 
statement suggested that privacy is one of the elements needed to maintain a 
person’s integrity and value for the development of human good.20 
 
                                                          
15Post “Three Concept of Privacy”, above n 1, at 2091-2092. 
16
At 2092. 
17
[2004] UKHL 22 (Campbell). 
18
At [51]. 
19
At [12]. 
20
Hunt “Conceptualizing Privacy and Elucidating its Importance”, above n 8, at 202. The 
author referred to David Lindsay “An Exploration of the Conceptual Basis of Privacy and the 
Implications for the Future of Australian Privacy Law” (2005) 29(1) Melbourne University 
LR 131 and discussed the importance of privacy from deontological and consequentialist 
approaches. Deontologists see privacy as an aspect of dignity, autonomy and personhood, 
while consequentialists perceive the importance of privacy from the promotion of various 
good.  
30 
 
Beside English cases, the European Court of Human Rights in Von Hannover 
v Germany
21
 held that the scope of protection under art 8 of the ECHR:
22
 
 
...includes a person’s physical and psychological integrity... and 
is primarily intended to ensure the development, without outside 
interference, of the personality of each individual in his relations 
with other human beings. 
 
In New Zealand, Tipping J said in Hosking v Runting
23
 in favour of the 
recognition of privacy tort:
24
  
 
It is the essence of the dignity and personal autonomy and well-
being of all human beings that some aspects of their lives should 
be able to remain private if they so wish. 
 
The Malaysian High Court also considers the preservation of human dignity 
when dealing with privacy cases. For example, in Lee Ewe Poh v Dr Lim Teik 
Man & Anor
25
 the court held: 
 
The privacy right of a female in relation to her modesty, decency 
and dignity in the context of the high moral value existing in our 
society is her fundamental right in sustaining that high morality 
that is demanded of her and it ought to be entrenched. Hence, it 
is just right that our law should be sensitive to such rights. In the 
circumstances, the plaintiff in the instant case ought to be 
allowed to maintain such claim.  
 
In another Malaysian case, Lew Cher Phow @ Lew Cha Paw & Ors v Pua 
Yong Yong & Anor
26
 the court held: 
                                                          
21
[2004] VI ECHR (Von Hannover). 
22
At [50].  
23
[2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) (Hosking). 
24
At [239].  
25
[2011] 1 MLJ 835 (HC), at [8].   
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The act of carrying out overt surveillance on the plaintiff carries 
with it an implied threat that the fruits of the surveillance may be 
used for purposes adverse to the interests of the plaintiffs. In 
effect, this is clearly calculated to undermine the plaintiff’s 
dignity, self-esteem, comfort and privacy. The defendants’ 
continuing act of putting the plaintiffs under overt surveillance 
represents a failure of respect for the plaintiffs’ dignity and 
autonomy. 
  
The above cases show that it is generally accepted in both the Commonwealth 
and Malaysia that the importance of privacy lies in the protection of human 
dignity and autonomy, and is regarded as a fundamental consideration in 
deciding adequate protection for breaches of privacy. The significant value 
that attaches to privacy calls for a comprehensible definition of privacy. 
 
Over the last century, there have been many approaches to defining privacy. 
As a result, there are numerous conceptions of privacy advanced by 
commentators and scholars from the famous “right to be let alone”27 to the 
most influential one in modern times of the right to “inaccessibility”.28 This 
next part will discuss these definitions from the Western perspective and 
evaluate which definition is the best in the context of the thesis.  
 
III Western Concepts of Privacy  
 
Privacy has been defined in different ways. The Oxford Dictionaries Pro
29
 
defines privacy as “the state of being private and undisturbed; a person’s right 
to this; freedom from intrusion or public attention”. The definition conveys 
the idea that privacy is the condition of being secluded from the presence or 
                                                                                                                                                       
26
[2011] MLJU 1195 (HC). 
27SD Warren and LD Brandeis “The right to privacy” (1890)(4) Harv Law Review 193, at 
195. 
28Ruth Gavison “Privacy and the Limits of Law” (1980) 89 Yale LJ 421. 
29
The  Oxford Dictionaries Pro < http://english.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/privacy> 
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scrutiny of others. If the affairs of an individual are within the reach and 
knowledge of others, that person is not enjoying privacy as understood by this 
definition. This definition of privacy encompasses the four heads of privacy 
issue discussed by Clayton and Tomlinson.
30
 
 
The first to articulate the concept of privacy as such in modern times
31
 were 
Warren and Brandeis who referred to the right to privacy as the individual’s 
right “to be let alone,”32 a phrase borrowed from Judge Thomas Cooley’s Law 
of Torts.
33
 Cooley referred to the right to privacy as a person’s right of 
complete immunity. The phrase “right to be let alone” is related to the idea of 
liberty, in the sense that an individual has the liberty to choose whether or not 
to permit the publication of facts about themselves. The right encompasses an 
individual right of exclusivity in private life free from any interferences 
effected either directly or indirectly.
34
 According to Warren and Brandeis, the 
underlying principle of privacy was “that of inviolate personality”. 35  The 
value of privacy, as they noted, was not found in the right to take the profits 
arising from publication, but in the peace of mind or the relief afforded by the 
ability to prevent any publication. In other words, the end product of the 
invasion of privacy is rooted in mental pain and distress far greater than could 
be inflicted by mere bodily injury.
36
  
 
The right “to be let alone” as referred to by Warren and Brandeis was 
interpreted by Justice Fortas in Time Inc v Hill as the right “to live one’s life 
as one chooses, free from assault, intrusion or invasion except as they can be 
                                                          
30
Clayton and Tomlinson The Law of Human Rights, above n 3, at 1007. 
31
Historically the notion of privacy has existed at least since 1361, when the Justices of the 
Peace Act in England provided for the arrest of peeping toms and eavesdroppers. Then, in 
Entick v Carrington (1765) St Trials 1029, Lord Camden, striking down a warrant to enter a 
house and seize papers wrote, “We can safely say there is no law in this country to justify the 
defendants in what they have done; if there was, it would destroy all the comforts of society, 
for papers are often the dearest property any man can have.”  
32
Warren and Brandeis, above n 27, at 195. 
33
Thomas M Cooley A Treatise on the Law of Torts (2
nd
 ed, Callaghan, Chicago, 1888). 
34
As discussed in Warren and Brandeis, above n 27, at 195. 
35
At 205.  
36
At 196. 
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justified by the clear needs of community living under a government of 
law”.37  In particular, the right “to be let alone” refers to the privilege of 
planning and shaping one’s own life to do anything one pleases or to go 
anywhere one desires. Thus, if privacy is the right “to be let alone” it makes 
the concept so broad and vague as to embrace all aspects of one’s life free 
from any interference. 
 
It is definitely true that loss of privacy results from a situation of not being left 
alone, but there are instances where a state of not being left alone is not a loss 
of privacy; for example scratching someone on the face which is clearly the 
situation of not letting a person alone, may have nothing to do with loss of 
privacy. Similarly, privacy is not lost when A hits B’s head. A is not letting B 
alone, and B’s right to privacy is not lost, although A may be liable for assault 
and battery. However, the situation would be different if A entered B’s house 
and hit B. This is clearly a situation of not letting someone alone, and 
therefore, of a loss of privacy. 
 
On the other hand, Dean Prosser
38
 believes that Warren and Brandeis are 
wrong and that their analysis of the tort of privacy is mistaken because 
privacy is not an independent value but rather a collection of interests in 
reputation, peace of mind and intangible property.
39
 He states that what is 
involved “is not one tort, but a complex of four.”40 The “four distinct torts” 
are: 
 
(1) Intrusion into seclusion, solitude, or private affairs. The type of interest 
protected is the interest in freedom from mental distress; 
(2) Publication of private facts in which the tort protects the interest in 
reputation; 
                                                          
37
Time Inc v Hill [1967] 385 US 374, at 413. 
 
38William L Prosser “Privacy” (1960) 48(3) California Law Rev 383.  
39
At 384.  
40
At 389. 
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(3) Casting a person in a “false light”. It protects the interest in reputation; 
(4) Appropriation of personality or likeness. The tort protects the proprietary 
interest in name and likeness. 
 
Prosser’s analysis of the privacy cases is remarkable for two reasons: the first 
that there is not a single tort of invasion of privacy, but rather “four distinct 
torts”; the second, that there is no distinctive single value or interest which 
these “distinct torts” protect, and that, in fact, they protect three different 
interests, not one of which can properly be denominated an interest in 
privacy.
41
 For Bloustein, none of the four categories of distinct tort protects 
privacy specifically; rather it transforms into a form of defamation, infliction 
of mental distress and misappropriation.
42
 If Dean Prosser is correct, there is 
no “new tort” of invasion of privacy, there are rather only new ways of 
viewing “old torts”.43 Moreover, the interest in privacy is not an independent 
one, rather it is a composition of values that society holds in preserving 
mental calmness, reputation and dignity as well as other intangible forms of 
property.
44
  
 
Powers’45  view on how privacy is understood and defined is noteworthy. 
According to him, some theorists see privacy within a conceptual point of 
view and develop a conception of privacy in the context of legal theory.
46
 
Through this method, desirable protection could be provided in the context of 
a particular legal jurisdiction.
47
  Others focus on interpretative issues, such as 
the legitimacy of a judicial development of fundamental rights to privacy 
when no explicit reference to it is found within the language or history of the 
                                                          
41As indicated by Bloustein “Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity” above ch 1, n 1, at 966. 
42
At 966. 
43
At 966. 
44
Prosser, above n 38, as highlighted by Bloustein, above ch 1, n 1, at 962, 966.  
45Madison Powers “A Cognitive Access Definition of Privacy” (1996) 15 Law and 
Philosophy 369. 
46
At 369. 
47
Gavison, above n 28, at 423. According to Gavison, privacy must be a concept useful in 
legal context, that enable people to identify those occasions which call for legal protection 
because the law does not interfere to protect against every undesirable event. 
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constitution of a jurisdiction.
48
 This occurs when the right to privacy is not 
specifically given a guarantee in the Constitution. Malaysia is such an 
example. Purely conceptual inquiries, by contrast, concentrate on the search 
for a privacy definition that can be defended on general philosophical grounds 
and used to make sense of the myriad of debates arising within any political or 
legal tradition.
49
 
 
Having discussed privacy generally, two important questions prevail. The first 
relates to the status of the term: is privacy a situation, a right, a claim, a form 
of control, or a value? The second relates to the characteristic of privacy: is it 
related to information, to autonomy, to personal identity, to physical access?
50
 
These questions require further discussion of the concept of privacy to 
determine whether privacy is best understood as a description of (1) a capacity 
for control or (2) a state or condition. The discussion is important because a 
legal conception of privacy must be built on a solid foundation so to exclude 
unnecessary acts being regarded as breaches of privacy. 
 
The following sections discuss privacy authors’ support for the control 
definition of privacy on one hand, and the rejection of the control definition 
on the other hand.  
  
A Support for the control definition 
 
Many commentators regard privacy as control over access to oneself; either to 
information about oneself, to one’s physical self or to both. The protection of 
personal information and protection against intrusion are discussed by 
                                                          
48John Hart Ely “The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v Wade” (1973) 82 Yale LJ 
920; see also Powers, above n 45, at 370. 
49
Powers, above n 45, at 370. 
50
Gavison, above n 28, at 424. 
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scholars including Schoeman,
51
 Parker,
52
 Fried,
53
 Miller,
54
 Beardsley,
55
 
Solove,
56
 Wacks,
57
 Altman
58
 and Gerety.
59
 All perceived privacy as a form of 
control. 
 
The word “control” suggests that a person has the power to influence or the 
ability to manage or to restrain the actions, occurrence of events or behaviour. 
If control is lost, or the subject of the control over the self disappears, privacy 
is said to have been invaded.  
 
Privacy has been identified as the measure of control an individual has over 
(a) information; (b) intimacies of personal identity; or (c) sensory access to 
the person.
60
 In other words, privacy as a form of control equates with an 
individual’s control over access to some aspects of the self. A clear example 
of the concept of privacy as a form of control is Westin’s definition which 
considers information privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or 
institutions to determine for themselves, when, how and to what extent 
information about them is communicated to others.”61 In other words, Westin 
perceived privacy as a claim to control information rather than a state of 
control itself.   
 
                                                          
51 Ferdinand Schoeman “Privacy: Philosophical Dimensions” (1984) 21(3) American 
Philosophical Quarterly 199. The author discussed privacy philosophically from intellectual 
and historical context.  
52
Richard B Parker “A Definition of Privacy” (1974) 27 Rutgers Law Rev 275.  
53Charles Fried “Privacy” (1968) 77(3) Yale LJ 475. 
54
Arthur R Miller The assault on privacy: computers, data banks, and dossiers (University of 
Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1971). 
55Elizabeth Beardsley “Privacy: Autonomy and Selective Disclosure” in (eds) JR Pennock and 
JW Chapmans Privacy and Personality (Transaction Publishers, USA, 1971). 
56
Solove, above n 1. 
57Raymond Wacks “The Poverty of Privacy” (1980) 96 LQR 73. 
58
Irwin Altman “Privacy - A Conceptual Analysis” (1976) 8 Environment and Behaviour 7. 
59Tom Gerety “Redifining Privacy” (1977) 12 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Rev 
233.  
60
Schoeman, above n 51 at 199. 
61
AF Westin Privacy and Freedom (Bodley Head Ltd, London, 1970) at 7. 
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The “control” definition of privacy has been adopted by other writers. Fried 
defines privacy as control over information. For him, privacy is not simply an 
absence of information about people in the minds of others; rather it is the 
control people have over their information.
62
 Control is not simply over the 
quantity of information; it also includes quality of knowledge.
63
 Thus, if 
people know general facts, this might not invade privacy, conversely if details 
are known, this may require protection of privacy. Fried provides an 
interesting example where if A, a casual friend of B, not only knowing that B 
is sick, but knowing also the nature of the illness, and reveals these details, 
such revelation violates B’s privacy. Fried concludes that a person should be 
granted power to control aspects of their environment. This can be done by 
giving the person a legal title to control that which is the least open to 
question and argument.
64
  
 
Another concept of privacy identifies it with control over information about 
oneself. Beardsley equates the right to privacy with the right to selective 
disclosure and explains the latter as the right to decide when and how much 
information may be made known to others.
65
 In other words, a person has a 
right to decide what, when and to whom his or her information may be 
revealed. Beardsley argues that selective disclosure constitutes the conceptual 
core of privacy.
66
 While Beardsley maintains the element of choice or 
selection of information, Miller stresses the “ability to control”, and asserts 
that “the basic attribute of an effective right of privacy is the individual’s 
ability to control the circulation of information relating to him”.67 Thus, Miller 
is in agreement with Fried, and supports privacy as the state of control one has 
over the circulation of personal information as opposed to a claim to control.
68
  
                                                          
62
Fried, above n 53, at 482. 
63
At 483. 
64
At 493. 
65
Beardsley, above n 55, at 65. 
66
At 70. 
67
Miller, above n 1.  
68
At 25. 
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Wacks approaches privacy as an interest claimed by individuals to withhold 
certain information by virtue of its privacy or sensitivity.
69
 Here, the private 
and sensitive characteristics of information make it clear that such information 
will cause an invasion of privacy only if it is known to others. This concept of 
privacy supports the need to defend secret and personal information that no 
one wishes to make public. 
 
According to Parker, privacy is “control over who senses us”.70 He defends 
the view that “privacy is control over when and by whom the various parts of 
us can be sensed by others”. The word “sensed” here refers to the five senses 
of sight, hearing, touch, smell and taste. Though privacy is often used as a 
means of controlling circulation of information about people, yet privacy itself 
is control over who can sense them.
71
  While Fried
72
 views privacy as the 
control a person has over information, Parker stresses the control over a 
person’s physical parts that can be sensed by others.  However, I suggest that 
to confine the definition of privacy to Parker’s notion reduces the flexibility to 
deal with emerging privacy problems.
73
 
 
A further control concept of privacy that has gained increasing support 
identifies it with control over access to the self. Altman
74
 attempts to defend 
the idea that privacy consists of a boundary control process whereby people 
can make themselves accessible to others or close themselves off.
75
 Clearly, 
the idea revolves around the power to exercise complete control one has over 
personal relationships and is not concerned with control over information.  
Indeed, where other scholars focus on the informational aspect of privacy, 
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Altman perceives privacy as control over other privacy aspects, which is an 
intrusion on the self.  
 
To sum up, the proponents of control definition perceive privacy as a form of 
control over personal information as well as to the self or physical parts of a 
person. It is understood, therefore, a privacy breach is said to have occurred 
when a person loses control over either one or both aspects. 
 
B Criticisms of control definition of privacy 
 
This control definition of privacy is criticised by some writers.
76
 They point 
out that control is not a prerequisite, and even that control can be exercised 
without privacy. Examples given by Fried shows that control is neither a 
necessary nor sufficient condition of privacy. The first instance is that of a 
man inadvertently cast on a desert island. He has lost control over who has 
information about him but he nonetheless retains his privacy by virtue of 
being alone on the desert island. Another instance is that of a man who freely 
chooses to divulge personal information. Although he has control over access, 
by disclosing it to certain people of his choice, he lacks privacy because 
others have gained information about him. Schoeman observed, therefore, that 
control is not a sufficient condition for the existence of informational 
privacy:
77
  
 
One difficulty with regarding privacy as a claim or entitlement to 
determine what information about oneself is to be available to others is 
that it begs the question about the moral status of privacy. It presumes 
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privacy is something to be protected at the discretion of the individual 
to whom the information relates. 
 
Miller’s theory of control focuses on information which excludes aspects of 
privacy that are not informational though he fails to define types of 
information over which an individual has control.
78
 The term “information 
relating to him” is too broad to cover all types of general information. Some 
information does not require controlled circulation, and some is specific and 
detailed and circulation would amount to an invasion of privacy.  Solove 
states:
79
  
 
the privacy as control over information theory at most says that we protect as 
private all information over which individuals want to retain control. Privacy, 
however, is not simply a matter of individual prerogative; it is also an issue 
of what society deems appropriate to protect.  
 
Solove comments that Parker’s “control over who senses us” would make 
most interpersonal contact in society a privacy invasion because it brings 
unwanted access to the self. In daily activities, we are frequently seen and 
heard by others without perceiving it as even the slightest invasion of 
privacy.
80
 
 
Parent
81
 argues that the effort to conceive of privacy as a form of control is 
totally wrong. The right to control as he suggests, whether it be over sexual 
matters, personal information, or access to oneself should be seen not as 
constitutive of the right to privacy but as an integral element of the right to 
liberty. Whenever one person or group of persons tries to deprive another of 
control over some aspect of life, this should be recognised as attempted 
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coercion and should be evaluated as such, under the general concept of 
freedom-limiting action.
82
  
 
Gavison’s rejection of the control definition makes it possible to describe 
changes in that condition which count as losses of privacy.
83
 For her, a 
voluntary disclosure of information is not a loss of privacy; rather it is an 
exercise of control. However, a voluntary disclosure may constitute a loss of 
privacy because the disclosure has prevented the owner of the information 
from stopping others from disseminating the information. For example, if A, a 
married man tells B about his affairs with a famous singer who is not his wife, 
A is exercising his power of control over his personal information. At this 
stage he does not suffer any loss of privacy. But, if B informs A’s friend about 
the affairs and the friend passes the news to a colleague, it is a great invasion 
of A’s privacy. 
  
According to Gavison,
84
 the need for privacy has coherence in three different 
contexts. There must be a neutral concept so that a loss of privacy can be 
identified; it must also have coherence as a value, so that an identifiable loss 
of privacy can be considered undesirable in certain contexts and thus worthy 
of legal protection; finally it must have coherence in a legal context since it is 
not possible to provide legal protection against all undesirable events. The 
three different contexts simplified as loss of privacy, invasions of privacy, and 
actionable violations of privacy are linked to the concept of privacy and its 
promotion of liberty, autonomy, selfhood and human relations.
85
   
 
Gavison argues further that “control” suggests that an important aspect of 
privacy is the ability to choose it and ensure that the choice is respected. 
Whatever the choices are, they are consistent with enjoyment of control. 
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Defining privacy in terms of control, therefore, relates it to the power to make 
certain choices rather than how the power is exercised.
86
 
 
There are two reasons why Gavison rejects the control form of privacy. In a 
weak situation of control, she argues that control is not sufficient as a 
description of privacy, for a person only has the control of disclosing or 
withholding information, but others may know the information through other 
means.
87
 Thus, if X who suffers from HIV wants to keep the information to 
himself, he has absolute control by not communicating it to others, but he 
cannot prevent others having access to that information if through his 
carelessness, Y discovers that his patient or medication card classifies X as 
HIV positive. On the other hand, through a stronger sense of control, loss of 
privacy is possible when there is only a threat of such loss.
88
 For example, if a 
person voluntarily announces his love affairs with someone and no one is 
interested, his privacy may be lost if the information is conveyed to others 
against his wishes, despite the fact that he is only exercising his power to 
control the disclosure of the information.     
 
The unsuitability of the control definition for privacy is also discussed by 
Moreham.
89
 According to her, control over access to a person can be lost even 
though no access is actually gained. As Gavison points out,
90
 a strong sense of 
control may be a sign of loss of privacy when in fact there is only a threat of 
such a loss. Thus, by employing the control definition, there is a failure to 
distinguish between situations where there is a risk of unwanted access, and 
those where unwanted access has in fact been obtained.
91
 The following 
                                                          
86
At 423. 
87
At 427. 
88
At 427. 
89NA Moreham “Privacy in the Common Law: A Doctrinal and Theoretical Analysis” (2005) 
121 LQR 628 [“Privacy in the Common Law”].  
90
Gavison, above n 46 at 427, Discussed also by Moreham, above n 89, at 638. 
91
Moreham, above n 89 at 638. Moreham gave an example of an internet hacker to illustrate 
this point. See also Hunt “Conceptualizing Privacy and Elucidating its Importance”, above n 8 
at 184-187. The author referred to Moreham. According to Hunt, there are three significant 
43 
 
example may be useful. If an employer has installed a device in his 
employee’s computer to monitor and track all personal activities, the 
employee has lost control over his activities via computer, and has, therefore, 
lost his privacy, even though it is merely an installation because the employer 
has never activated the device. Moreover, the difficulty of the control 
definition is found in the exercise of control over information itself because 
the disclosure of personal information involves a simultaneous exercise and 
relinquishment of control. Thus, to maintain privacy within the control 
definition is to refrain from disclosing information to anyone.
92
   
 
The criticism of the control conception of privacy leads to a formulation of 
another description of privacy: a state or condition of limited access to one or 
more aspects of a person. 
 
C Privacy as a state or condition 
 
The discussion above argues that privacy cannot be described as a form of 
control because loss of that control does not necessarily result in a loss of 
privacy. So, if privacy is not about control, how is it to be described?   
 
The interest in privacy relates to the concern about conditions of life, 
particularly the extent to which persons are known to others, physical access 
others have to them, and the degree to which they are the subject of others’ 
attention.
93
 Hence, there are scholars who conceive of privacy as a state or 
condition, not a form of control or a right. 
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Gross suggests that privacy is a state of affairs: the condition of life in which 
acquaintance with persons, or with affairs of their lives is limited.
94
 Common 
practices in society preserve such a condition; for example, curtains, bedroom 
doors, locked cabinets, and clothes indicate the concern for privacy. Thus, 
concern for privacy is the concern for a state of affairs, not merely a claim for 
privacy as it is understood from Westin’s definition. 95  Gross further 
emphasises essential features of privacy such as physical solitude, physical 
exclusiveness, and autonomy.
96
 These terms designate privacy as a state of 
affairs and cannot be referred as claim or control. 
 
Parent proposes privacy as “the condition of not having undocumented 
personal information about oneself known by others”.97 Personal information 
is understood to consist of facts about a person which he or she at any time 
does not want widely known. Most persons in a given society choose not to 
reveal about themselves (except perhaps to close friends or family) facts about 
which they are acutely sensitive even though some people do not care if these 
same facts about themselves are widely known.
98
  
 
The above discussion suggests that privacy is actually a situation of being 
inaccessible to others and is more than a control one has over personal 
information or physical being. That is to say, the control definition of privacy 
implies an objective control an individual has over privacy aspects, but, 
privacy as a condition or a state, on the other hand, encompasses situations 
beyond a claim or a control. 
 
                                                          
94
 Hyman Gross “The concept of privacy” (1967)(42) NYUL Rev 34 at 37-38. 
95Westin has defined privacy as the “claim of individuals, groups or institutions to determine 
for themselves when, how and to what extent information about them is communicated to 
others”. See above n 61, at 7. 
96
Gross, above n 93. 
97
Parent, above n 76 at 306. 
98
At 307. Thus, Parent excludes knowledge of documented personal information from his 
definition of privacy. Information of public records such as in newspapers, court proceedings 
and government archives will not attract any liability for invasion of privacy because they are 
documented form of information.  
45 
 
D Inaccessibility 
 
Privacy as a state of affairs is a condition of limited access to one or more 
aspects of a person. Privacy is thus a consequence of inaccessibility, and loss 
of privacy is loss of inaccessibility.
99
  
 
Accessibility and inaccessibility are two components of privacy. Moreham 
defines privacy as the state of “desired inaccess”, or as “freedom from 
unwanted access”.100 Thus, if a person is seen, heard, touched or found out 
only to the extent that he or she wants to be seen, heard, touched or found out 
about, that person is said to be in a state of privacy. A person is “in private” if 
others respect his or her wishes to be free from outside access to his or her 
personal information. Thus, according to Moreham there are two aspects of a 
privacy definition - access and a desire not to be accessed.
101
 
 
It is interesting to assess Moreham’s element of “desire” in her definition of 
privacy. “Desire” connotes a strong feeling of wanting to have something or 
wishing for something to happen.
102
 According to her, the desire element 
recognises that self-disclosure is a breach of privacy only if the person 
concerned does not want it to occur.
103
 In my opinion, “desired inaccess” 
implies the element of choice that an individual has in relation to disclosure of 
personal statement or access to the self. For example, A has a choice of 
whether or not to tell the facts about her financial status to B, a close friend, 
but there are two implications as a result of A’s choice. First, if A discloses 
them and B disseminates the information to another friend, C, A’s privacy is 
invaded. Second, if A keeps the information to herself and has no desire to 
make it known to others, A is enjoying privacy.  
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What is then meant by “access”? In Moreham’s view access means perceiving 
a person with one’s senses (ie seeing, hearing, touching, smelling or tasting), 
obtaining physical proximity to him or her, and obtaining information about 
him or her.
104
 Thus photographing a person, installing a CCTV in a house, 
recording a person’s activity in private places are examples of access which if 
unwanted, are clearly breaches of privacy.  
 
While Moreham focusses on the inaccessibility and desire to reveal or conceal 
the state or condition of a person, Gavison views privacy in relation to 
concept and value. Concept identifies loss of privacy neutrally and 
descriptively, whereas value refers to privacy in terms of reasons for its 
protection. 
 
Gavison
105
 and Garrett
106
 defend the definition of privacy which equates it 
with the limitation of access to the self. This definition is in one way broader 
than Altman’s who argues that privacy consists of a boundary control process 
whereby people can choose to make themselves accessible to others or close 
themselves off since exercising autonomy is one way of ensuring distance. 
Thus, on the basis of this theory, every citizen has the right to keep their 
affairs to themselves and to decide to what extent the same shall be the subject 
of public scrutiny and discussion.  
 
E Elements of accessibility 
 
If privacy is a consequence of inaccessibility, there must be requirements for 
such a state of inaccessibility. I believe that Gavison’s description of the state 
of privacy is the most satisfactory one. She defines privacy as “a limitation of 
others’ access to an individual”107. It is a situation whereby an individual 
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enjoys perfect privacy when that individual is completely inaccessible to 
others. A loss of privacy occurs when others obtain information about an 
individual, pay attention to, or gain access to that individual.
108
  
 
The limited access conception of privacy is a state of being protected from 
unwanted access by others either by physical access, personal information or 
attention.  Gavison argues that privacy as a broad concept contains three 
elements: secrecy, anonymity and solitude. In her words:
109
 
 
secrecy, anonymity and solitude are shorthand for the extent to 
which an individual is known, the extent to which an individual 
is the subject of attention and the extent to which others have 
physical access to an individual. 
 
The concept of privacy as “limited access” to the self has been recognised as 
the individual’s desire for concealment and for being apart from others. 110 
This concept has been widely discussed in Gavison’s theory of access. These 
categories of access are distinct and independent, but interrelated.
111
 
 
Secrecy of certain matters in relation to privacy is the non-disclosure of 
concealed information. According to Posner:
112
 
 
The word “privacy” seems to embrace at least two distinct interests. One 
is the interest in being left alone — the interest that is invaded by the 
unwanted telephone solicitation, the noisy sound truck, the music in 
elevators, being jostled in the street, or even an obscene theatre billboard 
or shouted obscenity…The other privacy interest, concealment of 
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information, is invaded whenever private information is obtained against 
the wishes of the person to whom the information pertains. 
 
When information about an individual is known, that individual loses privacy. 
That is what Gavison means when she refers privacy as secrecy. According to 
her, secrecy is largely connected with information privacy, where a loss of 
privacy occurs when others obtain information about an individual. Unless 
this information is considered at least partly determinative of the degree of 
privacy an individual has, these cases cannot be described as involving losses 
of privacy.
113
  
 
However, there are scholars who argue that there is no loss of privacy when 
information about an individual becomes known. Gerety
114
 argues that 
information is part of privacy only if it is “private” and related to intimacy, 
identity and autonomy. Information which is general and not private when 
publicised, does not entail loss of privacy.
115
 In this connection, Parker 
advocates that there are situations when loss of control over information does 
not mean loss of privacy. An example given was an examination in which it 
was revealed the student did not study.
116
 
 
While most theorists recognise the disclosure of certain secrets to be a 
violation of privacy, many commonly recognise privacy invasions do not 
involve the loss of secrecy. Solove comments that to view secrecy as a 
common denominator of privacy makes the definition privacy too narrow.
117
 
Linking privacy with secrecy results in a failure to recognise what information 
individuals want to keep private from some people but not from others.
118
 For 
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example, if an employee criticises a policy adopted by the manager at his 
workplace to a fellow employee, he does not want his criticism known by the 
manager, but does not care if it is known to other employees.  
 
The second category of access highlighted by Gavison is anonymity. 
Anonymity in relation to privacy is not an issue of not being identifiable by 
name, but rather of being the subject of attention. A person is said to lose 
privacy when he becomes the subject of attention.
119
 Though the person’s 
name is not known, other facts may be known such as the place of living, 
work, hobbies and interests which can identify them or to make them 
recognisable to others. All facts taken together means that attention is paid to 
the person which amounts to an invasion of privacy. Discussion may involve 
loss of privacy by communicating information about a person, or by creating 
an interest in the person under discussion that may itself lead to more 
attention. This activity may in turn produce a further loss of privacy if new 
information is obtained.
120
 
 
The last category of access is solitude in which individuals lose privacy when 
others gain physical access to them. Physical access connotes physical 
proximity that is close enough to touch or observe through normal use of the 
senses.
121
 In this sense, an intrusion on privacy takes place not because more 
information has been acquired or more attention has been drawn to the person, 
but that the individual’s spatial needs have been diminished. 
 
This concept of privacy as secrecy, anonymity and solitude is coherent 
because all are part of the same notion of accessibility and are related in many 
important ways. A good example is the psychiatrist who sits next to his 
patient and listens to him, and acquires information about the patient, pays 
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attention to him and has physical access to him.
122
 The example shows that all 
three elements may coexist in the same situation. However, none of the three 
elements is the necessary companion of the other two. This may be illustrated 
in a situation in which a person becomes the subject of attention. In this 
regard, information about the person is acquired and thus results in loss of 
privacy. Nonetheless, the information is obtained without involving physical 
proximity to the person.  
 
Having discussed all the elements, their importance is acknowledged in 
determining privacy both from theoretical and practical legal perspectives. A 
law of privacy should address these aspects in providing protection from 
invasion.  
 
F Intrusion 
 
Gavison’s theory of accessibility that relates to protection against intrusion is 
explained by the elements of anonymity and solitude. Although the concept of 
anonymity does not involve any physical touch, to become a continual subject 
of attention interferes with a person’s privacy. For example, if a person is 
continually followed, stared at, listened to, and observed in any other way, 
that person’s privacy is said to have been invaded. 
 
In the intrusion of solitude, physical access has been obtained by others which 
constitutes an invasion of a person’s privacy. For example, a stranger who 
gains access to a room to see a person undress or to record a video of that 
person having a shower, or access to a labour room to watch a woman giving 
birth are examples of intrusion upon seclusion and, therefore, breaches of 
privacy.  
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Moreham refers to this as physical inaccess, that is the absence of access to 
one’s person (or to things closely associated with one’s person such as one’s 
house, clothes or wallet) either through the use of the senses or through 
unwanted physical proximity. For example, if A installs a CCTV in B’s house 
and captures all B’s activities, A is said to interfere with B’s physical privacy. 
According to Moreham, these physical privacy interests are an integral part of 
the privacy concept.
123
  
 
Allen
124
 claims that a person is physically inaccessible if she cannot be 
experienced through one of the five senses. According to her, a person is 
dispositionally inaccessible when her states of mind cannot be detected. States 
of mind include beliefs, desires and preferences. A person is informationally 
inaccessible when facts about her are unknown or unknowable. She further 
claims that “inaccessibility in one respect does not always entail privacy in 
other respects”.125 
 
A number of commentators
126
 recognise that a comprehensive definition of 
privacy must accommodate both physical and informational privacy interests. 
In other words, it must protect individuals against the unwanted watching, 
listening, touching etc as well as against the unwanted acquisition and 
dissemination of private information.
127
 
 
In the context of this thesis, unwanted access to the self or the body implies 
the act of intruding upon a person’s interest in privacy. “The self” implies 
wider coverage than “the body” to include an individual’s personality, 
feelings, perspectives and thinking whereas “the body” refers to the physical 
manifestation of a person. In this relation, a physical intrusion occurs when 
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there is unwanted or undesired access to a person. Thus, a claim of invasion of 
privacy is maintained in this situation.  
 
IV Privacy and Private Matters in Islam 
 
Having discussed the concept and definition of privacy in the West, it is 
important to examine the same from Islamic perspective. Such a discussion is 
relevant to determine whether the basis for the concept of privacy in Islam is 
consistent with the Western concept.  
 
In this part, the concept of privacy and private matters in Islam will be 
discussed and some Quranic verses are highlighted as the basis for the 
protection of privacy. The division between public and private spheres is 
examined to ascertain what is private to Muslims and therefore requires 
appropriate protection.   
 
Privacy is very important in Islam and the right to privacy is one of the most 
precious freedoms, most comprehensive and respected of rights.
128
 In Islam, 
privacy and good manners in public contribute to the highest virtues, and are 
parts of a Muslim’s duty.129  
 
Although Muslim scholars’ engagements with the Islamic notion of privacy is 
lacking compared with ideas and arguments of Western scholars on 
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privacy,
130
 there is, to a certain extent agreement among Western and Islamic 
jurists that the domestic sphere ought to be legally safeguarded because of the 
importance of domestic privacy.
131
 On this basis, it is essential to differentiate 
between the private and the public spheres as they relate to the protection of 
an individual’s privacy.  
 
Alshech’s analysis of the Islamic references shows that the vast majority of 
Muslim scholars living between the seventh and the fifteenth centuries C.E. 
did not articulate any explicit notion of privacy. However, this fact did not 
prevent them from compiling laws relating to the protection of homes, bodies, 
private information, private affairs and peace of mind.
132
 In the early period of 
Islam, scholars viewed the private sphere as a realm within which a person 
and his family should be protected from public humiliation. Based on this 
view, people were allowed to conceal information about themselves, such as 
information about immoral behaviour, illegal acts and intimate body parts. 
Thus, Alshech believed that the early conception of privacy encompassed a 
limited set of freedoms and protections, and the sphere of privacy was 
relatively narrow in scope.
133
  
   
Significantly after that period, the Islamic notion of privacy has developed 
beyond the limited realm of protecting one’s reputation to include more 
general control of personal information and limited access to all personal 
matters.
134
 According to Alshech, the private sphere is defined by the desires 
of individuals, so that jurists make laws to safeguard those matters that a 
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person would want to conceal from others.
135
 The expansion of the private 
spheres definition has not altered the ultimate aim of privacy in Islam, that is, 
a means of protecting and preserving other important values including a 
person’s reputation, healthy social relations and household stability.136  
 
In relation to public and private spheres in Islam, Kadivar cited three 
meanings of private given by Boruch:
137
 
 
First, that which is personal or exclusive to the individual; 
second, that which one would rather keep concealed and 
protected from others; and third, that over which the 
individual should exercise exclusive authority and control.  
 
Kadivar defined “private” as a situation when an issue is kept hidden and 
inaccessible to others, and falls exclusively within the decision-making 
authority of an individual.
138
 This definition suggests that people have an 
absolute choice to decide which part of them is accessible to others and which 
part may be shared. One’s private wishes, desires, hopes and most of one’s 
personal memories, therefore, may fall into this sphere. Privacy is the sole 
prerogative of the individual, and others may not decide for or even offer 
advice regarding matters in the private sphere.
139
  
 
According to Sharia standards, the prima facie status of every matter is 
private; the assumption is that all matters belong to the private domain unless 
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and property, housing and occupation, religion and ideology, body and clothing, political 
subscriptions and social affiliations. 
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proven otherwise.
140
 Individuals are entitled to decide their affairs themselves, 
and any interference requires proof that such issues belong to public concern. 
This principle implies that no one has the right to interfere in the affairs of an 
individual without specific permission.
141
  
 
On the other hand, in the public sphere in principle, nothing is kept secret 
from citizens: the management, improvement and alteration of the public 
sphere are the prerogative of the citizenry.
142
 In other words, the public 
domain is the sphere of influence for governmental authority and jointly 
owned by all citizens. By analogy, all information in the public sphere is 
placed in a transparent container whose contents are in everyone’s plain 
view.
143
 
 
In accordance with the two criteria of public and private spheres, Islamic 
jurisprudence has fully acknowledged the sanctity of the private domain. For 
example, in the Holy Quran, it is stated very clearly that an individual’s 
privacy is guaranteed and no one should invade it without permission:
144
  
 
O ye who believe! Enter not houses other than your own, 
until ye have asked permission and saluted those in them: that 
is best for you, in order that you may heed (what is seemly.) 
If ye find no one in the house, enter not until permission is 
given to you: if you are asked to go back, go back: that makes 
for greater purity for yourselves: and Allah knows well all 
that ye do. 
                                                          
140
At 663. 
141
At 663. 
142
At 662. 
143
At 662.  
144
Abdullah Yusuf Ali The Holy Quran: Text, Translation and Commentary (Amana 
Corporation, USA, 1989) [The Holy Quran]. See The Holy Quran (An-Nur 24:27-28). See 
also (Al-Baqarah 2:189) “They ask thee concerning the New Moons. Say: They are but signs 
to mark fixed periods of time in (the affairs of men), and for Pilgrimage. It is no virtue if ye 
enter your houses from the back: It is virtue ye fear Allah. Enter houses through proper doors: 
and fear Allah that ye may prosper.”  
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There are a number of verses in the Holy Quran stressing the sanctity of home 
and personal life, and the importance of the human right to privacy. The 
Quran stipulates clear commandments of not entering into the house of others 
unless permission is manifestly given. And whenever a person has permission 
to enter a house, it is important to enter properly.
145
  
 
Hayat stresses
146
 that Islam orders that no one inquire into the private matters 
of others, and strictly prohibits prying into these matters. If someone happens 
to come across private information, further disclosure of that information is 
not permitted. Any information about an  individual should not be discussed 
or revealed in public whether or not it is true, without the consent of the 
person concerned. Managing the affairs of the private domain is the exclusive 
right of the individual.
147
 In contrast, there is no protection of privacy for the 
publication of private information which is already in the public domain. 
 
In the Hadith,
148
 the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) has reported that a person 
who attacks an intruder to prevent him from spying on his private home is not 
liable for punishment for the attack. The Hadith implies that the act is justified 
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The Holy Quran.  See also, Alschech “Do not Enter Houses Other than Your Own”, above 
n 130. 
146MA Hayat “Privacy and Islam: From the Quran to Data Protection in Pakistan” (2007) 16 
(2) Information and Communications Technology Law 137. 
147
At 137-138. See also The Holy Quran, above n 144 (Al-Hujuraat 49:12) “O ye who 
believe! Avoid suspicion as much (as possible) for suspicion in some cases in a sin: And spy 
not on each other, nor speak ill of each other behind their backs. Would any of you like to eat 
the flesh of his dead brother? Nay, ye would abhor it, but fear Allah: for Allah is Oft-
Returning, Most Merciful.” For further discussion of the concept of a private domestic sphere; 
see also Alshech “Out of Sight and Therefore Out of Mind”, above n 130.  
148
The Hadith is the record of the exclusive sayings of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). The 
sayings and conduct of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) constitute the Sunnah. The Hadith has 
come to supplement the Holy Quran as a source of the Islamic religious law. The Hadith is the 
second pillar after the Quran upon which every Muslim rests his faith. See Mohammad 
Hashim Kamali Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (Cambridge, UK, Islamic Texts Society, 
2003), at 49. 
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in protecting the sanctity of a private place. It is narrated from Abu Hurairah 
that the Prophet said:
149
 
 
He who looked at the inside of person’s house without his 
permission and his eyes were gouged, has no right to blood 
money nor punishment over them.  
 
Preserving one’s chastity and modesty is also an important aspect of privacy 
protection in Islam. The teaching places great emphasis on dress for men and 
women in order to protect their dignity and honour and safeguard privacy. 
However, a greater amount of privacy is required for women than men. The 
Holy Quran states:
150
 
 
Say to the believing men that they should lower their gaze 
and guard their modesty that will make for greater purity for 
them: and Allah is well acquainted with all that they do. 
 
And say to the believing women that they should lower their 
gaze and guard their modesty, that they should not display 
their beauty and ornaments except what (must ordinarily) 
appear thereof, that they should draw their veils over their 
bosoms and not display their beauty except to their husbands, 
their fathers, their husbands’ fathers, their sons, their 
husbands’ sons, their brothers or their brothers’ sons, or their 
sisters’ sons, or their women, or the slaves whom their right 
hands possess, or male servants free of physical needs, or 
small children who have no sense of the shame of sex and 
that they should not strike their feet in order to draw 
attention to their hidden ornaments. And O ye believers! 
Turn ye all together towards Allah, that ye may attain bliss. 
                                                          
149
Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah Turuq al-hukmiyyah translated by Ala’eddin Kharoffa 
(International Law Book Services, Kuala Lumpur, 2000). See also Zainal Amin Ayub and  
Zuryati Mohamed Yusoff  “Leave me Alone!: Syariah v Civil Law” [2007] MLJ xcix. 
150
The Holy Quran, above n 144, (An Nur 24: 30-31). 
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The importance of women’s attire also relates to the image of the female 
Muslim so that they are easily recognised and protected from being 
improperly approached by men. The Holy Quran states:
151
 
 
O Prophet! Tell thy wives and daughters and the believing 
women, that they should cast their outer garments over their 
persons (when abroad): that is most convenient, that they should 
be known (as such) and not molested. And Allah is Oft-
Forgiving, Most Merciful. 
 
According to Berween,
152
 although the right to privacy is fundamental in 
Islam, it is not absolute. If there is a compelling reason warranting the 
violation of privacy, the government has the right to intervene, but no 
deprivation of the right should occur without due process of law.
153
 This is in 
line with the protection of privacy upheld in human rights documents where 
exceptions to the right are clearly emphasised to highlight any limitations of 
the right.
154
 In this regard, Hayat views privacy not as an individual or 
religious concern but rather the right of the individual to be respected by the 
state and government. One of the companions of the Holy Prophet reports-
155
 
 
Hadrat Umar bin Khattab, the second caliph, was roaming in 
the city one night when he heard shouting and cursing 
coming from a residence; he then peeked over the perimeter 
and started admonishing the man: ‘You, the sinner, do you 
think that God will ignore your sins, as you’re sinning 
against him?’ The man replied: ‘Woe, commander of the 
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The Holy Quran, above n 144, (Al Ahzab  33:59). 
152
Berween, above n 128. 
153
At 73. 
154For example art 8(2) of the ECHR provides that “There shall be no interference by a public 
authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and are 
necessary is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public 
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. 
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As discussed in Hayat, above n 146, at 140-141. 
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faithful, do not rush to judgment; if I sinned once, you sinned 
three times. God has forbidden you to look into someone’s 
fault and you have done otherwise. God has commanded you 
to enter peoples’ homes through the front door, and you have 
intruded over the fence. And you have approached me 
without salutation, and God has commanded you not to enter 
into other peoples’ home without their permission, and 
without saying greetings (salam) when you enter their 
premises.   
 
The Caliph Umar asked for the man’s forgiveness, was granted it and went on 
his way. This shows that private life, private information and the affairs of the 
individual are left to the individual’s control and no one, not even the 
government, has the authority to inquire or investigate an individual’s private 
domain.
156
  
 
The above discussion shows that the concept of privacy in Islam is not so 
different from Western principles. The importance of dignity, the protection 
of modesty, and a clear division of private and public matters, which are the 
underlying basis for the protection of privacy in Islam have all been discussed 
in the West when defining privacy and providing its protection. 
 
The following part discusses privacy from a Malaysian perspective, 
particularly that of the Malays, in order to determine relevant protection for 
privacy in Malaysia.    
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V Privacy from a Malaysian Perspective 
 
Malaysia has a multi-cultural and multi-racial population consisting of 
Malays, Chinese, Indians and numerous indigenous peoples.
157
 Malays and 
indigenous people comprise 67.4% of the population, 24.6% are Chinese, 
7.3% are Indians and other ethnicities comprise 0.7%.
158
  With such a varied 
ethnic composition, a great diversity of religions prevails throughout 
Malaysia. Although Islam is the official religion,
159
  and the most widely 
professed religion with the proportion of 61.35%, all other religions including 
Buddhism (19.8%), Christianity (9.2%) Hinduism (6.3%) and tribal religions 
are practised freely.
160
 
 
There is a strong link between the country’s multi-racial and multi-cultural 
combination and its history. Besides the local Malays and the native groups, 
immigrants from China, India, and other parts of the world have contributed 
to the multi-racial composition of the population. The country’s cultural 
diversity can be largely attributed to its long and on-going interaction with the 
outside world and colonial rule by the Portuguese, Dutch and the British.
161
 
                                                          
157
The Orang Asli are the indigenous peoples or native groups of Peninsular Malaysia. 
Anthropologists and government officials have traditionally regarded the Orang Asli as 
consisting of three main groups, comprising several distinct sub-groups: Negrito (Semang), 
Senoi and Aboriginal-Malay. In Sarawak, the indigenous peoples are collectively called 
Orang Ulu or Dayak and include the Iban, Bidayuh, Kenyah, Kayan, Kedayan, Mu-rut, 
Punan, Bisayah, Kelabit, Berawan and Penan. The 39 different indigenous ethnic groups in 
Sabah are called natives or Anak Negeri.(Source: 
http://www.iwgia.org/regions/asia/malaysia/877-update-2011-malaysia). 
158
(Source: Bureau of East Asian & Pacific Affairs), as at March 2012. See also  (Source: 
Population Distribution and Basic Demographic Characteristics 2010, Department of Statistic 
Malaysia , Chart 7: Percentage Distribution of the Population by the Ethnic Group, Malaysia 
2010). 
http://www.statistics.gov.my/portal/download_Population/files/census2010/Taburan_Pendudu
k_dan_Ciri-ciri_Asas_Demografi.pdf 
159
Article 3(1) of the Federal Constitution provides that “Islam is the religion of the 
Federation; but other religions may be practised in peace and harmony in any part of the 
Federation”. 
160
Above n 158. 
161
Foreign colonisation of Malaysia began when it was conquered by the Portuguese (1511-
1641), followed by the Dutch (1641-1824), then occupation by the British (1824-1942). The 
country was under Japanese occupation from 1942-1945 before it came under the British rule 
again in 1945 until its independence in 1957.   
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This has resulted in its unique blend of religions, socio-cultural activities, 
customs and traditions, dress and costume, languages and perspectives. The 
value of privacy is reflected in every aspect of the population’s daily 
transactions.  
 
Islam in Malaysia is thus closely associated with the Malay people. A Malay is 
defined in the Constitution as “a person who professes the religion of Islam, 
habitually speaks the Malay language, conforms to Malay custom”. 162 
According to Abdul Hamid, this definition suggests that the first test of a 
person’s race is his religion, and that this provision is unique.163  
 
In Malaysian society where moral principles and values are highly upheld and 
preserved, privacy as a basic human value is not an alien concept. The concept 
of privacy underpins traditional Malay cultures in terms of individual 
personality and social interactions. Communities in Malaysia are often close 
knit, with communal needs, necessities and requirements transcending those 
of individuals. Extended families, tight communities, and tribal customs often 
mean that the communal understanding of individual privacy is 
underdeveloped. However, urbanisation and progress, and the attendant 
migration to bigger cities have, to a certain extent, broken the traditional 
patterns of communities.  
 
For example, in traditional Malay society, privacy needs are related to beliefs, 
values and norms which are largely supported by Islamic laws.
164
 In terms of 
family privacy, women are protected from being seen by visitors in the front 
area of the house. It is the customary practice, as well as Islamic teaching, that 
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Article 160 of the Federal Constitution.  
163Abdul Hamid Mohamed “Harmonization of Common Law and Shariah in Malaysia: A 
Practical Approach” (Abd Razzaq Al-Sanhuri Lecture, Islamic Legal studies Program, 
Harvard Law School, 6 November 2008). 
164
Zainal Kling “The Malay family: Beliefs and realities” (1995) 26 (1) Journal of 
Comparative Family Studies, 43 at 60. The writer’s view was that the Islamic laws, in 
particular the family laws are to a large extent coterminous with Malay custom. 
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women and men are separated in all formal social interaction. This is a 
reflection of the social norms restricting male-female relationships between 
family and non-family members, relatives, guests and visitors.
165
  
 
This traditional concept has influenced the traditional Malay house and 
settlement.
166
 Building elements in all Muslim houses play an important role 
in providing privacy in traditional Malay houses. For example, several 
elements such as house planning, layout and the relationship between spaces, 
the position of women, and the segregation of men and women are influenced 
by the concept of privacy.
167
 Spaces are arranged to avoid direct views into 
the house and to provide privacy for the female household performing 
everyday activities, even in the presence of male visitors.
168
     
 
Malay society regards behavioural norms as important privacy regulating 
mechanisms.
169
 Traditional values of budi (etiquette) and bahasa (language) 
regulate behaviour in the close-knit Malay society. The term budi bahasa 
sums up the kind of proper behaviour an individual should display both in the 
privacy of family life and in public, such as not prying into the private matters 
of others, giving salutations, and asking permission before entering other 
people’s houses, not looking into other people’s houses, as well as rules on 
clothing and interaction. The observation of accepted behavioural patterns 
indirectly provides privacy for the community at large. This is much in line 
with morality as enjoined by Islamic teachings.
170
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Ahmad Harizal H, Zaiton AR, Sharifah Norazizan SAR and Nurizan Y “Visual privacy and 
family intimacy, A case study of Malay inhabitants living in two storey low-cost terrace 
housing” (2006) 33 Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design, 301. 
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At 301.  
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See T Burckhardt Art of Islam: Language and Meaning (Westerham Press, Edenbridge, 
Kent, 1976); G Mitchell Architecture of the Islamic World (Thames and Hudson, London, 
1987) and Mohamad Tajuddin MR Essays on Architecture Volume 1 (Universiti Teknologi 
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 Harizal et al, above n 165 at 305. 
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 Zainal, above n 164, at 60. 
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 At 60. 
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In term of costume and dress, Malay women wear the baju kurung which is a 
knee-length blouse worn over a long skirt. The head is covered with a scarf or 
shawl. Such an outfit is worn to cover specific parts of the body (‘aurah) and 
to protect women’s honour and dignity. Malay men can wear anything but 
should cover themselves from navel to the knee.
171
  
 
Malaysian culture has played a significant role in shaping attitudes and 
perspectives of privacy. Traditional Malay values relating to privacy reveal its 
connection to Islamic ideas of privacy mentioned in the Holy Quran more 
than 1400 years ago.
172
  
 
VI Conclusion 
 
A vast amount of existing literature reveals that the notion of privacy, its 
conceptualisation and theory is problematic. Various definitions have been 
proposed for privacy which may encompass both physical and informational 
aspects. Some scholars perceive it as a form of control, while others believe it 
to be a state or condition of life. 
 
Privacy is a socially generated need which involves one’s relationship with 
society. If a person is living alone, asserting that one has privacy is 
meaningless. A common example is a person stranded on a deserted island; 
that person has absolute privacy, but this does not make much sense as the 
person is actually in a state of isolation. Thus, to define privacy as a form of 
control simply because a person has control over himself in the given example 
                                                          
171Narrated by ‘Ali (R.A): The Messenger of Allah (pbuh) said: “Do not show your thigh, and 
do not look at the thigh of anyone, living or dead.”(Abu Dawood (3140) and Ibn Maajah: 
1460). The majority of fuqaha’ are of the view that these ahaadeeth should be followed and 
they stated that a man’s ‘aurah is from the navel to the knee. See Ibn Qudamah and 
Muwaffaq al-Din al Maqdisi al-Mughni (Riyadh, Al-Maktabah al Haditsah, 1984) at 2/284. 
Most of the scholars say it is an authentic hadith and a man should cover navel to knee. 
172
The revelation of the Holy Quran began in the year 610 CE. 
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is unnecessary. However, privacy is not lost if a person lives alone because 
nobody is interested in knowing his affairs.  
 
In the context of this thesis, Gavison’s definition that privacy is a “condition” 
is the most satisfactory. By employing her definition, it does not matter 
whether a person lives alone or in a society: as long as they are completely 
inaccessible, then they are enjoying their privacy. Privacy is required for the 
protection of an individual’s physical body and space, as well as personal 
information. In both situations, privacy in the sense of limited access to the 
self by others is the most appropriate definition. The word “self” here is not 
confined to an individual’s physical being only, but includes information; for 
the reason that knowing someone’s physical traits conveys specific 
information. 
 
Combining Gavison’s approach of “limitation of other’s access to individual” 
and Moreham’s definition of “freedom from unwanted access”, this thesis 
views a breach of privacy as unwanted access to the physical body and space 
as well as to information which warrants legal protection for its invasion. An 
individual, therefore, has a right to determine the extent to which he wishes to 
share matters with others or to keep them to himself or herself. In other words, 
if people wish to keep their affairs to themselves, they have an absolute right 
to do so and to decide the extent to which the same will be shared with others. 
Thus, both Islamic and Western societies recognise that individuals and 
groups are entitled to put up barriers around aspects of themselves and to 
exclude others.  At a high level, then, the cultural attitudes of the two cultures 
are arguably the same. Both cultures accept that people’s reasonable 
expectations of privacy need to be respected, and that what amounts to a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in any given situation will differ.  
 
The discussion of Islamic views of privacy, the concept of private and public 
spheres, and Malaysian perspectives of privacy strengthen the definition of 
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privacy used in this thesis. Discussion of the Western concept and notion of 
privacy shows that the idea of privacy generally is consistent with Islamic 
principles and traditional Malay societies. The discussion of both concepts is 
aimed at providing a social background for Malaysia privacy law. It is, 
therefore, appropriate to look to Western theorists and principles for a 
framework that would work in Malaysia. As in New Zealand and England, it 
is envisaged that the precise scope of the reasonable expectation of privacy in 
Malaysia will be determined on a case by case basis.   
 
Having established the meaning of privacy and the scope of its protection, the 
next chapter discusses the state of privacy protection in Malaysia and its 
significant development in the Malaysian legal framework.  
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PART II: CURRENT PROTECTIONS IN MALAYSIA 
CHAPTER THREE 
PROTECTION OF PRIVACY INTERESTS IN MALAYSIA 
 
I Overview 
 
The discussion in Part II is divided into two chapters. Chapter Three discusses 
the current framework for the protection of privacy interests in order to 
emphasise the inadequacies of the protections in Malaysia.  Chapter Four 
examines all relevant statutory protection of privacy currently in force in 
Malaysia. It analyses the Personal Data Protection Act 2010 (PDPA) and 
compares it with the laws on personal data of the two model jurisdictions ie 
UK and New Zealand. 
 
As discussed in Part I, there is no general right to privacy in Malaysia, and 
ultimately there is no specific protection afforded by its breach. Privacy 
infringements are not uncommon in Malaysia. The problems are serious and 
require immediate legal attention. The ability of existing laws to address the 
matter is disputable thus further development of the law is necessary to 
provide comprehensive legal protection against breaches of privacy. Privacy, 
as defined in Chapter Two which is consistent with Western and Islamic 
principles informs the shape of privacy protection in a Malaysian context. 
Furthermore, the importance of privacy is related to the protection of human 
rights and human dignity which are unanimously acknowledged by all 
theorists. 
 
When the Constitution was drafted in 1956, the right to privacy was not given 
equal status with certain other rights. However, with the development of 
information and communications technology and its influence on modern life, 
this inequality must be remedied by the development of law. The existing 
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framework needs to change in order to reflect the importance of individual 
privacy and to provide necessary protection to safeguard the interest in 
privacy.   
 
This chapter deals with the current state of the law in Malaysia as it relates to 
privacy and is divided into seven parts. Part I details the subject matters of 
discussion in this chapter. Part II discusses the historical background of the 
law in force in Malaysia as it originates from English common law. Part III 
examines constitutional protection of privacy derived from art 5 of the 
Constitution. Relevant common law principles for the protection of privacy 
interests are discussed in Part IV to assess their adequacy in addressing any 
breach of privacy.  The judicial development of the right to privacy in tort and 
other cases is discussed in Part V. Part VI concludes the discussion of 
Malaysian privacy law. 
 
II Applicability of English Common Law in Malaysia  
 
Discussion of privacy in Malaysian private law must begin with a 
consideration of the application of English law in Malaysia. The Malaysian 
legal system, especially the common law, is historically connected to the 
English legal system. Although the Malaysian legal system also reflects 
Portuguese, Dutch, Japanese and British influence, it was the British 
occupation which had the most significant influence on local rules and 
regulations.  
 
The introduction and reception of English law began in 1807 through the First 
Royal Charter of Justice with the establishment of a Court of Judicature of 
Penang. As a result, English law became applicable to local inhabitants 
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including British and non-British subjects.
1
 In order to implement their law, 
British judges declared no law or legal system existed at that time in Malaya, 
and thus resorted to English common law, rules of equity and English statutes 
although there were no clear provisions in the Charter that required the 
importation of English law.
2
  
 
The formal reception of English common law and the rules of equity into the 
local system was made through the Civil Law Ordinance 1956. In 1956, it was 
amended and renamed the Civil Law Act 1956 (the CLA) to facilitate its 
application to all states in the Federation of Malaya. By virtue of the CLA, 
judges were obliged to apply English common law and the rules of equity to 
local cases.  
 
 
The CLA provides three relevant sections for the application of English law.
3
 
English common law and rules of equity formed part of unwritten sources of 
Malaysian law.
4
 Section 3 of the CLA states that courts in the Malaysian 
Peninsula should apply English common law and rules of equity as 
administered in England on 7 April 1956. The same provision provides that 
the courts in both states should apply English common law, rules of equity 
                                                          
1
In 1826, the Second Royal Charter of Justice extended the application of English law to the 
Straits Settlement comprised of Penang, Malacca and Singapore. 
2Shamrahayu A Aziz “The Malaysian Legal System: The Roots, The Influence and the 
Future” (2009) 3 MLJ xcii. The author said that when discussing the history of the application 
of English law in Malaya, it is important to note that the position of Islam and Malay custom 
remained inviolable and were left unaffected by the British. See also Ong Cheng Neo v Yeap 
Cheah Neo (1875) LR 6 PC 381, at 393. 
3
Sections 3, 5 and 6 of the CLA 1956. 
4
The sources of Malaysian law can be classified into written and unwritten laws. Written law 
includes the Federal and State Constitutions, legislation enacted by Parliament and subsidiary 
legislation made by persons or bodies under powers conferred on them by Acts of Parliament 
or State Assemblies. On the other hand, unwritten law comprises principles of English law 
applicable to local circumstances, judicial decisions of the superior courts (High Courts, Court 
of Appeal and Federal Court), and customs of the local inhabitants which have been accepted 
as law by the courts. See Lee Mei Pheng General Principles of Malaysian Laws (5
th
 ed, 
Oxford Fajar Sdn Bhd, Malaysia, 2005). 
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together with statutes of general application as administered in England on 1 
December 1951 in Sabah, and 12 December 1949 in Sarawak respectively.
5
 
 
Although the relevant provisions allow the application of English common 
law and rules of equity in deciding local cases, the authorisation does not 
suggest that the Malaysian court must import English law comprehensively 
and in its entirety. English common law and rules of equity may be applied 
subject to two conditions: first, only in so far as the circumstances permit and 
second, in the absence of local legislation.
6
  
 
Circumstances in the first condition refer to respective laws and customs of 
the local inhabitants. In In the Goods of Abdullah, Sir Benjamin Malkin held 
that the religions and customs of the local inhabitants were recognised as 
exceptions to the general application of English law, particularly in the 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction, by the general principles of English law, not by the 
Charter.
7
 This important qualification of English law in local law was 
confirmed in Choa Choon Neoh v Spottiswoode
8
 in which the court held that 
any application of the law to various subjects must conform to the condition 
                                                          
5
Section 3 (1) provides for a general application of English law. It provides “Save so far as 
other provision has been made or may hereafter be made by any written law in force in 
Malaysia, the Court shall: (a) in West Malaysia or any part thereof, apply the common law of 
England and the rules of equity as administered in England on the 7th day of April, 1956; (b) 
in Sabah, apply the common law of England and the rules of equity, together with statutes of 
general application, as administered or in force in England on the 1st day of December, 1951; 
(c) in Sarawak, apply the common law of England and the rules of equity, together with 
statutes of general application, as administered or in force in England on the 12
th
 day of 
December, 1949, subject however to sub-section 3 (ii): Provided always that the said common 
law, rules of equity and statutes of general application shall be applied so far only as the 
circumstances of the States of Malaysia and their respective inhabitants permit and subject to 
such qualifications as local circumstances render necessary”.  
6
Wan Arfah Hamzah and Ramy Bulan An Introduction to the Malaysian Legal System 
(Oxford Fajar Sdn Bhd, Malaysia, 2003) at 112-114 [An Introduction to the Malaysian Legal 
System]. 
7
In the Goods of Abdullah (1835) 2 Ky Ecc 8 at 11. See also Wan Arfah and Ramy, above n 
6, at 105. 
8
(1869) 1 Ky 216. 
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and wants of inhabitants as far as is necessary to prevent unjust consequences 
and oppression.
9
 
 
With regards to the second condition, in terms of the hierarchy of the law, an 
Act of Parliament takes precedence over English common law. This means 
that where the common law on a particular subject is superseded by 
legislation, the court’s duty is to interpret the statute without recourse to the 
common law existing before the statute was enacted.  English common law is 
only meant to fill the lacunae, when local legislation is not present.
10
 The fact 
that there is local legislation does not necessarily mean that common law in 
the area is irrelevant. There will be occasions where a statute does not cover a 
point, and thus, reference to case law or English common law may be 
necessary. 
 
In Yong Joo Lin v Fung Poi Fong
11
 Terrell Ag CJ held that principles of 
English law were for many years accepted in the Federated Malay States 
where no other provision was made by statute, and that the qualification 
contained in s 3(1) was in fact the statutory recognition of the judicial practice 
of resorting to English law to fill the lacunae in the local law.
12
  
 
Before applying English common law, the court must first determine whether 
written law is already in force in Malaysia. If there is none, the court should 
determine the relevant common law, and the rules of equity as administered in 
England since 7 April 1956. The “cut-off date” signifies that the court should 
determine English common law at the date of reception, and how it has been 
modified and developed locally since that date. Having done that, the court 
should consider whether its application is permitted as such by local 
circumstances. If it is “permissible”, then the court should apply it. 
                                                          
9
At 211. 
10
Wan Arfah and Ramy, above n 6, at 105. 
11
[1941] MLJ Rep 54. 
12
At 55. 
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Once permissible, the English common law principle is binding. However, if 
the court finds that such a principle is not “permissible”, the court is free to 
reject it or adopt any part which is “permissible”, with or without 
qualification. Where the court rejects it wholly or in part, the court is free to 
formulate Malaysia’s own common law. In so doing, the court is at liberty to 
look at any source of law, local or otherwise, principles of common law in 
other countries, Islamic law of common application or common customs of 
the people of Malaysia.  
 
In practice, the courts may follow developments in English common law after 
such dates, but any English law referred to after the date specified, and current 
decisions of the English courts will be treated as persuasive authority only and 
may simply be useful comparative analogies.
13
 Although English common 
law after 7 April 1956 is not binding on Malaysian courts, reference to it may 
still be made in deciding local cases.    
 
To conclude, judges are free to develop Malaysian law in two situations. First, 
they may refer to English common law before the “cut-off date” which was 
binding on Malaysian courts, provided no local legislation already applies. 
Second, judges may refer to English law after the “cut-off date” as a 
persuasive source of law, laws of the Commonwealth jurisdictions or Islamic 
law in making their decisions, as long as the laws suit local conditions and 
circumstances. Although the two sources of the law before and after the “cut-
off date” are treated differently, they remain the most useful reference for 
Malaysian courts. It is not surprising, therefore, that judges continue to refer 
                                                          
13
For general discussion of the Malaysian legal system and the reception of English common 
law principles in Malaysia, refer Wu MA The Malaysian Legal System (3
rd
 ed, Pearson 
Malaysia Sdn Bhd, Kuala Lumpur, 2007). Refer also Ahmad Ibrahim and Ahilemah Joned 
The Malaysian Legal System (Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Malaysia, 1987). See also Jamil 
bin Harun v Yang Kamsiah [1984] 1 MLJ 217,  where the court held that “it is for the courts 
in Malaysia to decide, subject always to the statute law of the Federation, whether to follow 
English law. Modern English authorities may be persuasive, but are not binding. In 
determining whether to accept their guidance the courts will have regard to the circumstances 
of the states of Malaysia and will be careful to apply them only to the extent that the written 
law permits and no further than in their view it is just to do so”. 
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to English law, in particular, the law of privacy as long it is acceptable to local 
people and consistent with local circumstances.  
 
The next part will discuss the position of the right to privacy in the 
Constitution. The absence of an express recognition of the right to privacy in 
the Constitution raises the question of whether there is any possibility of 
developing this right within the explicit rights guaranteed by the Constitution.  
 
III Constitutional Protection of Privacy 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, privacy is a fundamental human right related to 
the idea of liberty. The Constitution, as the guardian of fundamental rights and 
freedoms, expressly provides protection for these rights. However, there is no 
express right to privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. How far, therefore, do 
the explicit rights protect privacy as defined by this thesis? In this Part, the 
relationship between common law and the Constitution is addressed in order 
to emphasise the status of privacy as a tort. Having discussed this relationship, 
the possibility of developing a constitutional protection of privacy from the 
explicit protection of the right to life and personal liberty is analysed. This 
analysis leads to a consideration of the development of a constitutional right 
to privacy in India which has significantly influenced such development in 
Malaysia.  
 
A The Relationship between the Common Law and the Constitution 
 
The subject of privacy and its protection is a branch of tort law which governs 
the interactions between individuals. So far, despite some indications that 
courts will be developing it in the future, a privacy tort is not an actionable 
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cause of action in Malaysia.
14
  Since a private action for damages for breach 
of privacy is therefore hard to maintain, and common law must develop 
consistently with the Constitution, the protection of privacy may be derived 
from constitutional law. As a part of human rights, the right to privacy may be 
protected by the Constitution which provides for fundamental rights of every 
citizen.  
 
The Constitution is the supreme law of Malaysia which provides for the 
protection of individual against arbitrary powers of the state.  Article 4 (1) 
states that “This Constitution is the supreme law of the Federation and any 
law passed after Merdeka (Independence) Day which is inconsistent with this 
Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void”. 
 
The above provision signifies that the Constitution prevails over common law 
where inconsistency exists.  
 
Thus Malaysian common law will continue to develop by taking into account 
the subsequent development of English common law without the need to 
amend the Civil Law Act 1956. The proviso to s 3 of the CLA requires that 
regard be given to local circumstances when applying English law and enables 
Malaysia to create its own common law. The Act never intended the wholesale 
application of English law.
15
 In this regard, art 162 of the Constitution 
provides for the continuation of existing laws after Merdeka Day.
16
 As long as 
                                                          
14
The judicial development of the right to privacy in Maslinda Ishak v Mohd Tahir Osman & 
Ors [2009] 6 MLJ 826, [2009] 6 CLJ 653 (CA) and other privacy cases is discussed below in 
Part V.  
15
See Jamil bin Harun v Yang Kamsiah & Anor [1984] 1 MLJ 217 (PC); Chung Khiaw Bank 
Ltd v Hotel Rasa Sayang Sdn Bhd & Anor [1990] 1 MLJ 356, at 361; Sri Inai (Pulau Pinang) 
Sdn Bhd v Yang Yit Swee [2003] 1 MLJ 273, at 285; Danaharta Urus Sdn Bhd v Kekatong 
Sdn Bhd (Attorney General Malaysia) [2004] 2 MLJ 257 as discussed in Farid Sufian Shuaib 
“Towards Malaysian Common Law: Convergence Between Indigenous Norm and Common 
Law Methods” (2009) Jurnal Undang-undang 158, at 164. 
16
 Merdeka Day means Independence Day for Malaysia which was on 31
t
 August 1957. 
Article 162(1) provides that “Subject to the following provisions of this art and art 163, the 
existing laws shall until repealed by the authority having power to do so under this 
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the supremacy of the Constitution is adhered to, Malaysian common law has 
absolute freedom to develop. 
 
B Fundamental Liberties under the Constitution 
 
The Constitution came into force in 1957 and provides for the establishment 
of three main branches of government: the legislative branch called the 
Parliament, which consists of the House of Representatives (in Malay, Dewan 
Rakyat), and the Senate (Dewan Negara), the executive branch led by the 
Prime Minister and his Cabinet Ministers, and the judicial branch headed by 
the Federal Court. The Constitution also defines the rights and responsibilities 
of the federal government, the member states of the federation and the citizens 
and their relations to one another. 
 
Human rights in Malaysia are governed by the Constitution.
17
 A commission 
called SUHAKAM was established under the Human Rights Commission Act 
1999 (HRCA) to advise and assist the government in matters pertaining to 
human rights. The HRCA has imported into Malaysian constitutional law the 
international human rights enshrined in the UDHR 1948. Section 4(4) of the 
HRCA provides that whatever rights and liberties not mentioned in the HRCA 
but referred to in the UDHR 1948 must be considered provided that there is 
no conflict with the Constitution.
18
  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Constitution, continue in force on and after Merdeka Day, with such modifications as may be 
made therein under this Article and subject to any amendments made by federal or State law.” 
17
Section 2 of Human Rights Commission of Malaysia Act 1999 provides that “human rights” 
refer to fundamental liberties as guaranteed in Part II of the Constitution. Aziz stated that the 
term “fundamental liberties” may refer to the rights which the constitution considers 
fundamental and basic, or that it refers to the rights that are so fundamental so they cannot be 
taken away except through special procedures laid down by the Constitution. See Abdul Aziz 
Bari Malaysian Constitution: A Critical Introduction (The Other Press, Kuala Lumpur, 2003) 
at 143. 
18Section 4(4) states “For the purpose of this Act, regard shall be had to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights 1948 to the extent that it is not inconsistent with the Federal 
Constitution. 
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In 1957 when the Constitution was drafted, the range of human rights such as 
freedom of life and liberty, freedom of expression, freedom of religion, 
freedom of movement and association were among the rights that were 
directly recognised in the Constitution.
19
 Those rights are contained in arts 5-
13 of the Constitution. The right to privacy, however, is not mentioned. The 
effect of such an absence is that other rights, such as that of freedom of 
expression, override the right to privacy when rights compete with each other. 
It is submitted that among the rights, the right to life and personal liberty in art 
5 has an implication for the protection of aspects of privacy interest. 
1 Article 5 right to life and personal liberty 
 
The right to life and personal liberty is provided by art 5 of the Constitution 
which states “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty save 
in accordance with law”. 
 
There are two important rights contained in this provision: The right to life 
and the right to personal liberty.
20
 The Constitution embodies British and 
Indian constitutional concepts and traditional Malay elements. Though largely 
based on the Indian Constitution, the Malaysian Constitution developed from 
an earlier constitution drafted by a commission of foreign experts.
21
 Being a 
                                                          
19
Relevant provisions are art 5 right to life and personal liberty, art 6 on slavery and forced 
labour prohibited, art 7 on protection against retrospective criminal laws and repeated trials, 
art 8 on equality, art 9 on prohibition of banishment and freedom of movement, art 10 on 
freedom of speech, assembly and association, art 11 on freedom of religion, art 12 on rights in 
respect of education and art 13 on rights to property. 
20
For general discussion of art 5, see A Sheridan and HE Groves The Constitution of Malaysia 
(4
th
 ed, Malayan Law Journal Pte Ltd, Singapore, 1987) at 41-51; HE Groves “Kebebasan 
Asasi Dalam Perlembagaan Persekutuan Malaysia” in M Suffian,  HP Lee and FATrindade 
Perlembagaan Malaysia Perkembangannya: 1957-1977 (Penerbit Fajar Bakti Sdn Bhd, 
Malaysia, 1983) at 36-38; S Jayakumar Constitutional Law Cases From Malaysia and 
Singapore (2
nd
 ed, Malayan Law Journal Pte Ltd, Singapore, 1976) at 44-94. 
21
The Reid Commission, consisting of constitutional experts from fellow Commonwealth 
countries and headed by Lord Reid was appointed to make recommendations for a suitable 
constitution. The report of the Commission was completed on 11 February 1957. The Federal 
Constitution was proclaimed on the basis of the recommendations. 
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written constitution, it serves as a basic law to which all legislative and 
executive actions are subject. 
 
It was observed by the Chief Justice Hughes of the Supreme Court that “we 
are under a constitution but the constitution is what the Judges say it is”.22 
Therefore, the judges, when interpreting the Constitution, play a major role in 
construing the words that ensure the right balance between parties and 
achieving a just decision. 
 
The right to life and personal liberty encompasses privacy interests in the 
sense that everybody has the right to livelihood
23
 and the right be let alone. On 
the other hand, personal liberty guaranteed by the Constitution implies wider 
human rights values and includes privacy as interpreted by case law. 
 
2 Approach to constitutional interpretation 
 
Lord Diplock in Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher
24
 maintained that a written 
constitution based on the Westminster model was a “document sui generis 
which called for principles of interpretation and provisions to be generously 
interpreted to give full recognition and effects to the fundamental rights and 
freedoms referred to”. 
 
This suggests that the absence of an express recognition of certain rights in the 
Constitution does not mean there is no room for such recognition by the courts 
in order to give life and meaning to the cold letter of the law. According to the 
“strict constructionists”, the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance 
                                                          
22
See MP Jain Indian Constitutional Law ( 4
th
 ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2001) at 834. 
23
Hong Leong Equipment Sdn Bhd v Liew Fook Chuan [1996] 1 MLJ 481, at 510. The court 
held that the right to livelihood is one of the fundamental liberties guaranteed under Part II of 
the Federal Constitution.  
24
[1979] 3 All ER 21 at 25. 
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with the original intention of its framers.
25
 Provisions are interpreted based on 
the “plain language” that appeared in the original text.  
 
On this approach, the right to privacy is not a fundamental right enshrined in 
the Constitution. When interpreting the Constitution, judges cannot afford to 
be too liberal. They are justified in giving effect to what is implicit in the 
basic law and in crystallising what is inherent. In so doing, words or clauses 
of the Constitution may be construed in various ways. A word or the plain 
language of the provision, its structure and ordinary sense should be given its 
due effect.
26
 Thus, the interpretation is direct and simple. 
 
Another way of interpreting the Constitution is the liberal approach. The 
“legal realists” argue that the interpretive task is unavoidably creative because 
legal words do not necessarily have a self-evident meaning. The courts and 
judges determine meaning by a dynamic interpretation of legal principles that 
are complementary to changing social needs and conditions. A constitutional 
provision, therefore, should be read in the overall context of the rest of the 
Constitution. By applying this approach, any superficial or literal approach to 
interpretation should be rejected.
27
 
 
Shad observed that interpretation should be based on rights and principles.
28
 
The provisions of the Constitution should be viewed in the context of the 
entire system of laws and with regard to the moral principles, doctrines, 
standards and framework assumptions implicit in basic law.
29
 The 
fundamental purpose of interpretation is to safeguard not only textual rights 
but also rights implicit in the Constitution. 
 
                                                          
25Shaad Saleem Faruqi “Constitutional Interpretation in a Globalised World” (2005) 
<www.malaysianbar.org.my>.  
26
Shaad, at <www.malaysianbar.org.my>.  
27
Shad, above n 25. 
28
Shad, above n 25. 
29
Shad, above n 25. 
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Because the nature of the constitution differs fundamentally from ordinary 
legislation, the construction applicable to ordinary statutes should not be 
applied rigidly to constitutional instruments. In Dato’ Menteri Othman 
Baginda v Dato’ Ombi Syed Alwi bin Syed Idrus30  the court said: 
 
A constitution, being a living piece of legislation, its provisions 
must be construed broadly and not in a pedantic way, that is 
“with less rigidity and more generosity than other Acts”. 
 
A similar opinion was expressed earlier in Minister of Home Affairs v 
Fisher
31
: That the provisions of the Constitution were to be generously 
interpreted to give full recognition and effect to the fundamental rights and 
freedoms referred to. Due to the rigidity of the Constitution, a literal approach 
is not a suitable means of interpreting fundamental rights.  
 
In a literal interpretation of fundamental rights, “life” means mere animal 
existence, and personal liberty simply freedom from arrest. In Tan Tek Seng v 
Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidik & Anor
32
 the court stated that judges 
adopt a liberal approach when interpreting the supreme law in order to 
implement the true intention of the framers of the Constitution. Such an 
objective is achieved if “life” and “personal liberty” are given a broad and 
liberal meaning. 
 
3 Judicial interpretation of article 5 of the Constitution 
 
Article 5 guarantees every person a right to life and liberty. A person’s life or 
personal liberty cannot be taken away unless it is in accordance with law. The 
                                                          
30
[1981] 1 MLJ 29. 
31
[1979] 3 All ER 21. 
32
[1996] 1 MLJ 481 (Tan Tek Seng).  
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courts have said that the right to life includes a right to livelihood and quality 
of life,
33
 while the right to personal liberty includes the right to privacy.
34
 
 
The court, through judicial interpretation of the constitutional provisions, has 
the power to expand or narrow the horizons of freedom. In Tan Tek Seng
35
, 
the appellant was the headmaster of a school. He was, in that capacity, 
entrusted with a sum of RM3,179.00 belonging to the Johore Education 
Department (“the Department”). This sum constituted the unpaid salary of the 
school’s gardener who had not turned up for work for several months. Under 
the relevant financial regulations that governed the duties of the appellant, he 
was obliged to return this sum of money to the Department but he failed to do 
so. When he was asked for the money, the appellant told them that it had been 
sent to them which was not true. He had not returned the money. He had not 
used the money, merely kept it. Eventually he did send the money to the 
Department and was charged with an offence under s 409 of the Penal Code 
because he retained the money. The Session Court found that he was guilty. 
He was sentenced to six months imprisonment. 
 
The appellant appealed to the High Court, and the Judicial Commissioner, 
affirmed the finding of guilt but set aside the conviction and sentence, and 
instead made an order that the appellant be bound over to be of good 
behaviour for three years in RM5000 without sureties under s 173A(ii)(b) 
Criminal Procedure Code (CPC). Pursuant to that, the Johore Education 
Department wrote to the Education Service Commission, the relevant 
disciplinary authority, recommending that disciplinary action be taken against 
the appellant. It recommended that the appellant be reduced in rank and salary 
pursuant to General Order 36 of the Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) 
(Chapter “D”) General Orders 1980. 
                                                          
33
Lee Kwan Woh v PP [2009] 5 CLJ  631 per Gopal Sri Ram FCJ at 639 (Lee). 
34
Sivarasa Rasiah v Badan Peguam Malaysia & Anor [2010] 3 CLJ 507 per Gopal Sri Ram 
FCJ at 591 (Sivarasa). 
35
Tan Tek Seng, above n 32. 
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The appellant, being dissatisfied with his dismissal, instituted proceedings to 
challenge it. He sought two declarations: firstly, that his dismissal was null 
and void and of no effect and secondly, that he was still a member of the 
Public Service. Among the issues was whether the Government was entitled 
to summarily dismiss him in reliance on the finding of guilt, and if not, 
whether it was obliged to take into account the particular circumstances of the 
case and impose a lesser punishment. The court stated that the expression 
“life” appearing in art 5(1) of the Federal Constitution does not refer to mere 
existence. It incorporates all those facets that are an integral part of life itself, 
and those attributes which go to form the quality of life. For the purpose of the 
case, the word “life” encompassed the right to continue in public service 
subject to removal for good cause by resort to fair procedure. 
 
The case is significant because the judge’s interpretation expands the 
constitutional right of the word “life”.  
 
In Sugumar Balakrishnan v Pengarah Imegresen Negeri Sabah & Anor,
36
 the 
Court of Appeal adopted Indian jurisprudence (art 21 of the Indian 
Constitution) on the wide meaning of life and personal liberty: 
 
In our judgment, the words “personal liberty” in Art 5(1) should be 
similarly interpreted. Any other approach to construction will 
necessarily produce an incongruous and absurd result. For “life” 
and “personal liberty” are both equally dynamic concepts and 
should be treated in like fashion. 
 
This interpretative dynamism was introduced by Bhagwati J in Maneka 
Ghandi v Union of India.
37
 The judge held that the life and liberty provision 
and the equality provision are interrelated; that they support each other and 
should not be read as having a separate existence. This proposition that the 
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[1998] 3 MLJ 289 (CA). 
37
[1978] AIR 597. 
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words “personal liberty” should be given a generous interpretation was 
rejected by the Federal Court in Pihak Berkuasa Negeri Sabah v Sugumar 
Balakrishnan
38
 which argued that “personal liberty” should have a contextual 
meaning and that art 5(1) merely provided for freedom from being unlawfully 
detained. Thus, the court disagreed with Bhagwati J’s view that the words be 
generously and widely interpreted.  
 
The court in Sivarasa Rasiah v Badan Peguam Malaysia and Anor
39
 
expressed the view that the methodology of interpretation must be taken into 
account when interpreting fundamental rights. The Federal Court in three 
cases
40
 has held that in dealing with the provisions on fundamental liberties, 
they must be generously interpreted and a prismatic approach to interpretation 
must be adopted. “Life” and “personal liberty” must be interpreted as widely 
as possible
41
 in order to expose or reveal the rights contained in the concepts 
already expressly guaranteed. In Lee Kwan Woh v PP the court said:
42
 
 
On no account should a literal construction be placed on the 
Constitution’s language, particularly upon those provisions that 
guarantee to individuals the protection of fundamental rights. In our 
view, it is the duty of a court to adopt a prismatic approach when 
interpreting the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part II of the 
Constitution. When light passes through a prism it reveals its 
constituent colours. In the same way, the prismatic interpretive 
approach will reveal to the court the rights submerged in the 
concepts employed by the several provisions under Part II. Indeed 
the prismatic interpretation of the Constitution gives life to abstract 
concepts such as “life” and “personal liberty” in Article 5(1). 
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[2002] 3 MLJ 72 (FC). 
39
Sivarasa, above n 34. 
40
Badan Peguam Malaysia v Kerajaan Malaysia [2008] 1 CLJ 521 (Badan Peguam 
Malaysia); Lee, above n 33 and Shamim Reza v Public Prosecutor [2009] 6 CLJ 93. 
41
Badan Peguam Malaysia, above n 40.  
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 Lee, above, n 33, at 639. 
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In Sivarasa, an appellant was an advocate and solicitor. At the same time he 
was also an office bearer of a political party and a Member of Parliament. The 
appellant wished to be elected to the Bar Council, the governing body of the 
Malaysian Bar. However, s 46A(1) of the Legal Profession Act 1976 (LPA) 
prohibited him from doing so. As a result, he challenged the constitutionality 
of s 46A(1) on the grounds that (i) the section violated his rights of equality 
and equal protection guaranteed by art 8(1) of the Constitution; (ii) that it 
violated his right of association guaranteed by art 10(1)(c); and (iii) that it 
violated his right to personal liberty guaranteed by art 5(1). It was further 
contended that if in any event any one of these rights was found to be 
violated, s 46A(1) must be declared void as being inconsistent with the 
supreme law.  
 
The court concluded that s 46A of the LPA did not violate art 5(1) or art 8(1) 
and art 10(1)(c) and that it was a valid law. Another important finding by 
Gopal Sri Ram FCJ was that “personal liberty” in art 5(1) includes within its 
compass other rights such as the right to privacy. Thus, the right to privacy 
may now be recognised under the Malaysian Constitution by virtue of art 5(1) 
parallel to other rights guaranteed by the Constitution as fundamental rights 
protected by the Constitution. However, the part of the judgment that 
expressed privacy as being included under art 5 was obiter and did not form 
the reason for the decision. 
 
A clear statement of the range of art 5 was given obiter in Sivarasa. The court 
there held that the right to privacy was recognised under the Constitution 
through the interpretation of the phrase “personal liberty”. This decision is 
notable for two reasons. First, the recognition of the right through a written 
constitutional provision changed the landscape for the protection of privacy 
from the domain of common law to a constitutional matter. Second, it 
questions whether a right, which is implicitly recognised, enjoys the same 
status as explicit rights in the Constitution. 
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Based on the interpretation of “personal liberty” in previous cases, the Federal 
Court
43
 in Sivarasa held that the right to privacy is encompassed within the 
right to life and personal liberty under art 5(1) of the Constitution. The 
inclusion of the right to privacy under art 5(1) was a result of court’s 
observation of Indian cases regarding constitutionally guaranteed rights 
provisions.
44
 Having regard to the Indian authorities’ interpretation of 
“personal liberty” enabled the court to conclude that it is clear that although 
the right to privacy is not expressly provided under the Constitution, it may be 
protected implicitly.  
 
Given the court’s reliance on Indian precedents in Sivarasa, it is important to 
discuss the cases in some detail.  
 
C Indian Precedent 
 
In India, the court assisted the growth of privacy protection by developing this 
right through rights enumerated in the Indian Constitution. It concluded that a 
right enumerated in the Constitution would be meaningless unless certain 
other implied rights, such as of the freedom of the press were provided for. 
Although freedom of the press is nowhere expressly provided for in the 
Constitution, it continues to have a very definite presence by virtue of the fact 
that it constitutes an indispensable part of art 19(1)(a) which guarantees the 
right to freedom of speech and expression.
45
 The court further argued that a 
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The Federal Court of Malaysia is the highest judicial authority and the final court of appeal 
in Malaysia. 
44
The court referred to Kharak Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh [1963] AIR 1295 (SC), when 
discussing art 21 of the Indian Constitution, Ayyangar J said that “the expression “personal 
liberty” is used in the article as a compendious term to include within itself all the varieties of 
rights which go to make up the “personal liberties” of man other than those dealt with in the 
several clauses of art 19(1). In other words, while art 19(1) deals with particular species or 
attributes of that freedom, “personal liberty” in art 21 takes in and 
comprises the residue”. The court also referred to Govind v State of Madhya Pradesh [1975] 
AIR 1378 (SC) when concluding that the right to privacy is protected under the broad 
umbrella of personal liberty.  
45See Nehaluddin Ahmad “Privacy and the Indian Constitution: A Case Study of Encryption” 
(1997) 2 (4) AALL Spectrum 8 at 11. 
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number of constitutional provisions exist where the right to privacy plays a 
significant role, and that there is, therefore, scope for such a right in art 
19(1)(a) and (d) and art 21.
46
  
 
Thus, the protection of privacy developed mainly from this constitutional 
base, rather than by the courts developing a tort of invasion of privacy, or by 
extension of the law of breach of confidence as occurred in the United 
Kingdom.
47
 Case law and judicial pronouncements play a significant role in 
determining the status of the right in India.  
 
The right to privacy was established by the Supreme Court when dealing with 
arts 19 and 21 of the Constitution. In Kharak Singh v State of UP & Ors
48
 the 
petitioner was put under surveillance in accordance with reg 236 of the UP 
Police Regulations. The court held that domiciliary visits violated art 21 and 
were unconstitutional.  The majority found that though the Constitution 
contained no explicit guarantee of a right to privacy, the right to personal 
liberty was sufficiently expansive to include a right to dignity.  
 
The judgment by Justice Subba Rao in this case was important as it paved the 
way for the expansion and elaboration of the right to privacy drawn from art 
21. The judge defined personal liberty, as the right of an individual to be free 
from restrictions or encroachment on his person whether these are directly 
imposed or indirectly brought about by calculated measure.
49
 Thus, personal 
liberty in art 21 includes all varieties of freedom except those included in art 
19. The judgment reveals that the right to privacy exists and unlawful invasion 
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At 11. Articles 19(1), (2) on the protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc 
and 21 on the protection of life and personal liberty. 
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Since Douglas v Hello [2001] 2 All ER 289, Wainwright v Home Office [2002] 3 WLR 405, 
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of privacy is a justifiable cause of action which would render the offender 
liable for the consequences. It showed the existence of a constitutional 
recognition of the right to privacy which protected personal privacy against 
unlawful government invasion (eg surveillance). 
 
The court was of the opinion that the right to privacy in any event would 
necessarily entail a process of case by case development. Even assuming that 
the right to personal liberty, the right to move freely throughout India, and the 
right of freedom of speech create an independent right of privacy which may 
be characterised as a fundamental right, the right is not absolute. It must, 
therefore, be subject to restriction on the basis of compelling public interest.
50
 
This case marked ‘non absoluteness’ as the central defining feature of the 
right to privacy.
51
  
 
R Rajagopal v State of Tamil Nadu
52
 involved a petition concerning the 
freedom of press in relation to the right to privacy of Indian citizens and the 
parameters of the right of the press to criticise and comment on the acts and 
conduct of public officials. The case confirmed that the right to privacy had 
acquired constitutional status in India. Jeevan Reddy J referred both to Kharak 
Singh and Govind and also considered a large number of American and 
English cases. The judge finally concluded  that the right to privacy is implicit 
in the right to life and liberty guaranteed to the citizens of India by art 21, that 
is, the right to be let alone. A citizen has a right to safeguard his own privacy 
as well as his family, his marriage and other concerns such as procreation, 
motherhood, child-bearing and education.
53
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Telephone tapping was discussed in People’s Union for Civil Liberties v 
Union of India.
54
 The issue was whether wiretapping was an infringement of a 
citizen’s constitutional right to privacy. Kuldip Singh J delivered the judgment 
and provided a broad overview of the development of the right to privacy as a 
constitutional right and held that telephone tapping was definitely an 
infringement of privacy and ought not, therefore, to be permitted except in 
grave circumstances such as a public emergency. The court’s observation 
showed that the right to privacy was not absolute but was determined by each 
case brought before the court.
55
 
 
The above cases illustrate that the right to privacy in India is a limited rather 
than an absolute right. For example, the importance of “public interest” is the 
paramount consideration in determining whether a person is guaranteed an 
implicit constitutional right to privacy. In Mr. X v Hospital Z,
56
 a person sued 
a hospital for having disclosed his HIV status to his fiancée without his 
knowledge resulting in their wedding being called off. The Supreme Court 
held that the hospital was not guilty of a violation of privacy since the 
disclosure was made to protect the public interest. While affirming the duty of 
confidentiality owed to patients, the court ruled that the right to privacy was 
not absolute and was “subject to such action as may be lawfully taken for the 
prevention of crime or disorder or protection of health or morals or protection 
of rights and freedom of others.” 
 
Significantly, the Indian courts developed the right to privacy in cases of 
seizure and search or telecommunications surveillance. However, the case of 
Naz Foundation v Government of NCT of Delhi
57
 did not involve search and 
surveillance issues. The case was brought by an NGO, the Naz Foundation, to 
challenge the constitutional validity of s 377 of the Indian Penal Code which 
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penalises intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman or 
animal. It was argued by the petitioners that s 377 unreasonably abridged the 
right of privacy and dignity within the ambit of right to life and liberty under 
art 21 since both rights are recognised as dimensions of art 21 in the Indian 
Constitution.  
 
The court found that s 377, which denies a person’s dignity and criminalises 
the core identity solely on account of sexual misconduct, violated arts 14,15 
and 21 of the Constitution in so far as it severely affected the rights and 
interests of homosexuals and impaired their dignity. Thus, the Naz 
Foundation case demonstrates that the protection of privacy under the Indian 
Constitution extends beyond issues of search and surveillance.
58
  
 
It is hoped this judicial development will broaden the scope and application of 
constitutional protection of privacy in the future. This is expressed in Vishaka 
v State of Rajasthan:
59
 
 
if the legislature fails to meet the need of the hour, the courts 
may intervene and fill in the vacuum by giving proper directions. 
These directions would be binding and enforceable in law until 
suitable legislation is enacted to occupy the field. 
 
The constitutional right to privacy therefore, will continue to develop through 
judicial interventions so long as there is no specific legislation to address this 
issue. The right as it existed in India was a limited rather than an absolute one 
by reason of its lack of explicit constitutional recognition. However, the 
court’s interpretation and commitment in expanding the personal liberty 
clause to include the right to privacy should not be ignored in deciding local 
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cases. Indeed, the development that has taken place provides the contour of 
the future shape of privacy law in India. 
 
It is clear, however, that the person’s “right to be let alone” is not an absolute 
right and may be lawfully restricted for the prevention of crime, disorder or 
protection of health or morals or protection of rights and freedom of others.  
In Govind v State of Madhya Pradesh
60
 the petitioner challenged the validity 
of the regulations which provided for police surveillance of habitual offenders 
including domiciliary visits and picketing.
61
 The court observed that in 
construing the right to privacy under art 21, a caution had to be entered in 
order to avoid a strong judicial reliance on a right that is not explicit in the 
Constitution. 
 
The absence of specific legislation on privacy and the non-express recognition 
of its right in the Constitution leave the door open for the court to develop the 
right through judicial activities. The obiter in Sivarasa should pave the way 
for the development of the right to privacy within constitutional guarantees. It 
is strongly believed that the jurisprudential basis initiated by Sivarasa will 
further Malaysia’s continued development of the right to privacy. The 
similarity of the wording of the Constitutions of India and Malaysia on the 
protection of life and personal liberty will greatly influence Malaysia to 
interpret and widen the scope of the protection to cover the right to privacy.  
 
If Malaysia continues to develop a constitutional protection of privacy on the 
basis of the personal liberty clause as interpreted by Indian cases, that 
emerging right will have the status of a guaranteed right and be capable of 
providing comprehensive protection for privacy as defined in this thesis. It 
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could cover protection of personal information and protection against 
intrusion into physical space and bodily integrity.  
 
However, reliance on art 5 to protect privacy interests would be problematic 
because it is unclear whether Malaysian courts will follow India, and if they 
do, the question is how expansively Indian courts have interpreted the new 
right to privacy. It is predicted that any development in this area would be 
piecemeal and slow. Furthermore, the constitutional protection discussed in 
Indian cases above only covers interactions between state and individuals.  
 
However, in Vishaka, a case dealing with sexual harassment of working 
women, the Supreme Court extended constitutional guarantees to provide 
protection for the aggrieved individual against sexual harassment and to 
promote gender equality among citizens. Thus, there is a possibility of 
horizontal effect in art 15 of the Indian Constitution.
62
 On the other hand, 
direct horizontal application of other fundamental rights to non-state actors 
poses some difficulties though their indirect horizontal effect remains an 
option.
63
 In a similar vein, such possibility has been precluded in Malaysia 
and it is important to note that the effect of the Malaysian Constitution is 
solely vertical as confirmed by the Federal Court in Beatrice AT Fernandez v 
Sistem Penerbangan Malaysia:
64
 
 
We found that it is simply not possible to expand the scope 
of art 8 (equality before law) of the Federal Constitution to 
cover collective agreement such as the one in question. To 
invoke art 8, the applicant must show that some law or 
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action of the Executive discriminates against her so as to 
controvert her rights under the said article. Constitutional 
law, as a branch of public law, deals with the contravention 
of individual rights by the Legislature or the Executive or 
its agencies. Constitutional law does not extend its 
substantive or procedural provisions to infringements of an 
individual’s legal right by another individual.  
 
Having said that, an alternative possibility of protecting privacy interests may 
be through the application of existing common law principles. This is 
discussed in the next part. 
  
IV  Existing Common Law Principles for the Protection of 
Privacy  
 
In Malaysia, there is no general right to privacy and thus, no actionable tort of 
privacy. The courts are obliged to consider other tort principles when giving 
judgment in cases involving breaches of privacy.
65
 Similarly, in the UK, the 
court will refer to existing causes of action rather than formulate a new 
liability in tort.
66
 Thus, an important question arises which is to what extent do 
existing current law protections protect privacy as defined in this thesis? In 
this Part, existing common law principles are explored in order to evaluate 
their adequacy and applicability to accommodate privacy interests and to 
provide protection against infringements.
67
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Common law principles such as defamation, nuisance, trespass and breach of 
confidence are widely applicable to protect aspects of privacy. These 
principles do not provide direct protection of privacy. Instead they provide 
necessary protection to interests related to privacy involving private facts, 
reputation, infliction of harm and proprietary interests. 
 
A Defamation 
 
The law of defamation protects a person’s reputation against unjustifiable 
attack.  It aims at giving protection to a person from being brought into 
disrepute. It seeks to protect a personal dignity and honour. Thus, the interest 
that is protected by this tort is a person’s good name and reputation.68 In an 
action for defamation
69
 whether for libel or slander, the plaintiff must prove 
that the matter complained of:
70
 
(i) is defamatory; 
(ii) refers to the plaintiff; 
(iii) has been published to a third person.  
 
Defamation is actionable when there is a publication that causes a person to be 
ridiculed by right thinking members of the public or to lower a person in the 
public estimation or to be avoided by reasonable persons in society thus 
affecting that person’s reputation. The action could possibly be relevant to 
victims of breach of privacy to the extent that the publication involves private 
facts. In Tun Datuk Patinggi Haji Abdul Rahman Ya’kub v Bre Sdn Bhd & 
Ors
71
 Richard Malanjum J followed JB Jeyaretnam v Goh Chok Tong
72
 and 
adopted the following approach: 
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As to whether the words complained of in this case were 
capable of being, and were, in fact, defamatory of the plaintiff, 
the test to be considered is whether the words complained of 
were calculated to expose him to hatred, ridicule or contempt in 
the mind of a reasonable man or would tend to lower 
the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of 
society generally. 
 
If the fact that was published were true, that would serve as a complete 
defence. This makes the law of defamation inappropriate for the protection of 
privacy because invasion of privacy is mainly about public revelation of 
personal information regardless of its veracity. In addition, if the comment is 
an honest one based on facts, a qualified defence for defamation exists. In the 
nature of the action, defamation strikes at the essence of privacy, which is a 
person’s dignity. The tort involves injury not to an individual per se, but rather 
to an individual’s reputation as perceived by others in the community. 
 
In Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim v The New Straits Times Press (M) Sdn Bhd & 
Anor
73
 the plaintiff brought an action for defamation in relation to an article 
published in the newspaper under the caption “Anwar’s link to US lobbyist 
New Revelation” by a political weekly magazine. The plaintiff claimed that 
the article defamed him and sought general damages of RM100m as well as 
aggravated and exemplary damages. The court held that the effect of the 
article lowered the plaintiff in the estimation of ordinary, right-thinking 
members of Malaysian society and, therefore, the article was defamatory. The 
judge also commented on the test of “shunned and avoided” in determining 
whether or not the words were defamatory:
74
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The test, however, does provide some incidental protection 
against unwarranted privacy invasions which in any case ought 
to be provided by a specific legislation [sic] on privacy rather 
than a reliance on defamation law.   
 
To protect privacy through defamation law is unrealistic as an invasion of 
privacy may be more than an attack on reputation. Its aims are different and 
the relief to be provided is also different. The law of defamation should be 
strictly confined to the protection of reputation. However, invasion of privacy 
occurs when there is unwanted access to information or unauthorised 
publication of private facts. In this situation, if a person publishes B’s 
photograph with her boyfriend in a magazine, B may not take an action of 
defamation because the photograph is not defamatory and does not lower B’s 
reputation. In fact, however, B’s personal information was published without 
permission, and thus an action of the invasion of privacy is applicable.  
 
Similarly, in Kaye, an injunction was sought to restrain the publication of 
photographs and an alleged interview. Although the English Court of Appeal 
recognised that there had been an invasion of privacy, the law of defamation 
could not provide the grounds for the grant of an injunction.
75
  
 
The above observation illustrates that the law of defamation is not capable of 
providing protection for invasions of privacy. Though defamation has in some 
cases protected an interest akin to privacy, it is inadequate to protect privacy 
generally.  
 
B Trespass 
 
The law of trespass aims at the protection against interference of person, 
interests in land and goods. Any person who enters or gains access to land, 
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goods or a person may be liable in trespass. Trespass to the person includes 
assault, battery and false imprisonment. Assault is concerned with the 
protection of a person’s mental well-being against the unlawful act of 
another;
76
 an action for battery protects an individual from any interference 
with his person, thus preserving a person’s dignity as well as reputation.77 If, 
therefore, a reporter creates an apprehension of danger in the course of 
obtaining news or photographs, an action of assault may arise which may lead 
to battery if force is applied to the body of a person without that person’s 
consent or without other lawful justification in the course of acquiring the 
information. Both actions of assault and battery indirectly protect against 
breaches of privacy by intrusion. 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, individuals lose privacy when others gain 
physical access to them.
78
 A person is said to be physically inaccessible if she 
cannot be experienced through one of the five senses.
79
 Thus, if A installed a 
video camera in B’s room without B knowing of its existence, A has gained 
access to B’s room for the purpose of recording B’s activities. In this example, 
assault and battery are not appropriate actions because there is no 
apprehension of danger and the incident occurs without any application of 
force to B’s body. It is, however, an intrusion into private space and bodily 
integrity that could only be protected by a privacy action. 
 
Trespass to land occurs when a person unjustifiably enters onto land in the 
possession of another. It is an interference with possession of land.
80
 It is 
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actionable per se, without proof of special damage. Its main purpose is to 
protect proprietary interests. Nevertheless, it provides an indirect protection of 
privacy-related interests whereby the interest in land, by way of possession, 
cannot be interfered with. Those in the possession of the land may bring an 
action of trespass if a reporter or photographer enters land to conduct an 
interview or take photos or film activity within the boundaries of the land. 
However, the right of a landowner to the land is limited, for an action could 
not be upheld for photos taken from off the land or from the airspace above it. 
In Lord Bernstein of Leigh v Skyviews and General Ltd
81
 the court held that 
there was no trespass committed by the defendant who took a picture of the 
plaintiff’s premises. Griffiths J said:82 
 
The problem is to balance the rights of an owner to enjoy the 
use of his land against the rights of the general public to take 
advantage of all that science now offers in the use of airspace. 
This balance is …best struck… by restricting the rights of an 
owner in the airspace above his land to such height as is 
necessary for the ordinary use and enjoyment of his land and the 
structures on it, and declaring that above that he has no greater 
rights in the airspace than any other member of the public.   
 
The exclusive use and enjoyment of land and airspace is partially a privacy 
interest. It means that a person is entitled to an absolute enjoyment of and 
freedom from unwanted or unauthorised access to the land. Section 44(1)(a) of 
the National Land Code 1965 (NLC) gives the registered owner of the land the 
exclusive use and enjoyment of so much of the column of airspace above the 
surface of the land, and so much of the land below that surface, as is 
reasonably necessary to the lawful use and enjoyment of the land. In Chen Yue 
                                                                                                                                                       
land and in fact continuing after he came into possession of the said land. Other cases see also 
Karuppannan v Balakrishnen (Chong Lee Chin, Third Parties) [1994] 3 MLJ 584 and Julaika 
Bivi v Mydin [1961] MLJ 310. 
81
[1977] 2 All ER 902. 
82
At 907. 
96 
 
Kiew (F) v Angkasamas Sdn Bhd the court found that a landowner is entitled to 
exclusive use of the land and the air space above the land. Even though the 
intrusions onto the respondent’s land by the appellant appeared trivial to the 
appellant; it could not be denied that they constituted a clear breach of the 
respondent’s right to the exclusive use and enjoyment of his land. The court 
did not hesitate to grant a perpetual injunction against anyone trespassing on 
the land of another or into the air space above it.
83
 Trespass to land can protect 
intrusion into private space or property, but is limited by the NLC.  
 
Again, the issue of an exclusive enjoyment of property was discussed in K 
Mahunaran v Osmond Chiang Siang Kuan.
84
 In that case, the plaintiff and the 
defendant were owners of the two premises comprised double-storey terrace 
houses separated by a common wall. The defendant concreted the wall at the 
front portion of the premises without the consent of the plaintiff. The plaintiff 
applied for an order for the defendant to pull down and remove the wall put up 
by him and to restore it to its original position or as close to that as possible. 
The plaintiff also alleged that the said construction had impeded his light, 
ventilation and view. The court decided that the defendant had committed an 
act of trespass by demolishing the original wall and building a new wall. In 
this situation, the right of individual over the land was denied, and, therefore, 
was a denial of exclusive use and enjoyment of the land as granted by the law.  
  
As far as an action in trespass to land is concerned, it neither protects privacy 
interests in information nor the self; it rather protects an individual’s 
proprietary interests to an exclusive use and enjoyment of his land. Thus, the 
owner of the land has absolute control over his land and is capable of 
excluding unauthorised access to it, but an action in trespass does not protect 
any subsequent conduct that breaches the privacy of the land owner.  
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C Nuisance 
 
A cause of action in nuisance also provides indirect protection of privacy. The 
purpose of the law of nuisance is to provide comfort to persons who have 
proprietary interests in land, and to members of society generally, through 
control of environmental conditions.
85
  
 
Malaysian courts have followed the law of nuisance as developed by the 
English courts. The tort of nuisance was considered in Hunter v Canary Wharf 
Ltd
86
 where Lord Lloyd stated that private nuisance basically involved three 
situations namely, nuisance by encroachment on a neighbour’s land, nuisance 
by direct physical injury to a neighbour’s land, and nuisance by interference 
with a neighbour’s quiet enjoyment of the land. Thus, nuisance is relevant 
when it involves interference with enjoyment of the land or “the personal 
inconvenience and interference with one’s enjoyment, one’s quiet, one’s 
personal freedom and anything that discomposes or injuriously affects the 
senses or the nerves”.87 Clark & Lindsell submitted that it is always a question 
of degree to determine whether the interference with comfort or convenience 
is sufficiently serious to constitute a nuisance. Circumstances such as time, 
place, extent or manner of performance determine whether lawful activities 
such as sounds, smells or vibration constitute a nuisance.
88
  
 
The court in Ong Koh Hou v Perbadanan Bandar & Anor
89
 observed that it is 
a question of fact whether or not a nuisance is committed. The primary 
consideration in a nuisance case is the question of reasonableness in which 
reference to all circumstances of the case: the time and place of commission, 
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the seriousness of harm, the manner of committing it and, the effect of its 
commission that is whether it is continuous or not. These are the determining 
factors for an actionable nuisance which must seriously interfere with the 
comfort or convenience of the living standards of the average person.
90
  
 
The English court in Halsey v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd
91
 held that loud noises 
and vibration interfere with one’s enjoyment, one’s quiet, one’s personal 
freedom, and anything that disturbs or injuriously affects the senses or the 
nerves.
92
 The judgment was followed in Azman Bin Mohd Yussof & Ors v 
Vasaga Sdn Bhd,
93
 in which the court stated that the loud music from the 
defendant’s premises caused vibration to the plaintiff’s building and others. 
The court held that interference with the enjoyment of property includes 
unreasonable noise or vibration.  
 
In situations discussed above, the law of nuisance offers indirect protection to 
privacy, although limited in its application, because invasion of privacy has 
essentially nothing to do with interests in land. If the defendant’s action does 
not unlawfully interfere with the plaintiff’s use or enjoyment of the land or 
some right over or in connection with it, the tort of nuisance is not applicable. 
However, privacy may be invaded if there is unlawful interference with the 
use and enjoyment of the land when access is gained, and subsequently the 
owner’s personal information is published. In this instance, the law of 
nuisance does not provide adequate protection to the owner.  
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D Trade Secrets and Breach of Confidence 
 
The law on trade secrets and confidential information could provide means for 
the protection of privacy in Malaysia. The protection of trade secrets and 
confidential information is broadly based on the common law principle of 
breach of confidence. The law of breach of confidence seeks to protect 
confidential information from unauthorised use or unlawful disclosure — an 
aspect of privacy. Currently, Malaysia adopts the common law principles of 
confidentiality as applied by the UK courts. For example in Worldwide Rota 
Dies Sdn Bhd v Ronald Ong Cheow Joon,
94
 the court found that (a) the 
information which the plaintiff sought to protect was of a confidential 
nature; (b) that the information in question was communicated in 
circumstances importing an obligation of confidence; and (c) that there was an 
unauthorised use of that information to the detriment of the party 
communicating it. The court was satisfied that all the three elements in Coco v 
A N Clark (Engineers) Ltd
95
 existed and granted an injunction against the 
defendants. 
 
An action for breach of confidence is not limited to circumstances where there 
is a contractual relationship. The scope of the law was widened when the 
court recognised that breach of confidence was one of the actions in tort.
96
 
Kamalanathan Ratnam JC in Schmidt Scientific Sdn Bhd v Ong Han Suan
97
 
when deciding the issue of disclosure of confidential information or trade 
secrets by an ex-employer, stated that a breach of confidence should also be 
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regarded as a tort with an award of damages if the claim was successful. 
According to him, since the categories of tortious liability remain open, the 
ingenuity and resourcefulness of the human mind can and ought to lead to 
fresh categories of tort being established, and this could include a tort for 
breach of confidence.
98
  
 
Looking at the court’s practice in breach of confidences cases so far, there is 
no potential for the breach of confidence action to provide protection against 
breach of privacy. What is protected by the action is “confidential 
information” and the doctrine has not extended the protection to privacy. The 
courts have been unwilling to move beyond the requirements of the action as 
articulated in Coco, and the action is only applied in the commercial context. 
Therefore, the utilisation of breach of confidence action for privacy protection 
is unlikely to happen in Malaysia. 
 
The above-mentioned cases show that legal protection of privacy-related 
interests is available in Malaysia. However, legal protection is not accorded to 
privacy per se. Protection of privacy interests in Malaysia is indirect and 
piecemeal. 
 
The discussion in this part illustrates that even when taken together the actions 
described do not protect privacy adequately. An analysis of the common law 
principles shows that though aspects of privacy may possibly be protected by 
the established tort principles, they fail to provide remedies in the context of 
the theoretical framework of privacy advanced by this thesis. Protection of 
privacy is desirable when there is unwanted access to the physical body as 
well as to personal information. It is argued that the lack of the protection 
                                                          
98
The court referred to statement made by Lord Denning MR in Seager v Copydex Ltd [1967] 
2 All ER 416 that equity would interfere to prevent those receiving information in confidence 
from taking unfair advantage of it and decided that a breach of confidence should also be 
regarded as a tort with damages to be awarded to the successful plaintiff. 
101 
 
offered by the existing common law principles needs to be remedied through 
constitutional measures, particularly explicit rights in the Constitution.
99
  
 
The continuing observation of privacy matters by the court in Malaysia that 
may lead to the development of the right to privacy through judicial activities 
is the subject of the following discussion.  
 
V Judicial Development of the Right to Privacy 
 
Section A below considers the current position of privacy in tort law, and its 
development from 2004. The importance of judicial developments requires a 
detailed discussion of certain cases. In section B, the limited references to 
privacy in pre-2004 cases will be discussed to show that privacy was 
considered when reaching a judgment. The constitutional developments of the 
right to privacy, particularly in Sivarasa, were discussed in Part III (B)(3). 
 
A Tort Cases 
 
Since 2006, a few tort cases have suggested a shift towards acknowledging 
privacy as a right in Malaysia. The position has radically changed during that 
period and is now moving towards the establishment of a privacy right in the 
Constitution and its recognition as a cause of action in private law. 
 
1 Denying the existence of the tort 
 
In 2004, hesitation to recognise the right to privacy was illustrated by the 
High Court decision in Ultra Dimension Sdn Bhd v Kook Wei Kuan,
100
 a case 
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against the appellants who took a photograph of a group of pupils at an open 
area outside their kindergarten and published it in two local newspapers with 
the caption “Bonus Link Share Your Points”. The issue was whether or not 
the picture amounted to invasion of privacy and breach of confidence. It was 
claimed that supplying of the photograph for an advertisement had invaded 
the respondent’s privacy. However, the court found that the publication of the 
photograph in the advertisement did not give the respondent a cause of action 
as the facts of the case did not fall within the boundaries of any recognised 
and existing tort. Having referred to the English court decision in Kaye, the 
court held that the privacy right was not recognised under the Malaysian law. 
 
The decision in Kaye was referred to in this case by virtue of s 3 of the Civil 
Law Act 1956.
101
 The court also made an observation that a cause of action 
for privacy may arise only if photographs are highly offensive in nature and 
show a person in an embarrassing position or pose. The photograph involved 
in the instant case was not offensive in nature because it merely showed a 
group of kindergarten pupils in cheerful mood taken at an open area outside 
the kindergarten, and there was no publication of any information relating to 
the respondent in the advertisement. It was used for a decent purpose: An 
advertisement for Bonuslink cards.  
 
It is worth considering the judge’s remarks. Faiza Tamby Chik J concluded 
that “privacy rights” are “the right to be left alone” and “to live free from all 
intrusions by others” as defined by Nicholas J Mullany,102 is different from 
the right to “Life” and “Personal Liberty” which may be interpreted as 
enjoyment of life and the freedom of an individual to move and engage in any 
                                                                                                                                                       
100
[2004] 5 CLJ 285 (HC) (Ultra Dimension). 
101
Section 3(1)(a) of the Civil Law Act 1956 provides for the application of the English 
common law and the rules of equity in West Malaysia. See above, Part II. 
102
Nicholas J Mullany Torts in the Nineties (LBC Information Services, Sydney, 1997) at p 
176.  
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activities (which do not contravene the laws) without hindrance or obstacles 
as defined in art 5 of the Federal Constitution.
103
  
 
In fact, the case provided an opportunity for the court to develop judicial 
recognition of the right to privacy. However, due to a heavy influence of the 
English common law and the court’s reluctance to uphold a new head of 
liability, it simply followed development in the UK by reason of the 
applicability of ss 3 and 5 of the Civil Law Act 1956. The judgment was 
based on questionable grounds. First, Malaysia has a written constitution that 
safeguards the fundamental rights and freedom of its subjects. When the 
Constitution is silent on a matter, then subsequent sources of law are to be 
considered.
104
 In reaching the judgment, the judge went straight to s 3(1) of 
the Civil Law Act 1956 and applied the common law principle to the matter. 
Following the hierarchy of the sources of law, a judge in formulating 
judgment should first determine the existence of any written law in Malaysia. 
Before any reference to English cases is made this route is mandatory. Gopal 
Sri Ram JCA said:
105
 
 
It is wholly unnecessary for our Courts to look to the Courts 
of England for any inspiration for the development of our 
jurisprudence on the subject under consideration. That is not 
to say that we may derive [sic] useful assistance from their 
decisions. But we have a dynamic written Constitution and 
our primary duty is to resolve issues of public law by having 
resort to its provisions. 
 
                                                          
103
Article 5(1) provides the deprivation of life and personal liberty save in accordance with 
law. 
104
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Another argument is that s 3(1) provides for the importation of English 
common law by the cut-off date in Peninsular Malaysia of 7 March 1956, but 
the application of the English common law after the date has a persuasive 
authority only.
106
 It is awkward that the judge followed the English precedent 
that did not represent common law as it had developed to 2004 and that she 
failed to note the passing of the Human Rights Act 1998.  Kaye was an odd 
case to rely on in 2004 considering the development of breach of confidence 
action and Douglas v Hello! which significantly altered the English legal 
landscape in protecting privacy.  
 
Following Ultra Dimension, the High Court in Dr Bernadine Malini Martin v 
MPH Magazines Sdn Bhd & Ors,
107
 confirmed that an invasion of privacy was 
not an actionable wrong. In this case, the plaintiff who was a government 
medical officer brought an action against the defendants for the tort of 
defamation. She alleged that the publication of her photograph in a bridal 
gown together with a write-up without her consent was defamatory, and 
alleged that the advertisement portrayed her as a woman of loose morals and 
an unsuccessful doctor who resorted to part-time modeling to supplement her 
income. In his judgment Hishamudin Yunus J acknowledged that the 
unauthorised publication of the plaintiff’s photograph in a magazine was 
intended for public circulation and that it was unethical and morally wrong of 
the defendants to have published it without her consent for the purpose of 
their commercial promotion. It was, he found, an unwarranted invasion of the 
plaintiff’s privacy. However, unfortunately for the plaintiff, as the law of this 
country stands presently, an invasion of privacy is not an actionable 
wrongdoing.
108
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 Reference to the law in England after the cut-off date does not have any binding effect in 
Malaysia. See The Malaysian Legal System, above n 13. 
107
[2006] 2 CLJ 1117 (Lew Che Phow). 
108
At [50]. 
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2 Recognition of the privacy tort 
 
In 2011, the High Court in Lew Cher Phow @ Lew Cha Paw & Ors v Pua 
Yong Yong & Anor
109
 recognised a right to privacy and held that the right to 
privacy of the plaintiffs should be protected. Although it was a High Court 
judgment and subject to review by higher courts, it has opened a new 
dimension in developing the right to privacy in Malaysia.   
 
The case concerned the issues of private nuisance and breach of the right to 
privacy. The plaintiffs and defendants were neighbours whose houses were 
separated by zinc sheets only. Disagreement arose between them and their 
relationship deteriorated. One of the plaintiffs was charged and convicted of 
criminal intimidation against the defendants. Sometime later, the defendants 
installed five CCTV cameras in their house. Camera (no 3) was located at the 
front porch and pointed directly at the plaintiffs’ house capturing and 
monitoring images of their front courtyard. The plaintiffs brought an action 
claiming that their right to privacy had been infringed.   
 
The court found that privacy in the present case was related to a person’s right 
to respect for his private and family life and his home. The fact that there is no 
specific provision in the Constitution guaranteeing the right to privacy does 
not preclude a court from holding that such a right exists because privacy is 
recognised as a fundamental human right internationally, given recognition by 
international covenants, treaties and regional human rights treaties. The 
defendants’ continuing act of putting the plaintiffs under surveillance 
represented a failure of respect for the plaintiff’s dignity and autonomy. It 
constituted an intrusive surveillance on the plaintiffs’ private and family life 
and home. The defendants’ fear for their safety and security did not justify 
their actions and did not override the plaintiffs’ right to privacy. Continuous 
CCTV surveillance by the defendant was an unwarranted violation of the 
                                                          
109
[2011] MLJU 1195 (HC). 
106 
 
plaintiffs’ right to privacy. Thus, the plaintiffs were entitled to protection even 
though the invasion did not cause actual or pecuniary damage. An injunction 
to restrain the defendants from installing any CCTV directed at the plaintiff’s 
house was granted.
110
 The court also acknowledged that the views presented 
in Ultra Dimension were out of date considering new emerging trends and 
changing societal conditions. 
 
The question as to whether a cause of action for violation or invasion of 
privacy rights is actionable under the law of tort had been confirmed in the 
earlier case of Lee Ewe Poh v Dr Lim Teik Man & Anor.
111
 There, the plaintiff 
brought an action against the first defendant who took photographs of her 
private parts during the Stapler Haemorrhoidectomy procedure. She claimed 
that taking the photographs was a violation of her privacy and dignity as it 
was done without her consent. The court referred to Maslinda Ishak which 
held that in Malaysian common law privacy is an actionable cause of action 
and accepted as a cause of action thus permissible for a plaintiff to found her 
action. On the nature of privacy, the court stated that the privacy of a female 
in relation to her modesty, decency and dignity in the context of its high moral 
value in society is fundamental to sustaining that high morality demanded of 
her and ought, therefore, to be entrenched. Hence, the plaintiff successfully 
maintained her claim. Chew Soo Ho JC remarked that:
112
 
 
…modesty and decency of the female patients must be respected and 
not violated. A failure to do so constitutes an invasion of the 
plaintiff’s privacy or a breach of the trust and confidence that the 
plaintiff as patient had reposed on her treating doctor. 
 
The situation is the same if it involves a male patient although, of course, 
different parts of the body would be treated differently depending on the 
                                                          
110
per Vernon Ong J. 
111
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gender of the subject. Beyond this, there should be no gender discrimination 
in treating situations involving privacy. This is confirmed by art 8 of the 
Constitution on equality: 
 
(1) All persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal 
protection of the law. 
(2) Except as expressly authorised by this Constitution, there shall 
be no discrimination against citizens on the ground only of religion, 
race, descent, place of birth or gender in any law or in the 
appointment to any office or employment under a public authority 
or in the administration of any law relating to the acquisition, 
holding or disposition of property or the establishing or carrying on 
of any trade, business, profession, vocation or employment. 
 
The refusal to recognise the tort of privacy in Ultra Dimension was not 
followed in Maslinda Ishak.
113
 Instead the status of an invasion of privacy in 
Malaysia changed when the Court of Appeal recognised and affirmed it as a 
cause of action and thus an actionable tort. The plaintiff Maslinda was 
arrested at a night-club in a joint operation of officers of RELA
114
 and 
JAWI.
115
 She was put in a truck together with other persons arrested. The 
plaintiff asked the defendant to use toilet facilities but was refused, scolded 
and told to urinate in the truck. As she was unable to hold on, she asked her 
friends to shield her by encircling her with a shawl. At the same time the 
defendant (an officer of RELA) opened the door, rushed in, pulled down the 
shawl and took numerous photos of her. Maslinda pleaded that her privacy 
had been invaded, resulting in humiliation, trauma and serious mental anguish 
as a result of the defendant’s action of photographing her in a squatting 
position urinating within the view of everyone in the truck.  
                                                          
113
Above n 14. 
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 Federal Territory Islamic Affairs Department. 
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The judge found for Maslinda and held that the issue of invasion of privacy 
was never under challenge. The High Court in so finding departed from the 
old English law that invasion of privacy is not an actionable tort.
116
 When the 
case was brought on appeal, the Court of Appeal indirectly, though the issue 
was not canvassed,
117
 seemed to endorse such cause of action and did not 
overrule invasion of privacy as a cause of action on the ground that it was not 
in line with the English law.
118
 
 
The defendant was subsequently prosecuted and charged under s 509 of the 
Penal Code which provides that “it is an offence to insult the modesty of any 
person, utter any word, make any sound or gesture, or exhibit any object, 
intending that such word or sound shall be heard, or that such gesture or 
object shall be seen by such person, or intrude upon the privacy of such 
person”. He pleaded guilty and was convicted.   
 
The analysis of recent judgments shows that the Malaysian courts are 
progressing towards recognition of the right to privacy and providing 
remedies for infringements. This recognition was achieved in Lew Cher 
Phow, Maslinda Ishak and Lee Ewe Poh when the courts affirmed invasion of 
privacy as an actionable tort. However, it is vital to emphasise that these three 
judgments come from the High Court and the Court of Appeal which are not 
the highest courts in Malaysia. Further development of the right to privacy can 
only be determined by future cases.  
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B Other cases 
 
Historically, privacy was not an unfamiliar concept as it has been mentioned 
several times in the Malaysian judicial arena. The opportunity to analyse 
privacy as an issue that needed protection and recognition, however, has never 
been taken up by the courts.
119
   
 
There are isolated examples of courts recognising the importance of privacy 
interests in case law. For instance, Public Prosecutor v Lee Sin Long
120
 
involved the search of premises. A warrant is required before a search can 
take place, and the householder may be justified in refusing admission to a 
police officer in the absence of such a warrant. Callow J stipulated that “the 
privacy of a person in his home must be respected, and cannot be disturbed 
unless first shown proper authority that reasonable cause for interference is 
warranted”. However, there was no further discussion of privacy issues. 
 
In Electrical Industry Workers Union & Ors v Makonka Electronics Sdn 
Bhd,
121
 Abdul Wahab JC stated that strict compliance with the undertakings 
and terms was essential when an Anton Piller order
122
 is granted. The court 
was aware of the effect of the order on the privacy rights of the defendant but 
made no further comment on the privacy matter.  
 
The importance of privacy of one’s home was again mentioned in HMO 
Pacific Sdn Bhd v Dr Johari Bin Muhamad Yusup
123
 in which Rekhraj JC that 
the Anton Piller order as one of the law’s “nuclear weapons” which is to “be 
                                                          
119See Hurriyah El Islamy “Privacy as Freedom of Private Life: The Re-examination of the 
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very sparingly resorted to in very special and rare circumstances; as the relief 
sought erodes the right to sanctity and sanctuary to a privacy of one’s own 
home”.  
 
These cases show that the importance of privacy was considered when giving 
judgment. Nevertheless they did not directly determine the issues or the 
meaning of privacy.  
 
VI Conclusion 
  
Discussion of the existing protection for privacy in Malaysia shows that the 
protection available in various sources of law in Malaysia is inadequate to 
offer a comprehensive safeguard to the right to privacy, and insufficient to 
provide remedies to the victim of an invasion of privacy.  
 
Constitutional protection and relevant common law principles have indirectly 
provided elements for the protection of the right; however, the nature and 
coverage of each law is not complete and does not conform to the concept of 
privacy advanced by this thesis.  
 
Future opportunities to develop a constitutional right to privacy as occurred in 
Sivarasa should be considered. As the personal liberty clause encompasses a 
wide range of values connected with individual liberty, it is sensible to include 
the protection of the right to privacy under the umbrella of personal liberty. 
The route taken by the Indian courts could provide reference for Malaysia to 
develop the same. Besides, the judicial direction initiated in Lew Cher Phow, 
Lee Ewe Poh and Maslinda Ishak needs to continue if privacy is to be given 
the status of a right in Malaysia. Thus, a constitutional right to privacy and a 
common law tort have some potential to fill the gaps in the legal framework. 
Having discussed Sivarasa and common law principles, the thesis found that 
those two methods could provide protection to some aspects of privacy breach 
111 
 
but not as comprehensive as what will be offered by the proposed Act itself. 
Thus, this thesis is advocating a more inclusive and direct approach, namely 
the enactment of a specific privacy action which is discussed in Chapter 
Seven. But, even if the courts prefer the common law path to the one being 
advocated in this thesis, they will need to look at other jurisdictions. Two of 
those are the UK and NZ, which are discussed in Part III.  
 
Before those jurisdictions’ experiences are examined, it is important to look at 
other Malaysian statutes’ ability to afford protection to privacy interests which 
is discussed in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
A COMPARATIVE EXAMINATION OF STATUTORY 
PROTECTION OF PRIVACY IN MALAYSIA 
 
I Overview 
 
Apart from the constitutional protection and common law principles indirectly 
applicable for the protection of privacy and shown in the previous chapter to 
be inadequate, the next question to consider is how far the existing legislation 
provides protection against breach of privacy. It is important to explore such 
protection in criminal law and other statutes. 
 
In addition to criminal law and other statutes, the only legislation in Malaysia 
that directly deals with an aspect of privacy interest, ie data privacy, is the 
Personal Data Protection Act 2010 (PDPA). As a result of rapid commercial 
and economic development and concerns about consumer needs, domestic or 
international trade, there is an urgent need for the introduction of data privacy 
legislation. Incidents involving violations of personal data, such as the credit 
status of individuals, has increased public awareness and the government’s 
need to introduce a specific law to protect an individual’s personal data. Issues 
such as rights and liabilities pertaining to information, protection of 
information from unlawful use, the right to information, the status of 
information belonging to individuals, and overall issues pertaining to the 
future of online trade and commerce using other people’s data should be given 
attention in Malaysian legal development.  
 
This chapter examines all legislative protections of privacy to determine their 
ability to provide sanctions and remedies for breach of privacy actions and 
also to underline their inadequacies. The main focus of such laws is the PDPA 
which is compared to two model countries’ Acts: the UK Data Protection Act 
113 
 
1998 (DPA) and the NZ Privacy Act 1993 (PA). This comparison is necessary 
to identify gaps the PDPA has in its current form and to suggest 
improvements based on the model countries’ experiences.   
 
Thus, Part I gives an overview of legislation that will be discussed in this 
chapter. Part II examines the criminal branch of law and other statutes that 
have an implication of privacy interests in Malaysia. Part III discusses the 
PDPA 2010 and its adequacy to protect private and personal information as 
defined by this thesis. Part IV analyses the UK Data Protection Act 1998 in 
order to address any gaps inherent in the PDPA. Part V analyses the New 
Zealand Privacy Act 1993 to understand the kind of data protection law which 
enhances the protection of personal data. Part VI analyses the flaws in the 
PDPA and addresses relevant provisions from the DPA and PA which would 
improve the Malaysian law. Part VII concludes the discussion and suggests 
ways to remedy the weaknesses in the PDPA.  
 
II Relevant Statutes for the Protection of Privacy 
  
There is no specific legislation for the protection of privacy in the Malaysian 
legal framework. However, general protection for privacy may be sought from 
other legislation. The discussion in this Part evaluates protection provided by 
criminal law and other statutes.  
 
A Criminal law 
 
In the context of criminal law, the protection of privacy may be addressed by 
the protection from physical interference of a person’s modesty or dignity.  
The word “privacy” in s 509 of the Penal Code is used in connection with 
words or gestures intended to insult the modesty of a person: 
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Whoever, intending to insult the modesty of any person, utters any 
word, makes any sound or gesture, or exhibits any object, intending 
that such word or sound shall be heard, or that such gestures or 
object shall be seen by such person, or intrudes upon the privacy of 
such person, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which 
may extend to five years, or with fine, or with both.  
 
The phrase “intrudes upon the privacy of such person” implies wider 
protection for privacy interests. An offence is committed if there is an 
intrusion upon the privacy of another person with the intention of insulting 
that person’s modesty.1 In other words, intrusion of privacy alone under s 509 
does not amount to an offence.  However, through case law, the provision has 
been construed to include the physical act of intruding on a person’s privacy 
that does not involve any direct contact between the offender and the victim.  
 
For example in Abu Hassan Bin Abd Jamal v Public Prosecutor,2 the court 
held that the appellant had committed an offence under s 509 of the Penal 
Code by exposing his private parts because such an act would naturally cause 
embarrassment and insult any person’s modesty. The incident occurred in the 
canteen of a girls’ primary school and was seen by a group of schoolchildren. 
The court determined that an offence under s 509 of the Penal Code is not a 
trivial offence and the circumstances under which the appellant committed it 
did not at all warrant the exercise of any discretion under s 173A of the 
Criminal Procedure Code to discharge the appellant conditionally or 
unconditionally. Thus, the fine and term of imprisonment imposed by the 
Magistrate was upheld. 
 
                                                          
1
See Kong Lai Soo v Ho Kean [1973] 2 MLJ 250. In that case, the defendant’s son was 
charged and convicted under s 509 of the Penal Code for exposing his private parts with the 
intention that the landlord’s daughter could see them. The court held that it undoubtedly 
outraged the modesty of the landlord’s daughter. 
2
[1994] MLJU 223 (HC). 
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The case illustrates that s 509 protects some aspects of physical privacy and 
against some intrusions into modesty but does not fit within the definition of 
unwanted access to information or physical space or body given in Chapter 
Two.  
 
 Similarly, in Maslinda Ishak v Mohd Tahir Osman & Ors
3
 the court held that 
taking numerous photos of the person in a squatting position urinating in 
public view was an offence under s 509. The defendant pleaded guilty and 
was convicted.
4
 The defendant’s act was an intrusion into a person’s modesty 
that is the primary focus of s 509. Both cases show that s 509 indirectly 
protects an individual’s privacy in the situation where the act of intrusion 
occurs with the intention of offending that person’s modesty.  
 
To invoke s 509 in the context of unwanted physical access as defined in this 
thesis is inappropriate because sometimes unwanted or undesirable physical 
access occurs but has nothing to do with the other person’s modesty. For 
example, Gavison’s definition of solitude maintains that physical proximity is 
also a kind of physical access but there are certain occasions when physical 
proximity will not necessarily insult the person’s modesty as provided by s 
509. For example if a person is continually followed, watched or overheard, 
unwanted physical access occurs but these acts do not necessary insult a 
person’s modesty. These kinds of unwanted access are not sanctioned by 
criminal law. 
 
Another form of unlawful intrusion, such as assault and battery is provided for 
in the Penal Code.5 These provisions protect against bodily intrusion from any 
gesture or any preparation that will cause any person present to apprehend that 
criminal force is about to be applied to that person. Thus, the provision 
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Maslinda Ishak, above ch 3, n 14. 
4
The defendant was convicted under s 509 of the Penal Code under Arrest Case C83-494 of 
2003.  
5
Sections 350, 351 of the Penal Code (Act 574). 
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prevents access to an individual’s physical body. However, if A hits B’s head, 
unwanted intrusion to B’s physical body occurs but this in itself has nothing to 
do with privacy, and therefore, A is guilty of assault and battery under 
criminal law. 
 
In terms of telecommunication privacy, s 234 of the Communications and 
Multimedia Act 1998 provides another potential avenue by which a person 
can be charged for intruding on the privacy of another in the context of data 
privacy. The provision prohibits unlawful interception of communications and 
unlawful disclosure of authorised interception. 6  This clear prohibition of 
unlawful intentional interception and disclosure of communication is aimed at 
protecting the confidentiality of information. This provision is capable of 
covering interception of various forms of Internet communication including e-
mail, e-commerce transactions and chat-room interactions. The provision not 
only makes interception an offence, but also the disclosure and use of 
communications obtained through unlawful interception.7  
 
In a situation where no criminal intimidation or threat exists, an offence under 
s 292 of the Penal Code occurs if the accused intrudes upon the privacy of 
others by possessing, circulating, distributing obscene acts or photos.8 This 
provision offers indirect protection of privacy to an individual if any acts or 
photos have been distributed, processed or circulated.9  
 
                                                          
6
Section 234 provides on the prohibition of interception and disclosure of communications. 
7
Exceptionally, provisions in the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 restricting 
telecommunications interception can be ignored or overridden by the Internal Security Act 
1960 and the Computer Crime Act 1997. The Internal Security Act 1960 gives special powers 
to police to act in situations relating to subversive publication, internal security and for the 
preservation of public security. Further s 6 of the Computer Crimes Act 1997 provides that a 
person shall be guilty of an offence if he communicates directly or indirectly a number, code, 
password or other means of access to a computer to any person other than a person to whom 
he is duly authorised to communicate. 
8
Section 292 provides on Sale, etc., of obscene books, etc. 
9
The distribution of the copies of the DVDs of an MCA high council member having sex with 
an unknown woman was an offence under this provision. See above Chapter One, Part II.  
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Other than that, there are specific measures to be observed by the police who 
conduct a search and seizure under the Criminal Procedure Code.10 The Code 
provides that the police officer or private person making the arrest may search 
a person and place in safe custody all articles other than essential clothing 
found upon him, and any of articles which there is reason to believe were the 
instruments or fruits or other evidence of the crime, and these may be detained 
until the discharge or acquittal of the person arrested. This procedure 
indirectly protects individual’s privacy.  
 
Looking at the nature of the offences and the extent of the protection offered 
by criminal law, it is clear that current law does not protect privacy adequately 
and a better legislative framework is desirable to provide a more 
encompassing safeguard for privacy interests. As discussed earlier in Chapter 
Three Part III (A), privacy is a branch of tort law. Therefore, to remedy a 
breach of privacy through a criminal law protection requires the proof of actus 
reus and mens rea, which are irrelevant in tort. Furthermore, criminal liability 
relies on police investigation and no compensation is available to the victim. 
In fact, even in circumstances where the breach is an offence against the state, 
invasion of privacy is a civil wrong against another person. Thus, criminal law 
protects privacy indirectly as long as it relates to the protection of modesty 
and human dignity but the protection does not extend to unwanted access over 
personal information and private space. 
 
To conclude, it is possible for criminal sanction and civil liability for breach 
of privacy to co-exist. To illustrate the point, if A publishes an intimate photo 
of X, the offence is caught under s 292 of the Penal Code.
11
 A claim for 
compensation can be brought by X, who wishes to keep the matter private, 
against A for unauthorised publication of personal information. Apart from 
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Section 20 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act 593).  
11
C v Holland [2012] 3 NZLR 672 is a New Zealand example of a situation where intimate 
filming resulted in both criminal sanction and civil liability. 
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the criminal law, the following section examines possible protections for 
privacy in other statutes. 
 
B Other Statutory Protection 
 
As previously discussed, criminal laws are not capable of providing protection 
against breach of privacy. The question arises as to whether other laws may 
remedy the deficiencies in common law principles, the Constitution and the 
criminal law. This section examines the laws in order to answer such a 
question.
12
 
 
The Child Act 2001 protects the privacy of children under 18 years of age 
through restrictions imposed on the media for reporting and publicising any 
information relating to children. It prohibits the media from revealing the 
name, address, educational institution, or any particulars that may lead to the 
identification of any child. The prohibition also covers the publication of the 
photo of any child in a newspaper, magazine or electronic medium. 13 
However, the above restrictions do not apply if the Court for Children is 
satisfied that such revelation is necessary in the interest of justice and if there 
is an application by or with the authority of a Protector.
14
 Essentially, the 
protection provided is relevant only in cases of media intrusion and not the 
disclosure or publication of information by another individual. Though the 
law applies to a specific target, ie media, it undoubtedly acknowledges the 
importance of privacy of young people in Malaysia. 
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See also discussions of privacy interest and legislation in Haidar, above ch 3, n 67, at 209-
215. 
13
Section 15 provides restrictions on media reporting and publication. See also Haidar, above 
ch 3 n 67, at 210-211. The author explains how freedom of expression needs to be balanced 
with the interests of children. 
14Section 15(3). “Protector” is defined in s 2 means— (a) the Director General; (b) the Deputy 
Director General;(c) a Divisional Director of Social Welfare, Department of Social Welfare; 
(d) the State Director of Social Welfare of each of the States; (e) any Social Welfare Officer 
appointed under s 8. 
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Indirect protection of personal privacy in terms of proprietary right is 
provided under s 44 (1) (a) of the National Land Code 1965:  
 
Subject to the provisions of this Act and of any other written law for 
the time being in force, any person or body to whom (under this Act 
or a previous land law) land has been alienated, reserved land has 
been leased or temporary occupation license (including a license so 
styled under a previous land law) has been granted in respect of any 
land, shall be entitled to: 
(a) the exclusive use and enjoyment of so much of the column of 
airspace above the surface of the land, and so much of the land 
below that surface, as is reasonably necessary to the lawful use 
and enjoyment of the land; 
 
The above provides that a person has exclusive use and enjoyment of his land 
so far as it is reasonable to enjoy the proprietary rights. However, the phrase 
“reasonably necessary” implies that although the landowner has absolute 
control over the land and can exclude any unwanted or unnecessary access to 
it, the claim must be a reasonable one.15 
 
Several statutory provisions explicitly include privacy as an element in 
protecting other interests. One relevant provision dealing indirectly with 
privacy is s 29b (4) of the Moneylenders Act 1951: 
 
For the purpose of subsection (1), the doing of an act of harassment 
or intimidation upon another person includes the making of 
statements, sounds or gestures, or exhibiting of any object intending 
that such word or sound shall be heard or that such person shall see 
such gesture or object or intruding upon the privacy of such person.   
 
                                                          
15
Refer Chen Yus Kiew (F) v Angkasamas Sdn Bhd [2003] 4 MLJ 365, K Mahunaran v 
Osmond Chiang Siang Kuan [1996] 5 MLJ 293. For detailed discussion of the cases, see 
Chapter Three, Part IV.  
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The main interest in the protection scheme is to prohibit moneylenders from 
harassing and intimidating borrowers. The phrase “intruding upon the privacy 
of such person” suggests the effect of harassment on another person and not 
protection of privacy generally. Thus, in this provision, intrusion of privacy is 
an important element in order to establish the act of harassment or 
intimidation on the part of the moneylender. It does not aim to provide 
protection against an infringement of privacy.  
 
Economic and technological advancement has an impact on privacy-related 
interests and accordingly Malaysia has enacted several cyber laws such as the 
Digital Signature Act 1997,16 the Telemedicine Act 199717 and the Personal 
Data Protection Act 2010.18 These laws are part of the legal infrastructure in 
regulating information and communication through cyberspace.  
 
The protection of privacy in the cyber arena is the result of the government’s 
commitment to develop the information technology sector in its goal to 
become a developed country by 2020. This suggests that protection of privacy 
is necessary for economic purposes in information and communication 
technology rather than for the promotion of privacy as a foundational right in 
a democratic society.19 
 
The above discussion reveals that no single piece of legislation addresses the 
general concept of privacy and its protection in Malaysia. A patchy form of 
                                                          
16
The Digital Signature Act was enacted to instil confidence and encourage the public to 
perform secured electronic transactions domestically as well as internationally. Under the Act, 
the digital signature provides a verification system to authenticate the identity of the author 
and verify the transmitted message. 
17
The Act safeguards patient’s privacy by providing that “The consent given by a patient 
under subsection (1) is not valid for the purpose of that subsection unless the fully registered 
medical practitioner has, before the consent is given, informed the patient — (c) that all 
existing confidentiality protection apply to any information about the patient obtained or 
disclosed in the course of the telemedicine interaction”. 
18
The overview of the PDPA 2010, its applicability and the shortcomings will be discussed in 
the next part. 
19
Privacy is a matter of balance rather than human right. See Ida Madieha Azmi “E-
Commerce and Privacy Issues: An Analysis of the Personal Data Protection Bill” (2002) 16 
IRLCT 326. 
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protection in common law and legislation suggests that the existing 
framework provides protection for aspects of privacy but not for privacy 
generally. It mainly protects privacy indirectly because the nature of the 
privacy interest is embedded in the main action requiring protection by the 
relevant legislation. Some of these measures will protect privacy in limited 
and haphazard circumstances but by no means all.  
 
The enactment of the PDPA can be an effective tool in providing protection of 
private information. Its details are discussed below.  
 
III Personal Data Protection Act 2010 
  
This Part discusses briefly the reason for the introduction of the PDPA and 
examines in detail its scope and protection of personal data. It also analyses 
how far the Act provides protection against unwanted access to private 
information as defined in Chapter Two.  
 
A Introduction 
 
The draft Data Protection Bill in 1998 was the government’s first effort to 
introduce a specific law on data protection.
20
 However, the first Bill never 
made it to the Parliament due to heavy opposition from the communication 
and multimedia industry. Later in 2001, it was redrafted for further relaxation 
of rules, and in 2009, it was tabled and debated in the March sitting of 
Parliament.   
 
This Bill resulted in the introduction of the Personal Data Protection Act 2010 
(the PDPA) which was passed in June 2010.21 It may be regarded as the single 
                                                          
20
In 1998, the Malaysian government introduced a draft Data Protection Bill.    
21
The PDPA was passed on 5 April 2010 and was given the Royal Assent on 2 June 2010. It 
was gazetted and became law on 10 June 2010.  See “Parliament: Personal Data Protection 
Bill Passed” The Star Online (Malaysia, 5 April 2010). It was in force on 15 November 2013. 
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piece of legislation that specifically addresses the protection of personal data. 
Initially the PDPA replicated laws on personal data from other jurisdictions in 
respect of the personal data protection principles with modifications to suit 
local needs and circumstances. Its dominant influences are the Hong Kong 
Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance 1995 and the UK Data Protection Act 
1998. The personal data protection principles are identical to both pieces of 
legislation. The PDPA contains those principles in order to satisfy minimum 
requirements for the law governing the collection and processing of personal 
data.22   
 
According to Datuk Seri Dr Rais Yatim,23 the introduction of the PDPA will 
speed up the development of electronic connection and transactions such as e-
commerce and e-business. It is expected that the law will, among other things, 
help Malaysia to become a communication and electronic trade centre, an 
attractive location for investment in multimedia and communications 
industries, and an international trade partner able to offer personal data 
protection assurance according to international standards. 24  With the 
introduction of the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC), this aim is in line with 
the government’s desire to transform Malaysia into a knowledge-based 
economy and society and achieve a fully developed status by 2020. This 
                                                          
22
Article 25 of EU Directive provides that “(1) The Member States shall provide that the 
transfer to a third country of personal data which are undergoing processing or are intended 
for processing after transfer may take place only if, without prejudice to compliance with the 
national provisions adopted pursuant to the other provisions of this Directive, the third 
country in question ensures an adequate level of protection, (2) The adequacy of the level of 
protection afforded by a third country shall be assessed in the light of all the circumstances 
surrounding a data transfer operation or set of data transfer operations; particular 
consideration shall be given to the nature of the data, the purpose and duration of the 
proposed processing operation or operations, the country of origin and country of final 
destination, the rules of law, both general and sectoral, in force in the third country in 
question and the professional rules and security measures which are complied with in that 
country”. 
23
The former Minister for Information, Communication and Culture (in office from 10 April 
2009 – 5 May 2013).  
24Rais Yatim “Protecting your personal data” The Star Online (Malaysia, 12 February 2012). 
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initiative has been driven by Malaysia’s fourth Prime Minister Tun Dr 
Mahathir Mohamed.25 
 
The PDPA aims at regulating the collection, holding, processing and use of 
personal data in commercial transactions and also to prevent malicious use of 
personal information. It plays a crucial role in safeguarding the interest of 
individuals and makes it illegal for anyone, be it corporate entities or 
individuals, to sell personal information or allow such use of data by third 
parties. This objective is clearly outlined in its preamble: “to regulate and 
protect the process of personal data from being misused through commercial 
transactions and matters relating thereto.” 
 
For the first time in Malaysia the PDPA provides for the regulation and 
processing of both online and offline personal data in the area of commercial 
transactions for the purpose of providing protection for the interests of data 
subjects.26 The PDPA also has arguably filled the long-standing gap in relation 
to protecting an individual’s private data. Previously, apart from certain 
sectoral secrecy obligations, information of a personal nature was protected 
only through contractual obligations or the common law.27 The PDPA is able 
to strengthen the management of personal data as a social obligation. The 
objective of protecting the privacy of an individual is important, quite apart 
from the objective of producing integrated and responsible daily practice of e-
commerce use.28  
 
                                                          
25
The Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) was introduced in 1996 which is intended to 
“leapfrog Malaysia into the Information Age.” See  <http://www.malaysia.gov.my.> 
26 See Zuryati Mohamed Yusoff “The Malaysian Personal Data Protection Act 2010: A 
Legislation Note” (2011) 9 NZJPIL 119. In this article, the author discussed the background 
of the Act, the scope, limitations of the Act and provided suggestions to remedy the flaws in 
the Act.  
27
Huriyyah El Islamy “Information Privacy in Malaysia: A Legal Perspective” (2005) 1 
Malayan Law Journal xxv. 
28
See Rais, above n 24. 
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Before analysing the extent to which the personal data law provides protection 
for privacy interests, particularly private information, the following discussion 
assesses the PDPA’s key features and its principles. 
 
1  Salient features  
 
The focus of the Act is the protection of personal data which is defined29 as 
 
any information in respect of commercial transactions which- 
(a) is being processed wholly or partly by means of equipment 
operating automatically in response to instructions given for 
that purpose; 
(b) is recorded with the intention that it should wholly or partly 
be processed by means of such equipment; or 
(c) is recorded as part of a relevant filing system, or with the 
intention that it should form part of a relevant filing system, 
that relates directly or indirectly to a data subject, who is 
identified or identifiable from that information or from that and 
other information in the possession of the data user, including 
any sensitive personal data and expression or opinion about the 
data subject; but does not include any information that is 
processed for the purpose of a credit reporting business carried 
on by a credit reporting agency under the Credit Reporting 
Agencies Act 2010. 
 
Personal data, therefore, includes any information or opinion as far as it 
relates to an identified or identifiable living perso30 and is processed both 
                                                          
29
Section 4. 
30
Section 4 defines data subject as an individual who is the subject of the personal data. The 
word individual here clearly points to living persons. The term “data user” refers to a person 
who either alone or jointly or in common with other persons processes any personal data or 
has control over or authorises the processing of any personal data, but does not include a data 
processor defined in s 4. Data processor means any person, other than an employee of the data 
user, who processed the personal data solely on behalf of the data user, and does not process 
the personal data for any of his or her own purposes. According to Abu Bakar, a data user has 
to be a legal person and it covers individuals as well as companies and other corporate and 
unincorporated entities. See Abu Bakar Munir “Personal Data Protection Act: Doing Well By 
Doing Good” [2012] 1 MLJ lxxxiii. 
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manually and electronically. 31  However, personal data used for non-
commercial purposes is not covered by s 4. To invoke protection under the 
PDPA, data must relate to any transaction of a commercial nature, whether 
contractual or not, which includes any matters relating to the supply or 
exchange of goods or services, agency, investments, financing, banking and 
insurance, but does not include a credit reporting business carried out by a 
credit reporting agency under the Credit Reporting Agencies Act 2010. 
 
According to Abu Bakar, the test to determine whether data is “personal data” 
is: can an individual be indentified from the data, or from the data which is in 
possession of the data user? If the answer is “yes”, it is likely that the data is 
personal data.32  
 
The processing of personal data is comprehensively defined in the PDPA to 
include all activities of a data user. It defines “processing”33 to mean:  
collecting, recording, holding or storing the personal data or 
carrying out any operation or set of operations on the personal data 
including- 
(a) the organisation, adaptation or alteration of personal data; 
(b) the retrieval, consultation or use of personal data; 
(c) the disclosure of personal data by transmission, transfer, 
dissemination or otherwise making available; or 
(d) the alignment, combination, correction, erasure or 
destruction of personal data. 
 
                                                          
31 Section 4 defines “relevant filing system” to mean any set of information relating to 
individuals to the extent that, although the information is not processed by means of 
equipment operating automatically in response to instructions given for that purpose, the set 
of information is structured, either by reference to individuals or by reference to criteria 
relating to individuals, in such a way that specific information relating to a particular 
individual is readily accessible. 
32
Abu Bakar, above n 30, at lxxxiv. The author gives an example of a name such a 
Muhammad or John which would not be regarded as personal data on its own, but other 
personal information combined with the name such as addresses or an identification number, 
the combined information is personal data because a person can be clearly identified by such 
information.  
33
Section 4. 
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The PDPA provides a regulatory framework for the processing of personal 
data in commercial 34  transactions. Thus, the meaning of “commercial 
transactions” is crucial in order to understand the nature of the personal data 
protected under the PDPA. Commercial transactions refer to35 
any transaction of a commercial nature, whether contractual or not, which 
includes any matters relating to the supply or exchange of goods or services, 
agency, investments financing, banking and insurance, but does not include a 
credit reporting business carried out by a credit reporting agency under the 
Credit Reporting  Agency Act 2010. 
 
From the definition, the data and confidential information of online consumers 
fall under the meaning of “commercial transactions”. Thus, if a customer 
gives the name, address, contact number and other information to complete a 
transaction, that data or personal information is protected under the PDPA. 
The company receiving the information is under an obligation to keep the data 
and is only allowed to use or disseminate it with the consent of the data 
subject. Conversely, the data of a patient in relation to medical treatment does 
not fall under this definition as it does not have commercial features. 
Nevertheless, that data merits similar protection for the reason that it is easily 
abused and misused through online transactions.36 Similarly, the PDPA has no 
application to personal data collected through social media networking 
websites such as Facebook, Twitter and MySpace because that data is not a 
result of commercial transactions.37 The fact that this data is stored and held 
                                                          
34The word “commercial” has not been defined in Malaysian commercial legislation - the 
Contracts Act 1950, the Sale of Goods Act 1957, Banking and Financial Institutions Act 
1989, the Consumer Protection Act 1999 and also the Hire Purchase Act 1967. 
35
Section 4. The definition of personal data also excludes the information processed for the 
purpose of credit reporting business and is redundant with the definition of “commercial 
transaction”. 
36
However, there is a partial exemption for personal data processed in relation to information 
of the physical or mental health.  That data shall be exempted from the Access Principle and 
other related provisions of the PDPA.  This exemption is provided in s 45(2)(b). 
37See also Foong Cheng Leong “Personal data and the law” The Star Online (Malaysia, 5 
August 2010). 
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by foreign online providers which do not have local centres of data-
processing, justifies its exclusion from the scope the Act.38  
 
In relation to the definition of “commercial transactions”, it is interesting to 
note the definition of “credit reporting agency” as the PDPA expressly 
excludes its application to such business. Under the Credit Reporting 
Agencies Act 2010 (CRA 2010)39 the consent40 of an individual is needed 
before financial information can be revealed by credit-reporting agencies.41 In 
its explanatory statement, the CRA states that the purpose of the legislation is 
“to provide for the registration and regulation of persons carrying on credit 
reporting businesses and for matters connected therewith and incidental 
thereto”. The term “credit reporting business” as provided under the CRA 
2010 means:42  
a business that involves the processing of credit information for the 
purpose of providing a credit report to another person, whether for 
profit, reward or otherwise, but shall not include the processing of 
credit information- 
(a) for the purpose of discharging regulatory functions or that is 
required or authorized by or under any law; or  
(b) by a credit rating agency. 
 
Thus, all businesses which fall under this definition will be governed by the 
CRA 2010 and not by the PDPA. This specific exclusion of credit reporters 
from the ambit of the Act is harmful for data users whose information is 
                                                          
38This is expressly provided under section 3(2) that “This Act shall not apply to any personal 
data processed outside Malaysia unless that personal data is intended to be further processed 
in Malaysia”. 
39
The Act adopted the New Zealand Credit Reporting Privacy Code 2004 which is established 
under the Privacy Act 1993.  
40Section 24(1)(a) of the CRA 2010 provides that “No credit reporting agency shall disclose 
any credit information for any purpose to any person unless the customer has given his 
consent to the disclosure”. 
41See Zulkifli Abd Rahman “Bill requiring credit-reporting agencies to obtain consent passed” 
The Star Online (Malaysia, 20 April 2010).  
42
 Section 2 of the CRA 2010. 
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collected by them and sold to other parties. However, the Deputy Finance 
Minister Datuk Dr Awang Adek Hussin has stated that the activities of credit-
reporting agencies will also be checked through other provisions under the 
Companies Act and the PDPA. The onus is on the credit-reporting agencies to 
prove that they have taken reasonable steps to hold correct and up-to-date 
information in their database. This is to prevent problems of incorrect 
financial information of consumers by unverified sources.43 In this sense, a 
consumer’s data is protected from being intruded upon or altered because the 
consumer has the right to inspect and give consent as to whether the data is to 
be displayed or not. 
 
2 Personal data protection principles 
 
The core of the PDPA is the personal data protection principles. The Act 
requires that a data user complies with all the principles in processing 
personal data outlined in Part II of the Act.44 These principles are framed by 
reference to international instruments governing the protection of privacy and 
trans-border flows of personal data. The interrelationship of computers, 
freedom, privacy and trade has become a topic of concern among international 
organisations.45 The seven principles are briefly discussed here.46  
 
The PDPA does not allow a data user to process any personal data about an 
individual unless that individual has given consent to the processing of the 
                                                          
43
Zulkifli, above n 41.  
44
Section 5. 
45
Rosemary Jay Data Protection Law and Practice (3
rd
 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2007) 
at 6 [Data Protection Law and Practice]. 
46
Various authors have addressed the personal data protection principles under the PDP 2010. 
Among them are Khaw Lake Tee “Towards a personal data protection regime in Malaysia” 
(2002) JMCL 11; Abu Bakar Munir  “Data Protection Law: Too little, too late?” (Public 
Lecture 2009, Universiti Malaya, 4 August 2009); Ida Madieha Azmi “E-Commerce and 
privacy issues: An analysis of the Personal Data Protection Bill” (17th BILETA Annual 
Conference, Free University, Amsterdam, 5-6 April 2002) and Graham Greenleaf 
“Limitations of Malaysia’s data protection Bill” (2010) 104 Privacy Laws and Business 
International Newsletter 1. 
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personal data.47 A data user shall not process any sensitive personal data about 
a data subject unless consent is given and the processing is in accordance with 
the provision of s 40.48 The personal data shall not, without the consent of the 
data subject, be disclosed except where the disclosure is in connection with 
what it was collected for or is directly related to the data user’s activity.49  
 
Consent is vital in the processing of personal data. However, the PDPA does 
not define consent. According to Abu Bakar, consent in the PDPA can mean 
any freely given specific and informed indication of a data subject’s wishes 
and his agreement to his personal data being processed and whether oral  or 
implied.50 
 
Section 7 states that where a data user is required to give written notice 
informing an individual (“the data subject”) that his personal data is being 
processed by, or on behalf of the data user, the notice shall, amongst other 
things, include the purpose for which the personal data is being collected, and 
whether it is obligatory or voluntary for the data subject to provide his 
personal data. The notice must be given at the earliest opportunity for the data 
subject to supply his personal data. 
 
In the absence of consent by the data subject, the Act prohibits the data user 
from disclosing the personal data. 51  The data user may only disclose the 
personal data for the purpose or directly related purpose, which the data was 
disclosed at the time of collection. Also, the data user can only disclose the 
personal data to a third party or a class of third parties, whose existence is 
made aware to the data subject, and the data subject’s consent obtained before 
the personal data is processed by the third parties. However, s 39 provides for 
                                                          
47
Section 6 – General Principle. 
48
Section 40 – Processing of sensitive personal data. 
49
Section 6(2)(a)-(f) and 6(3)(a)-(c). 
50
Abu Bakar, above n 30 at lxxxvii. See also art 2(h) of the Directive 95/46. 
51
Section 8 – Disclosure Principle. 
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circumstances in which personal data may be disclosed,52 notwithstanding that 
such disclosure may contravene s 8.  
 
The law requires the data user to protect and safeguard the personal data of the 
data subject by taking practical steps to implement appropriate security 
measures.53
 
It is the duty of the data user to take all necessary steps to protect 
any loss, misuse, modification, unauthorised and accidental access or 
disclosure, alteration or destruction of personal data. The data user must take 
steps that are commensurate with the risk of processing the data while having 
regard to the cost of its implementation. There is, therefore, a balancing act 
between the seriousness of the consequences of a failure to secure the 
personal data and the costs implications involved in protecting the data.54  
  
Section 10 provides that the personal data processed cannot be kept longer 
than is necessary, and the data user shall take all reasonable steps to destroy 
personal data no longer required. However, this provision does not 
specifically mention the lifespan of personal data. Once the data is no longer 
required for the purpose for which it was processed, it must be destroyed or 
permanently deleted.  
 
Section 11 states that a data user must ensure that personal data is accurate, 
complete, not misleading, kept up to date, and related to the purpose. It is the 
duty of the data user to guarantee the accuracy, completeness and correctness 
of the data collected. The data user must also maintain that the data is current 
for its purpose, including any directly related purpose, for which the personal 
data was collected and further processed. It is essential to preserve the 
                                                          
52
Under s 39, disclosure is permitted if it is necessary for the purpose of preventing or 
detecting a crime, or for the purpose of investigations or required under any law or order of a 
court or the disclosure justified public interest.  
53
Section 9 – Security Principle. 
54
See also Abu Bakar, above n 30 at lxxxix. 
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integrity of a data because inaccurate and incomplete data may have a direct 
or indirect effect on data subjects.55 
 
A data subject must be given access56 to the personal data held by the data 
user and be able to correct, amend or delete personal data whenever it is 
inaccurate, misleading or not up-to-date. However, access or correction may 
be refused under the Act.57 
 
In any processing and handling of personal data, it is mandatory for the data 
user to observe all data protection principles and any contravention of the 
principles results in an offence committed by the data user.58  
 
3 Rights of data subject  
 
In terms of security for the data subjects, the Act offers various rights to 
individuals to safeguard their personal data. The rights guaranteed include the 
right of access to personal data,59 the right to correct personal data,60 the right 
to withdraw consent, 61  and the right to prevent the collection, holding, 
processing or use of any personal data which is likely to cause damage or 
distress 62  and the right to prevent processing for the purposes of direct 
marketing.63 
 
                                                          
55
At xc. 
56
Section 12. 
57
Sections 32 and 36 provides circumstances where data user may refuse to comply with data 
access request and data correction request respectively. 
58
Section 5(2) provides that on conviction, a data user shall be liable to a fine not exceeding 
RM300,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to both. In contrast, 
there are no criminal penalties in the Data Protection Act 1998. 
59
Sections 30-33. 
60
Sections 34-37. 
61
Sections 38-41. 
62
Section 42. 
63
Section 43. 
132 
 
A data subject is entitled to be informed by a data user whether the personal 
data is being processed by or on behalf of the data user. 64 Data subjects are 
also given the right to correct personal information where they find the data 
inaccurate, incomplete, misleading or out-of-date. In respect of these rights, a 
data subject may withdraw consent by giving notice in writing to the effect of 
such withdrawal. These provisions give data subjects a wider right to control, 
allow and deal with the processing of their personal data. Failure to comply 
with the provisions of the Act is covered by a number of new criminal 
offences.65 However, there is no provision providing for a redress that could 
be claimed by data subjects in cases of processing of personal data not in 
accordance with the PDPA.       
         
B Enforcement 
 
In terms of enforcement, the PDPA provides for a Personal Data Protection 
Commissioner who is appointed by the Minister. The Commissioner has 
various functions66 and powers67 particularly in implementing and enforcing 
the law. The Commissioner is responsible for advising the Minister on the 
national policy for personal data protection and for implementing all relevant 
actions in exercising the administration of personal data as spelt out by the 
Act and directed by the Minister. However, despite the wide functions and 
powers granted to the Commissioner under the Act, the Commissioner is 
responsible and answerable to the Minister.68  
                                                          
64
Section 30(1). 
65
In relation to the offences, a few of them are mentioned here. Section 132 provides that the 
prosecution can only be instituted by, or with the written consent of the public prosecutor. 
Section 135 provides that a Sessions Court shall have the jurisdiction to try any offence under 
the PDPA and to impose full punishment for any such offence under the Act.  Section 5(2) 
makes it an offence for failure to comply with the personal data protection principles. 
66
Section 48. Among the functions are to advise the Minister on the national policy for 
personal data protection and related matters, to implement and enforce the personal data 
protection laws and to supervise compliance with the provisions of the Act.  
67
Section 49. The Commissioner has all powers to do things necessary in connection with the 
performance of his functions under the Act. 
68Section 59. Greenleaf in “Limitations of Malaysia’s data protection Bill”, above n 43 
pointed out that this provision further underlines the Commissioner’s lack of independence. 
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The Commissioner has an administrative duty to decide whether a serious 
breach of personal data protection principles has occurred through a complaint 
by any person regarding an act or practice that contravenes the provision of 
the Act. 69  Upon receiving a complaint, an investigation is carried out in 
accordance to s 105. The Commissioner may refuse an investigation if that 
there has been no contravention of the Act. On completion of the 
investigation, if the Commissioner is satisfied that contravention of the Act 
has occurred, an enforcement notice as provided under s 108 is issued. 
 
The Commissioner may later appoint an authorised officer to exercise the 
powers of enforcement under the Act. The decision specified in the 
enforcement notice may be challenged by filing a notice of appeal with the 
Appeal Tribunal. A decision of the Commissioner is not final. An aggrieved 
party may appeal to the Appeal Tribunal70  whose decision is final.71  
 
C Limitations 
 
The PDPA passed with a few limitations.72 Section 2 provides that the Act 
applies only to a person who processes or who has control over or authorises 
the processing of personal data in respect of commercial transactions. This 
                                                                                                                                                       
The position is different with the Privacy Commissioner under the NZ Privacy Act 1993 (s 
12) who is an Independent Crown Entity. It is funded by the State, but is independent of 
government or ministerial control. Section 7 of the Crown Entities Act 2004 categorises 
Privacy Commissioner as one of the Independent Crown Entities which are generally 
independent of government policy. See also Part 3 of Schedule 1 of the Crown Entities Act 
2004. 
69
Section 104. 
70
Section 93. The Appeal Tribunal shall consists of  a Chairman and at least two other 
members of the Judicial and Legal Service of the Federation appointed by the Minister as 
stated under section 85 of the Act.  
71
Section 99 provides that the decision of the Appeal Tribunal on any matter shall be decided 
on a majority of members of the Appeal Tribunal and the decision is final. Section 100 
provides that a decision given by the Appeal Tribunal may, by leave of the Sessions Court, be 
enforced in the same manner as a judgment or order to the same effect, and where leave is so 
given, judgment may be entered in terms of the decision.  
72
Discussions on limitations of the PDPA either when it was a Bill or after it becomes a law 
can also be found in Khaw Lake Tee “Towards a personal data protection regime in 
Malaysia” and Greenleaf “Limitations of Malaysia’s data protection Bill”, above n 45; See 
also Zuryati, above n 26. 
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precludes the application of the Act to non-commercial affairs even though 
the information communicated in such transactions has equal need of 
protection. Thus, if a person’s personal data such as intimate photos, marital 
status, identity number, mobile number, and home address are disclosed, 
distributed and transferred for non-commercial, the PDPA fails to assist. 
Moreover, a clear exclusion of a credit reporting business as provided under 
the CRA 2010 does not help people whose banking information has been 
processed by credit reporting agencies.  
 
The Act does not bind the Federal Government and State Governments.73 As 
far as data and personal information are concerned, governments are the 
biggest collectors and holders of such data. Thus, the law must bind them if it 
is to prevent abuse and mishandling of personal data and protect information 
privacy. The non-application of the Act to public sectors has in fact made it 
less significant as excludes parties that deal with most personal data. There is 
no principled reason for its exclusion but, according to Datuk Seri Dr Rais 
Yatim, the Federal and State Governments are exempted from the PDPA 
application because the exemption provides space and the right for the 
government’s use of an individual’s basic personal data to be processed for 
legal administrative purposes.74 This significant exemption is problematic and 
highlights the need for application of the Privacy Bill to everybody including 
public authorities. 
 
Article 28 of the EU Directive provides that there must be an independent 
supervisory authority to enforce the law. Under the PDPA, a Personal Data 
Protection Commissioner appointed by the Minister75 has a range of powers.76 
Section 47(3) provides that the Commissioner is a body corporate having 
perpetual succession and a common seal. Obviously, therefore, the 
                                                          
73
Section 3.  
74
See Rais, above n 23. 
75
Section 47. 
76
Sections 48 and 49. 
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Commissioner is not a natural person but an entity created by the law. The 
Minister may revoke the appointment, 77  or the Commissioner may resign 
office by giving written notice to the Minister. 78  The position of the 
Commissioner as provided by the Act is incompatible with a body corporate 
entity which has perpetual succession. The Commissioner is responsible to the 
Minister79 and the Minister may give the Commissioner directions of a general 
character consistent with the provisions of the Act, thus signifying that the 
position of the Commissioner under the PDPA is not independent and fails to 
satisfy the EU adequacy requirement test. In Malaysia this may affect the 
transfer of personal data though it may still take place provided that the 
originating party takes additional measures to ensure that data is adequately 
protected.80  
 
The Commissioner should be answerable directly to Parliament in order to 
gain more independence in exercising his function under the Act. However, 
this argument is refuted on the basis that such position is a distortion of the 
established doctrine of separation of powers adopted by the Malaysian 
Constitution.81 
 
What is lacking in terms of enforcement of the PDPA is that although it has 
created a number of criminal offences for failure to comply with the 
provisions of the Act, it does not gives the data subject the right to enforce 
protected rights directly in the court. Under the DPA, however, certain rights 
                                                          
77
Section 54(1) 
78
Section 54(2). 
79
Section 59. 
80 Abu Bakar Munir “Malaysian Data Protection Law is Inadequate” (2010) 
<http://profabm.blogspot.com.>. 
81
In the Malaysian context, the governing bodies are the Executive, the Legislative and the 
Judiciary. Each body has specific powers: to enforce the law, make the law and interpret and 
apply the law. Specific provisions for each of them are outlined in the Constitution, arts 73-79 
(Legislative powers), arts 39-40 (the Executive) and art 121 (the Judiciary).   
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of the data subject may be enforced directly in the court.82 An Amendment to 
the PDPA should include provisions for redress and compensation so that in 
case of breach of privacy, adequate protection is available. 
 
Under s 45(1), the personal data protection principles have no effect on 
personal data processed by an individual for personal, family, household 
affairs and recreational purposes such as photographs of family members for 
personal keeping, or information about household collections.83 This broad 
exemption is in line with the main intention of the PDPA to protect personal 
data in commercial transactions only. Similarly, the processing of personal 
data for journalistic, literary and artistic purposes is exempt from the 
principles if the publication is of interest to the public.84  
 
Having discussed the scope and application of the PDPA and identified its 
flaws, the following section examines the UK Data Protection Act 1998 in 
order to further improve the PDPA. 
 
IV Data Protection Act 1998 
 
As discussed above, one of the main influences on the PDPA was the DPA. 
However, in many respects, the UK legislation is more comprehensive and 
effective. This Part analyses relevant protection for privacy interests offered 
by the DPA. It evaluates the ability of the DPA to protect private information 
and how the DPA could address gaps in the PDPA. 
 
 
 
                                                          
82Sections 15 of DPA 1998 provides that “The jurisdiction conferred by sections 7 to 14 is 
exercisable by the High Court or a county court or, in Scotland, by the Court of Session or the 
Sheriff.” 
83
This exemption is also known as total exemption.  
84
Section 45(2)(f). This exemption is known as partial exemption because it is exempted from 
certain principles only.  
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A Introduction  
 
The Data Protection Act 1984 was introduced to provide legal protection to an 
aspect of privacy, namely informational privacy. It ensures that personal 
information is collected, used and stored in an acceptable and suitable way: 
“An Act to regulate the use of automatically processed information relating to 
individuals and the provision of services in respect of such information”.  
 
In 1998 the 1984 Act was repealed and the Data Protection Act 1998 (the 
DPA) was introduced to extend and update the older Act to bring it into line 
with the European Directive 85  and to harmonise data protection in the 
European Union. The DPA’s long title clarifies its aim to provide for the 
regulation of the processing of information relating to individuals, including 
the obtaining, holding, use or disclosure of such information. The central 
focus is that data held on individuals must be fairly collected and used. This 
emphasis promotes the handling of personal data and prevents its processing 
in an unfair, damaging and intrusive way. The DPA is not intended to be 
privacy legislation; its aim rather is the better regulation of personal data 
transfer:86 
 
(i) the processing of information of an individual to be executed 
according to the rules and practices; 
(ii) to grant specific rights to an individual in respect of the 
information; and 
(iii) to ensure that  rules, rights and practices are carried out by an 
independent supervisory body. 
 
                                                          
85
The European Directive requires member states to protect the fundamental rights and 
freedom of natural persons, in particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing 
of personal data stated under  Art 1 of the Directive 95/46/EC. 
86
Mark Warby, Nicole Moreham and Iain Christie Tugendhat and Christie The Law of 
Privacy and The Media (2
nd
 ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) at 275-276 [The Law 
of Privacy and The Media]. 
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B Key sections 
 
The term “personal data” as defined by the Act indicates clearly that the Act 
applies exclusively to records relating to people, not companies. So long as a 
record falls within the terms of the Act and can be used to identify the 
individual to whom it refers, including opinions and an indication of the 
intention of the data subject, it is subject to the DPA.87 Eight data protection 
principles are recognised; most are from the 1984 Act with an additional 
principle which prohibits the transfer of data outside the European Economic 
Area unless the country to which it is to be transferred has an adequate level 
of data protection.
88
 The Data Protection Directive 98/46/EC was adopted in 
October 1995. A Directive in European law imposes a requirement on 
Member States to pass national law to implement it.  
 
The DPA protects the wrongful processing of “personal data”. “Personal data” 
in s 1 simply means “data which relate to a living individual who can be 
identified (a) either from this data, or (b) from data and other information 
which is in the possession of, or is likely to come into the possession of, the 
data controller”. The photograph of an individual therefore, clearly falls 
within the definition of the Act. For example in Douglas v Hello89 the three 
defendants were clearly data controllers, and the publication of the material in 
the UK amounted to processing and, therefore, fell under the jurisdiction of 
the Act. The processing itself was both unfair and unlawful being without 
justification under Schedule 2 of the Act. Thus there was a breach of DPA. 
Lord Phillips MR said:90 
 
Nor is it right to treat a photograph simply as a means of conveying 
factual information. A photograph can certainly capture every 
                                                          
87
Section 1 on basic interpretative provisions. 
88
Article 25 of the EU Directive 1995 provides that no personal data may be transferred to a 
third country unless the “third coutry in question ensures an adequate level of protection.” 
89
[2005] 3 WLR 881. 
90
At [106]. 
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detail of a momentary event in a way which words cannot, but a 
photograph can do more than that. A personal photograph can 
portray not necessarily accurately, the personality and the mood of 
the subject of the photograph. 
 
The definition of ‘data’ in the 1998 Act91 covers automatic and manual types 
of data. ‘Data’ means information which – 
 
(a) is being processed by means of equipment operating 
automatically in response to instructions given for that purpose, 
(b) is recorded with the intention that it should be processed by 
means of such equipment, 
(c) is recorded as part of a relevant filing system or with the 
intention that it should form part of a relevant filing system, 
(d) does not fall within paragraphs (a) (b) or (c) but forms part of 
an accessible record as defined in s 68, or 
(e) is recorded information held by a public authority and does 
not fall within any of paragraphs (a) to (d). 
 
Data held on individuals must be fairly collected and used. Thus, the Act is 
applicable to data that is held on any electronic storage system, typically a 
computer, or if it forms part of a filing system including manually kept paper 
records.92 It is wide enough to cover materials including photographs in a 
newspaper, broadcast on television or published on a website. The DPA 
covers all electronic or automatically processed records including obvious 
records such as e-mails and information stored in a database. It also 
encompasses voice-mail messages stored on a telephone system, entry pass 
records, word processing systems, files held on computer, CCTV records, and 
other similar records.   
 
                                                          
91
In 1984 Act, data was defined as information recorded in a form in which it can be 
processed by equipment operating manually in response to instructions given for that purpose. 
92
Section 1. 
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It also covers personal data held in manual (or hard copy) format, provided 
the data held manually is in a “relevant filing system.” 93 This means that 
manual or paper records will be covered by the Act as personal data provided 
that such specific information relating to a particular individual is readily 
accessible.  
 
The definition of “processing” is wide and includes obtaining, recording, or 
holding information or data or carrying out any operation or set of operations 
on them, including organisation, adaptation, alteration, retrieval, consultation, 
use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, 
alignment, combination, blocking, erasure or destruction. 94  In short, 
“processing” appears to cover all activities related to the handling of 
information or data. Thus, if a reporter extracts information about a local artist 
from a database, and publishes it in the newspaper, the act is subject to data 
protection principles outlined in the DPA.  
 
C Data protection principles and rights of data subjects 
 
There are eight data protection principles set out in the DPA. Data protection 
principle 1, states that in order for data processing to be lawful, such 
processing must meet one of the conditions set out in Schedule 2, or Schedule 
3 if the data to be processed is sensitive. Legitimate processing as intended by 
the DPA, s 4(3)  requires a data subject to give consent to the processing 
(Schedule 2; or express consent in the case of processing sensitive data as per 
Schedule 3). The data controller has a control mechanism to allow or not the 
                                                          
93Section 1 on “relevant filing system” means any set of information relating to individuals to 
the extent that, although the information is not processed by means of equipment operating 
automatically in response to instruction given for that purpose, the set is structured, either by 
reference to individuals or by reference to criteria relating to individuals, in such a way that 
specific information relating to a particular individual is readily accessible.  
94
Section 1 of the DPA. See also The Law of Privacy and The Media, above 86 at 283-284; 
Data Protection Law and Practice, above n 45, at 136-137 
141 
 
processing of personal data thus protecting an individual’s right to 
information.  
 
Consent to processing is the key principle of the DPA. It is a pre-condition as 
well as a continuing condition for legitimate data processing. The data subject 
may refuse consent for data processing or at any time withdraw consent and 
that results in any processing or further processing of the data illegitimate. To 
ensure that this requirement is observed, the data controllers are responsible 
for obtaining consent from individuals to process their personal data and to 
process it fairly. 95  Thus, the law protects individual privacy by requiring 
consent for the processing of personal data and that the processing of such 
data not be pursued further if consent is withdrawn.  
 
Principle 2 requires that personal data shall be obtained for one or more 
specified and lawful purposes only and shall not be further processed in any 
manner incompatible with that purpose or those purposes.96 The principle also 
determines whether any disclosure of personal data is compatible with the 
purpose or purposes for which it was obtained. This principle also considers 
the purpose or purposes for which the personal data are intended to be 
processed by any person to whom it is disclosed. This limitation ensures that 
data processing is only permitted for specified purposes and the data subject 
has the right to prevent processing if such processing is meant for any 
purpose(s) incompatible with the specified purpose or purposes for which the 
data subject has given consent. If data processed is different from what was 
lawfully required for a particular purpose, the processing has breached the 
principle.
97
 
 
                                                          
95
See Schedule 1 Part II, [1]-[2]. See also Data Protection Law and Practice, above n 44 at 
149-150; The Law of Privacy and The Media, above 86 at 289-290. 
96
See The Law of Privacy and The Media, above 86, at 292. See also Schedule 1 Part II, [5].  
97
Schedule 1 Part II, [5]. 
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Principle 3 provides that personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not 
excessive in relation to the purpose or purposes for which it is processed.98 
This principle is straight-forward and self-explanatory. Accuracy is an 
important characteristic of personal data protected by Principle 4. The data 
controller must take reasonable steps to ensure accuracy in the light of the 
purposes for which the data was obtained and further processed. Principle 5 
does not provide a life span for keeping personal data, but simply requires that 
it shall not be kept longer than necessary for the purposes for which it was 
processed.  
 
Principle 6 which requires that personal data shall be processed in accordance 
with the rights of data subjects under the DPA. The rights of data subjects are 
set out in ss 7 and 10 to 12 of the DPA. All rights guaranteed therein may be 
interpreted so as to ensure individual’s privacy to some extent. Section 7 
provides for the data subject’s right of access to personal data. By virtue of s 
7, a data subject has the right to be informed by any data controller if his 
personal data is being processed by or on behalf of the latter. The information 
so provided shall include the description of the personal data of such data 
subject; the purpose of processing; and the recipients or classes of recipients 
to whom the data is or may be disclosed. Furthermore, the data subject is 
entitled to have the information constituting his personal data and the source 
of such data communicated in an intelligible form. In the case of automatic 
processing of personal data for the purpose of its evaluation, the data subject 
is entitled to be informed of the logic behind such a decision.99 
 
Subject to the fulfilment of the conditions set out in s 7, this right of access 
allows an individual to be informed of the purpose of processing his data, its 
accuracy and the means by which the data has been made available to the data 
controller. Combined with other provisions of the DPA, the data subject is 
                                                          
98
Schedule 1 Part I, [3]. 
99
The Law of Privacy and The Media, above n 86 at 295. 
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able to exercise control over personal data to permit or not the process to be 
affected to such data and to prevent or stop further processing as necessary. 
This may be achieved by withdrawing consent to such processing or by 
asserting that such processing is in contravention of any provision of the 
DPA.100 The power to control the processing of personal data by the data 
subject demonstrates an individual’s right to privacy of personal data.  
 
Section 10 empowers the data subject to prevent processing likely to cause 
damage or distress. In this regard, the data subject is able to permit or prevent 
the processing of personal data and protects an individual’s privacy against 
the processing of distressing personal information.101 Section 11 allows a right 
to prevent processing for purposes of direct marketing. Further, subject to the 
fulfilment of the conditions, s 12 entitles a data subject to require a data 
controller to prohibit any decision that significantly affects the data subject 
solely based on processing by automatic means.102  
 
Finally, principle 8 dictates that no data shall be transferred to a country or a 
territory outside the European Economic Area (EEA) unless such country or 
territory ensures an adequate level of protection for the rights and freedoms of 
data subjects in relation to the processing of personal data.103 This principle 
provides further assurances that any rights and protection to be afforded to the 
data subjects are not limited merely within the EEA, and that if any data is 
processed outside the EEA it is subject to the conditions of the eighth 
principle.104 
 
 
                                                          
100
At 295-296. 
101
See also David Bainbridge Data Protection Law (2
nd
 Ed, XPL Publishing, Great Britain, 
2005) at 143-144 [Data Protection Law]; The Law of Privacy and The Media, above n 86 at 
299-300. 
102
At 149-150. 
103
Schedule 1, Part I, [13].  
104
The Law of Privacy and The Media, above 86 at 301. 
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D Exemptions 
 
Apart from protections and rights afforded to the data subject, the DPA also 
lists the exemptions that apply to particular data or processing. Sections 28 to 
39 of the DPA outline the exemptions that exclude the particular data or 
processing from the enforcement power of the Information Commissioner. 
The effect of the exemptions leaves an individual with no redress under the 
DPA 1998 even if the data is inaccurate or the processing causes loss or 
damage. However, remedies may be sought through other laws, including that 
of Art 8 of the ECHR applicable by virtue of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
 
The exemption under s 32 applies to the processing for the purpose of 
journalism, literature and artistic work. If publication of personal data is in the 
interest of the public in terms of freedom of expression or incompatible with 
special purposes, it is exempted from any provision of the DPA.
105
 Such 
exemption occurred in Campbell v MGN Ltd.106 Campbell brought an action 
against the Mirror for compensation under s 13 of the DPA. The Mirror relied 
on s 32 that allows exemption from a large number of provisions in the Act 
including the right to compensation. As the processing of the data in Campbell 
fell within the Act, the exemption applied to it, thus the Mirror was entitled to 
invoke the protection of the s 32 exemption in answer to Campbell’s claim. In 
that case, the data controller held that publication was in the public interest, 
thus the exemption from s 32 was of wide application to the press and other 
daily media.107  
 
The House of Lords in Campbell held that the publication of three disputed 
items of information: (1) the fact that she was receiving treatment at Narcotics 
Anonymous, (2) details of the treatment including how often and what kind of 
                                                          
105
Section 32(1) (a)-(c). 
106
[2004] UKHL 22 (Campbell). Section 32 exempts personal data which are processed for 
any journalistic, literary or artistic purposes from provisions of the Act.  
107
The effect of s 32 in Campbell was discussed in Data Protection Law, above n 101, at 182-
183. See also The Law of Privacy and The Media, above 86 at 309-310. 
145 
 
treatment etc, and (3) the photograph of her leaving the meeting place, 
amounted to a misuse of Campbell’s private information. Although there was 
no finding on a cause of action in DPA, the court accepted that the dispute fell 
within the action of misuse of private information and awarded Campbell 
monetary compensation under s 13 of the Act.108  
 
Section 36 provides that personal data relating to an individual’s personal, 
family or household affairs including recreational purposes are exempt from 
data protection principles. Thus, if photos are taken and shared between 
family members for a family journal or other private purposes, the principles 
have no application for such personal information. Further exemption is 
provided by s 37 for miscellaneous exemptions.   
 
In one way or another, the existence of data protection legislation affords 
protection for informational privacy though it was not intended to be specific 
privacy legislation. However, many questions remain about how adequately it 
addresses claims for breach of privacy. 
 
For the purpose of comparison and enhancement of data protection law in 
Malaysia, the following part discusses similar law sanctioned in New Zealand 
albeit with a different name: the Privacy Act 1993.   
 
V Privacy Act 1993 
 
A Introduction 
 
In New Zealand, the most relevant legislation that provides protection of an 
aspect of privacy rights is the Privacy Act 1993 (PA). It came into force on 1 
July 1993 to promote and protect individual privacy and to respect the trans-
border flows of personal data in general accordance with the guidelines of the 
                                                          
108
The Law of Privacy and The Media, above 86 at 309-310. 
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Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 109  It deals 
primarily with the protection of informational privacy and establishes certain 
principles at the core of the Act which regulate personal information. A 
breach of the principles constitutes an interference with the privacy of an 
individual. 
 
The objective of the Act is to promote and protect individual privacy in 
general110 and to establish certain principles governing the collection, use and 
disclosure by public and private sector agencies of an individual’s personal 
information in particular. It also appoints a Privacy Commissioner to 
investigate complaints of interference with an individual’s privacy. 
 
 However, the PA does not create any general right to privacy. It does not 
provide protection for privacy generally as suggested by its name; indeed it 
was introduced as a key requirement for New Zealand to comply with the 
European Data Protection Directives 1995. The same requirement influenced 
Malaysia when it introduced the PDPA with its aim to satisfy minimum legal 
requirements governing the collection and processing of personal data. It is 
important to note that from three laws from different jurisdictions, only the 
Privacy Act 1993 comprehensively covers one aspect of privacy interests 
more than those of the other two jurisdictions.    
 
This Part examines the coverage of the PA in addressing breach of data 
privacy particularly involving disclosure of personal information. This 
examination is useful for developing Malaysian data protection law. 
 
 
 
                                                          
109
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data < 
www.oecd.org> New Zealand adopted the Guidelines on 23 September 1980. 
110
The protection is in accordance with the Recommendation of the Council of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Concerning Guidelines Governing 
the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data. 
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B The scope and operation  
 
The scope of the Act is wide and applies broadly to governmental bodies, 
private business, societies, clubs and non-profit organisations as long as their 
activities relate to the handling of an individual’s information.111 Hence, the 
Act brings within its ambit public and private organisations alike and applies 
privacy principles to each indiscriminately. However, the news media are 
excluded from the definition of “agency” in respect of their news activities112 
and are exempt from the Act’s principles.  
 
The focus of the Act is on privacy of personal information and works on a 
principle-based approach. 113   The definition of “personal information” is 
central to the scope of the Act as a whole, since the privacy principles apply 
only to information that is “personal information”. “Personal information” is 
defined as:114 
 
information about an identifiable individual; and includes 
information relating to a death that is maintained by the 
Registrar-General pursuant to the Births, Deaths, Marriages, 
and Relationships Registration Act 1995, or any former Act.  
 
                                                          
111Section 2 provides “Agency means any person or body of persons, whether corporate or 
incorporate, and whether in the public sector or the private sector...”. The same provision also 
expressly stated that the Sovereign, the Parliament, a court or tribunal or a Royal Commission 
or commission of inquiry and the news media in relation to news activities are not agency 
under the Act. 
112
Section 2(1)(b)(xiii) defines “news activity” as (a) the gathering of news, or the preparation 
or compiling of articles or programmes of or concerning news, observations on news, or 
current affairs, for the purposes of dissemination to the public or any section of the public; 
(b) the dissemination, to the public or any section of the public, of any article or programme 
of or concerning—(i) news:(ii) observations on news:(iii) current affairs. 
113
See New Zealand Law Commission Study Paper Review of Privacy Act 1993 – Review of 
the Law of Privacy Stage 4 (NZLC, Wellington, 2010) at 43-44. The principle-based approach 
refers to a flexible, open-textured approach to regulating the collection, use, disclosure of 
personal information based on a set of 12 privacy principles provided in the Act. 
114
Section 2 of the Act. 
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This definition is broad and not limited to information that is sensitive, 
intimate or private. 115  The word “identifiable individual” indicates that 
identification is regarded as a requirement for the application of the Act.  
 
The Privacy Act, unlike similar statutes in other jurisdictions, does not have a 
separate category of “sensitive information”. All personal information is 
treated in the same way under the Act. In contrast, under the PDPA, the 
processing of sensitive personal data is permitted provided that it is carried 
out in accordance with the provision of s 40 of the PDPA. In this regard, the 
DPA has considered certain kinds of information as sensitive personal data.116   
 
The Privacy Act 1993 is, undoubtedly, the most significant legislation about 
privacy. It expressly provides for the protection of an aspect of privacy 
interest, namely informational privacy. However, in the context of its 
application, it is not an adequate framework for the protection of a general 
right to privacy. It does not deal with other aspects of privacy, such as bodily 
intrusion. Nevertheless, the Act works well in relation to personal data 
protection, and provides a broad range of protection including collection, 
storage and security of personal information, the right of access to 
information, and a limit on the use and disclosure of personal information.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
115
Refer Stephen Penk and Rosemary Tobin (eds) Privacy Law in New Zealand (Brookers 
Ltd, Wellington, 2010) at 59; See also Paul Roth “What is ‘Personal Information’?” (2000) 20 
NZULR 40. 
116
See s 2 DPA 1998. The Act categorised information relating to the racial or ethnic origin, 
political opinion, religious belief, membership of a trade union, physical or mental health or 
condition, sexual life, commission or alleged commission of any offence and any proceedings 
for any offence committed or alleged to be committed by the data subject as sensitive 
personal data. 
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C Information privacy principles 
 
Personal information must be handled in accordance with 12 information 
privacy principles set out in s 6 of the Act.117 These principles are concerned 
with how personal information may be collected, held, used and disclosed and 
are the fundamental focus of the Act. It is principally concerned with how 
agencies collect and store information about people, the security of that 
information, and how it is to be used. Based on this concern, the primary aim 
of the Act is always the protection of personal information rather than other 
privacy interests.  
 
The Act incorporates twelve information privacy principles. Principle 1 
allows for the collection of lawful personal information and is directly related 
to the agency’s functions or activities. Under Principle 2, the agencies must 
collect personal information from the individual to whom the information 
relates, unless certain exceptions apply. 118  It follows that any information 
collected from any other person other than the individual whose information is 
collected, it is not authorised by the Act. Thus, a breach occurs if C collects 
information about A from B, and not directly from A.  
 
Principle 3 states that when personal information is collected from the 
individual concerned, that individual must (unless certain exceptions apply) 
be made aware of such matters as the fact that the information is being 
collected, the purpose for which it is being collected, and the intended 
recipients of the information.119 The agency must take reasonable steps to 
ensure that the person whose information is collected is informed of the terms 
related to the collection, such as its purpose, who will get the information and 
                                                          
117
Discussion in this section is mainly based on the information privacy principles provided 
under s 6. Reference is also made to New Zealand Law Commission Study Paper, above n 
113.   
118
See New Zealand Law Commission Study Paper, above n 113, at 74-75. 
119
 See New Zealand Law Commission Study Paper, above n 113, at 74-75. 
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what consequences occur if the information is not provided.120 This principle 
is intended to safeguard the interest of the individual concerned.  
 
The manner by which the data is collected is defined in Principle 4 which 
states that agencies must not collect personal information by unlawful or 
unfair means, or in unreasonably intrusive circumstances. Para (b)(ii) of 
Principle 4 expressly prohibits “intrusion to an unreasonable extent upon the 
personal affairs of the individual concerned” which provides an element of 
protection against privacy invasion. 
 
In terms of security, Principle 5 warns agencies that hold personal information 
to take reasonable steps secure it against loss, unauthorised access, use, 
modification or disclosure, or other misuse. An agency must do everything 
reasonably necessary to prevent unauthorised use or unauthorised disclosure 
of information in a situation where transmission of information is required in 
the course of business.121  
 
 In relation to Principle 5, the right to access to personal information is stated 
under Principle 6 where an individual is entitled to obtain confirmation from 
an agency as to whether or not the agency holds that individual’s personal 
information and, if the agency does hold such information, the individual is 
entitled to have access to it. However, there are certain grounds on which an 
agency can refuse to provide an individual with access to his or her personal 
information.122 
 
Any information given may be corrected if an individual thinks it is wrong. 
Principle 7 states that if an agency holds an individual’s personal information, 
the individual is entitled to request that the agency correct that information. If 
                                                          
120
 Section 6, Principle 3. 
121
 Section 6, Principle 4 (a)-(b). 
122
 New Zealand Law Commission Study Paper, above n 113, at 75. Part 4 of the Act provides 
grounds on which access to personal information may be refused such as security, defence, 
international relations, trade secrets etc. 
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the agency does not so agree, it must take reasonable steps to attach a 
statement of the correction sought but not made to the information.123 With 
regard to the accuracy of the information, Principle 8 states that before using 
such information an agency must take reasonable steps to ensure that the 
information is accurate, up-to-date, complete, relevant and not misleading.124  
 
Although there is no definite time-frame for holding of the information, 
Principle 9 cautions agencies not to retain personal information for longer 
than is required for the purposes for which it may lawfully be used. 125 It 
should be kept only for as long as is necessary to carry out the purpose for 
which the agency originally obtained the information. Principle 10 provides 
that agencies must use personal information for the same purpose for which 
they obtained that information. Other uses are occasionally permitted if it is 
necessary to enforce the law, or if the use is directly related to the purpose for 
which the agency obtained the information.126 
 
Disclosure of information may be made in limited circumstances only. 
Principle 11 states that an agency must not disclose personal information 
unless certain exceptions apply. For example, an agency may disclose 
information if it reasonably believes that disclosure is one of the purposes for 
which it obtained the information, or that disclosure is necessary to uphold or 
enforce the law, or for a court proceeding, or that the person concerned 
authorised disclosure, or that the information is used in a form that does not 
identify the person concerned.127  
 
Principle 12 places restrictions on the use of “unique identifiers” such as IRD 
numbers or credit card numbers. The principle restricts the ways in which 
                                                          
123
Section 6, Principle 7. See also New Zealand Law Commission Study Paper, above n 113, 
at 93-94. 
124
Section 6, Principle 8.  
125
Section 6, Principle 9. 
126
Section 6, Principle 10. It provides the limits on use of personal information, see (a)-(g). 
127
Section 6, Principle 11 (a)-(h). 
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agencies may assign such numbers to individuals, and the circumstances in 
which they may require individuals to disclose such numbers.128 
 
It is vital to highlight that Principles 10 and 11 do not confer on any person 
legal rights and are not enforceable in a court of law as stated in s 11(2). 
Those who are affected by a breach of the principles in the Act can make a 
complaint to the Privacy Commissioner under s 67 alleging an interference 
with privacy.129 The Commissioner has the power to investigate the action, but 
can also refer the complaint to an Ombudsman,130 the Health and Disability 
Commissioner131 or the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security,132 and 
if the Commissioner is not able to secure a settlement of the complaint 
following the investigation, civil proceedings before the Human Rights 
Review Tribunal may be instituted pursuant to s 82. The Tribunal may grant a 
range of remedies if it is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that there has 
been an interference with the complainant’s privacy.133  
 
Section 14 of the Privacy Act expressly upholds the importance of privacy 
and other human rights and provides a balancing exercise in any event of 
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 New Zealand Law Commission Study Paper, above n 113, at 75. 
129
Section 67  provides that (1) Any person may make a complaint to the Commissioner 
alleging that any action is or appears to be an interference with the privacy of an individual. 
(2) A complaint under this Part may be lodged with the Commissioner or an Ombudsman. 
(3) On receiving a complaint under this Part, an Ombudsman shall forward the complaint to 
the Commissioner as soon as practicable. 
130
Section 72 on Referral of complaint to Ombudsman. The Commissioner shall consult with 
the Chief Ombudsman in order to determine the appropriate means of dealing with the 
complaint relates to a matter under the Ombudsmen Act 19975 or the Official Information 
Act 1982 or the Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987.   
131
Section 72A on Referral of complaint to Health and Disability Commissioner. The 
Commissioner shall consult with the Health and Disability Commissioner in order to 
determine the appropriate means of dealing with the complaint relates to a matter under the 
Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994. 
132
Section 72B on Referral of complaint to Inspector General of Intelligence and security. The 
Commissioner shall consult with the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security in order 
to determine the appropriate means of dealing with the complaint relates to a matter under the 
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1996. 
133
Section 85 on  Powers of Human Rights Review Tribunal. If, in any proceedings under 
section 82 or section 83, the Tribunal is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that any 
action of the defendant is an interference with the privacy of an individual, it may grant one or 
more of the remedies provided in the Act. 
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competing interest between privacy and other rights. Thus, in exercising his or 
her functions, the Commissioner must have due regard for the protection of 
important human rights and social interests that compete with privacy, 
including the general desirability of a free flow of information and the 
recognition of the right of government and business to achieve their objectives 
in an efficient way.134  
 
With the aim of providing substantial protection of informational privacy, the 
twelve information privacy principles establish a framework for limiting the 
use and disclosure of personal information and specify a breach of the 
principles as an interference with individual’s privacy.  
 
D Exemption and enforcement 
 
With regard to exemptions, s 56 provides that the information privacy 
principles do not apply to the collection of personal information by an 
individual, or to the holding of personal information by an individual, where 
that personal information is collected or held solely or principally for the 
purposes of, or in connection with, the individual’s personal, family or 
household affairs. The Act also has no application to news media because the 
definition of “agency” in s 2 excludes any news medium in relation to its 
news activities. This exemption precludes a complaint against the news 
media.135  
 
Section 11(1) provides that an entitlement given to individual by subclause (1) 
of principle 6 may be enforced in a court of law provided that the agency 
concerned is a public sector agency. In other situations such as non-
                                                          
134
Section 14(a). 
135
 See also Penk and Tobin, above n 115, at 71. 
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compliance with Principles 10 and 11, the Act does not confer on any person 
any legal right enforceable in a court of law.136  
  
The privacy of an individual is interfered with if an agency breaches any 
information privacy principle and the individual suffers harm as a result of the 
breach. For an interference to arise, s 66(1)(a) requires that there be a breach 
by an agency of an information privacy principle, or of a code of practice, or 
of the provisions of Part 10 of the Act (relating to information matching). It is 
not only that the breach has occurred, but it must also be satisfied that the 
breach by the agency has caused, or may cause, loss, detriment, damage, or 
injury to the individual, or has adversely affected, or may adversely affect, the 
rights, benefits, privileges, obligations, or interests of the individual, or has 
resulted in, or may result in, significant humiliation, significant loss of 
dignity, or significant injury to the feelings of the individual.137 
 
VI Remedying the Defects 
 
This Part discusses flaws inherent in the PDPA and suggestions for its 
improvement. Specific reference to the DPA and PA is necessary in order that 
the application and enforcement of the Act could be improved in the future. 
 
The passing of the much awaited PDPA is a result of a great effort by the 
government in relation to the processing and use of personal data. Malaysia is 
the first ASEAN country to have a specific data protection law. It is hoped 
that it will become a model for the development of such laws in other ASEAN 
member states. However, an analysis of the Act finds room for improvement. 
 
The obvious shortcoming of the Act is the definition of personal data. It is 
interesting to note that the Act applies only to commercial transactions 
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 At 77. 
137
 Section 66(1)(a)-(b). See also Penk and Tobin, above n 115, at 61. 
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although the precedents that inspired the Act are generally applicable to all 
situations. Similarly neither DPA nor the PA has separated personal data 
categories into commercial or non-commercial categories. All personal data is 
treated equally and subject to the same requirements of the Act. There seems 
to be no principled reason why the PDPA limits its scope only to commercial 
transactions. This may be because the introduction of the Act is essentially 
aimed at meeting the European Union’s data protection requirements. If the 
PDPA continues to be applied in its current form, little is protected.  
 
The non-applicability of the PDPA to Federal and State governments as 
highlighted by s 3 raises a concern as to different standards governing the data 
of public and private bodies. What kind of protection is available if the data 
user is dealing with the government with regard to the same data? The fact 
that the Act does not bind the government results in double standards in the 
treatment the same data. 138  The application of different standards, fails to 
achieve full protection of personal data. However, according to the 
Information, Communications, Culture and Arts Minister Datuk Seri Dr Rais 
Yatim, the reason why the Act binds only the private sector is because 
safeguards already exist which take care of government channels compared 
with insufficient regulations concerning the use of personal data in the hands 
of irresponsible people. He stated that the government already possesses the 
relevant authorities and legal controls and parameters such as the Official 
Secrets Act, and laws pertaining to creditors.139  
 
                                                          
138
Unlike those precedents that the Act referred to which provide the protection of data in both 
public and private sectors. South Korea for example, has two separate laws that govern these 
two different sectors. The Act on the Promotion of Information and Communications 
Network Utilization and Information Protection provides guidelines for personal information 
in the private sector whereas the Protection of Personal Information Maintained by Public 
Agencies Act was introduced to govern the personal information protection in public sector. 
Refer to Chang-Boem Yi and Ki-Jin Ok “Korea’s personal information protection laws” 
(2003) PLPR 8.  
139Yeng Ai Chun “Personal Data Protection: Government has own mechanism” The Star 
Online (Malaysia, 15 July 2009) <http://archives.thestar.com.my>. Laws pertaining to 
creditors include the Pawnbrokers Act 1972, the Hire Purchase Act 1967 and the 
Moneylenders Act 1951 (Malaysia). 
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The Official Secrets Act 1972 protects the government’s official secrets 
whereas the PDPA aims at protecting personal data in commercial 
transactions. These two laws do not have the same objective. The exclusion of 
the public sector, therefore, from the purview of the PDPA on the basis that 
protection is provided by the Official Secrets Act does not address the 
problem of different standards when dealing with personal data and the 
absence of protection for individuals whose personal data is held by 
government.  
 
In comparison, the DPA and PA apply to both public and private bodies. As 
far as processing of personal data and information is concerned, governments, 
corporations, partnership public and private agencies are subject to the same 
legislation in the UK and NZ respectively. This comprehensive application of 
the personal data law to public and private sectors should be adopted in 
Malaysia if the existing framework aims to fairly protect an aspect of privacy 
interest to all parties.  
 
Though data should be protected as part of an individual’s right to privacy, 
this Act is not privacy-driven because it discusses provisions for personal data 
protection in relatively few sections
140
 and the remaining provisions provide 
and explain the administration and maintenance of the system of handling of 
personal data. The ultimate end of protection – redress for individuals is 
absent from the Act. It contains no provision for compensation for an 
individual whose data has been misused. Though it grants correction of 
inaccurate information,
141
 the main focus of the Act is on sanctions for 
breach.
142
 This may provide some deterrence against breach, but does not 
compensate the victim. Due consideration should thus be given to ensure fair 
treatment to data subjects because fine or imprisonment of the data user is 
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The Act points out on personal data protection principles in sections 5 to 12 and on rights 
of data subject in ss 30 to 44 of the PDPA 2010. 
141
Section 34 on the right to correct personal data. 
142
Section 5(2). 
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poor consolation for the subject whose data has been processed or released 
without consent. 
 
The PDPA should provide specifically for private remedies such as damages 
with financial compensation and injunctions to data subjects affected as a 
result of a breach of privacy. This will encourage compliance and restrain 
further invasion and is in line with international precedents which provide 
compensation for individuals who have suffered distress caused by 
contravention by the data controller.
143
 In the UK, while there are no 
guidelines in the DPA as to the appropriate level of compensation for a claim, 
judges have discretion and when assessing damages for distress take into 
consideration many factors including the seriousness of the breach and its 
effect upon the claimant.
144
 For example in the case of Jacklyn Adeniji v 
Newham Council, 
145
 the High Court awarded the claimant £5,000 in damages 
and £50,000 for legal costs for breach under the DPA and the Human Rights 
Act 1998 after her photograph was used without permission. Another case 
where the court awarded damages for breach under the DPA was Campbell v 
Mirror Group Newspapers
146
 where Morland J awarded damages of £3,500 
for breach of confidence and breach of duty under s 4(4) of the DPA.  
 
Similarly, the PA clearly provides remedies that may be sought by the 
aggrieved party in cases of breach of information privacy principles.
147
 The 
Human Rights Review Tribunal may grant remedies such as a declaration, an 
order restraining the continuation of the interference, damages, an order to 
perform specific acts or other relief.
148
 Section 88 gives power to the Tribunal 
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October 2001, High Court hearing. 
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to award damages against the defendant for an interference with the privacy of 
an individual in situations where:
149
 
 
(a) pecuniary loss suffered as a result of, and expenses reasonably incurred 
by the aggrieved individual for the purpose of, the transaction or activity 
out of which the interference arose; 
(b) loss of any benefit, whether or not of a monetary kind, which the 
aggrieved individual might reasonably have been expected to obtain but 
for the interference; 
(c) humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to the feelings of the aggrieved 
individual. 
 
The above provision adequately addresses the issue of remedy absent in the 
PDPA. The experience of the UK law and NZ in providing protection to the 
aggrieved individual particularly in terms of remedy is a good example for the 
improvement of data protection law in Malaysia. 
  
With regard to enforcement, the position of the Commissioner as a body 
corporate and subservient to the Minister shows a lack of functional 
independence. In terms of the nature of the duties and powers assigned by the 
Act, the Commissioner should be independent and made accountable directly 
to the Parliament. The importance of the Commissioner’s position in relation 
to personal data protection issues requires greater accountability in the 
discharge of his duties. 
 
Under the DPA, the Information Commissioner is an independent official 
whose legal personality is a corporation sole. 150  The Commissioner is 
answerable directly to Parliament and not to a Minister. The Commissioner 
exercises legal powers vested directly in him and not delegated by a 
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Minister151. Under s 52, the Commissioner is required to set down an annual 
report before Parliament concerning the exercise of his function under the 
DPA. 
 
The Privacy Commissioner under the PA is an independent Crown Entity152 
with numerous functions under s 13. The Commissioner must act 
independently in performing statutory functions and duties. Reports must be 
made from time to time to the responsible Minister or the Prime Minister. The 
Act expressly provides that the Commissioner is responsible for safeguarding 
the information privacy interests of an individual by having due regard for the 
importance of human rights and social interests that compete with privacy, 
including the general desirability of a free flow of information and the 
recognition of the right of government and business to achieve their objectives 
efficiently.153 
 
The exclusive function of the NZ Privacy Commissioner concerning the 
protection of individual privacy is not among the Commissioner’s duty in 
Malaysia and the UK. This illustrates another failure of the Malaysian 
personal data law to provide protection for privacy interests and this important 
function should be considered when making improvements to the law. 
 
The PDPA’s fundamental motive is towards enhancing the security, integrity 
and protection of personal data but it offers no further protection for a general 
right to privacy as defined by this thesis. It is apparent, therefore, that the 
PDPA is not adequate to provide protection against breach of privacy.  
 
In short, if Malaysia is to have a comprehensive protection system for 
processing and handling personal data, these flaws must be addressed. Both 
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See  Data  Protection Law and Practice, above n 45, at 768-769. 
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Section 12 of the Privacy Act 1993 (NZ). 
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Section 14(a). 
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the UK Data Protection Act 1998 and the New Zealand Privacy Act 1993 can 
assist in the development of a better law for data protection in Malaysia.  
 
VII Conclusion 
 
Examination of the existing statutes for the protection of privacy in Part II 
demonstrates that the laws are piecemeal and indirect. Privacy is not the focus 
of these laws, although it may contribute to a more general protection within 
the law. For example, as discussed in the criminal law section, the protection 
of a person’s modesty and dignity is the aim of ss 292 and 509 of the Penal 
Code, but many significant acts of intrusion such as surveillance, unwanted 
touching and listening, fall outside it. The Child Act 2001 protects the interest 
and privacy of children but although this provides important protections, it 
only covers intrusion by the media.  Similarly, the National Land Code 1965 
protects an individual’s right to property by providing an absolute control over 
the land but the provision does not give the person a right to privacy; rather it 
secures his right to property through a control mechanism. 
 
The introduction of the PDPA has, due to its limitations, not remedied the 
inadequacies of privacy protection. References and analysis of the law on data 
protection of the two model countries provide a useful approach to how the 
PDPA should be improved to include maximum protection for the privacy of 
personal information.  Although it is obvious that the DPA and PA are not 
capable of providing protection of private information as defined in this 
thesis, they both address the protection of personal data more 
comprehensively than Malaysia. Analysis of the two statutes from UK and NZ 
suggests that many aspects of data protection need to be improved by the 
Malaysian PDPA.  
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It is significant that the NZ law is the most appropriate model for Malaysia to 
review and revise its law. The analysis of the laws in all three jurisdictions 
reveals that the focus of data protection law is the handling and processing of 
personal information. However, the NZ Privacy Act states explicitly that the 
law’s aim is to promote and protect individual privacy in general. Overall 
reading and analysis of the PA confirms why the Act was called Privacy Act 
and not the Data Protection Act. In enforcing its principles the PA always has 
regard to the protection of privacy and expressly provides for the effect of a 
breach ie infringement of an individual’s privacy. Thus, the protection offered 
by the PA is more akin to protection of privacy interests generally as 
compared with the DPA and PDPA, which focus solely on the management 
and processing of personal data in accordance with the rules and procedures.  
   
In conclusion, reliance on the existing statutes to protect privacy will not serve 
the aim of privacy protection. Due to its limitation in scope and application, 
the introduction of the PDPA did not resolve the matter. Although neither the 
DPA nor the PA has provided adequate protection for private information, 
both are far better than the PDPA. They provide guidance for Malaysia to 
rectify the defects, but even if Malaysia rectifies them, the newly revised 
PDPA still lacks ability to protect infringement of privacy. This justifies the 
need for a specific law on privacy as proposed by this thesis. 
 
As discussed earlier, when developing such a law (or indeed the common law 
protections of privacy), it is important to draw on the experience of other 
jurisdictions. The following chapter, therefore, discusses the state of privacy 
protection and its development in English law and examines how privacy 
action was formulated.   
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PART III: COMPARATIVE MODELS 
CHAPTER FIVE 
PROTECTION OF PRIVACY INTERESTS IN ENGLISH 
LAW 
 
I Overview 
  
The aim of this chapter is to provide an analysis of the development of the 
privacy action in England and in particular the development of a right to 
privacy within the breach of confidence action. This chapter argues that the 
formulation of a privacy action and its requirements are of utmost importance 
for developing the same action in Malaysia. Under English law an action for 
wrongful publication of private information may be sought. The recognition 
of such an action proves the court’s role in developing the law in this area.  
The development of the English privacy framework provides a useful model 
for Malaysia for three reasons.  
 
First, as discussed in Chapter Three, the application of English law in 
Malaysia did not stop on 7 April 1956 as stated in s 3 of the CLA 1956. It has 
continued as a source of reference although Malaysia has been under no 
obligation to follow. It is unsprising, therefore, when occasionally it has been 
followed entirely and formed the reason for a decision such as occurred in 
Ultra Dimension.
1
 Thus, the development of privacy protection in English 
private law since Douglas will undoubtedly be referred to when similar issues 
are raised in the Malaysian courts in the future. 
 
Second, in certain areas of law such as privacy, judges’ interpretation and 
understanding of the nature of the relevant issues greatly contribute to the 
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development of the law itself.  There was an opportunity to develop a privacy 
action in Malaysia initiated in Maslinda Ishak,
2
 and if this route followed in 
the future, the shift in Douglas and other v Hello! Ltd,
3
 and the formulation of 
a privacy action in Campbell v MGN Ltd
4
 would be constructively relevant for 
Malaysian courts. Third, the requirement of a privacy action that focuses on 
the test of reasonable expectation of privacy as the sole determinant factor for 
liability in privacy is flexible and inherently well-suited to respond to 
unforeseen privacy threats.
5
 Moreover, given the fact that the concept of 
reasonableness
6
 and the reasonable person are familiar tests in negligence and 
other private law cases in Malaysia, it would be easier for judges to apply the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test and to utilise its flexibility in privacy 
cases.  
 
In the past decade, there have been a number of key developments of the 
protection of privacy in the United Kingdom. The significant case of 
Campbell marked the rapid development of privacy rights in the UK. All five 
judges
7
 agreed that English law recognises a right to protection of private 
information. Lord Hoffman stated:
8
 
 
the difference of opinion relates to a very narrow point which arises 
on the unusual facts of this case... But the importance of this case 
lies in the statements of general principle on the way in which the 
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Above ch 3, n 14. 
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[2001] QB 967; [2001] 2 WLR 992 (Douglas). 
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[2004] UKHL 22; [2004] 2 AC 457 (HL) (Campbell). 
5
See The Law of Privacy and The Media, above ch 4, n 86, at 229. 
6See Chris DL Hunt “Privacy in the Common Law: A Critical Appraisal of the Ontario Court 
of Appeal’s Decision in Jones v Tsige” (2012) 37(2) Queen’s LJ 661, at 684-685. The author 
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expectation of privacy test is owing to its “open texture” approach and the familiarity of the 
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given its wide applicability in other areas of private law, this test fits in with established tort 
principles.  
7
Their Lordships in Campbell are Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, Lord Hoffman, Lord Hope of 
Craighead, Baroness Hale of Richmond and Lord Carswell. 
8
Campbell, at [36]. 
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law should strike a balance between the right to privacy and the 
right to freedom of expression, on which the House is unanimous. 
   
This position undoubtedly was a result of a journey to privacy recognition in 
English law since Kaye v Robertson.9 The introduction of the Human Rights 
Act 1998 (the HRA) which had the effect of incorporating the European 
Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the Convention) 
into domestic law, the extension of the traditional action for breach of 
confidence and the incorporation of the European jurisprudence are  major 
factors influencing the development. 
  
This chapter discusses the law of privacy in the United Kingdom. Part II 
considers the common law protection of privacy and traditional breach of 
confidence action. The existing common law principles which have a bearing 
on privacy interests are discussed in order to analyse the previous reluctance 
to recognise a separate tort of privacy as part of the law. Part III evaluates 
breach of confidence post-HRA and the impact of the HRA in privacy cases. 
The utilisation of a breach of confidence action to accommodate privacy 
breaches and its new methodology which expands the boundary of 
confidentiality to personal information are examined in this Part.  The 
incorporation of the Convention rights has greatly changed the landscape of 
privacy law by providing an opportunity for significant development of the 
right. Part IV discusses the tort of misuse of private information as recognised 
in Campbell and its elements to define the tort. The application of the test of 
reasonable expectation of privacy and other tests in determining privacy cases 
are analysed in the light of Campbell and other subsequent cases. This Part 
also highlights the protection against physical privacy and remedies in privacy 
action. Part V concludes the discussion of English privacy law. 
 
 
                                                          
9
Kaye v Andrew Robertson [1991] FSR 62 (Kaye). 
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II The Framework for the Protection of Privacy 
  
In this Part, the existing common law protections grounded in trespass, 
nuisance, defamation, copyright, malicious falsehood are discussed to assess 
how the previous framework had provided remedies for breach of privacy, 
and to acknowledge the existence of a patchy form of privacy protection. This 
Part also analyses the applicability of the traditional breach of confidence to 
privacy actions. 
 
Previously, there was no general law of privacy in English law. Consequently, 
the courts were not actively involved in construing the right of privacy as a 
recognised cause of action. The hesitation to enlarge the ideas of privacy were 
restated in Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner where the court held 
that English common law did not recognise a cause of action for the 
infringement of telephonic privacy.10 
 
Another strong authority which confirmed this position is Kaye. In that case, 
the plaintiff, Mr Kaye, a well-known actor, applied for an order restraining the 
publication of photographs, obtained by a tabloid’s journalist, of injuries he 
sustained in a car crash while he was still in hospital undergoing treatment. 
The Court of Appeal commented on the defendant’s action as “a monstrous 
invasion of privacy”.11 
 
The inadequacies of English law to address privacy matters in that case were 
commented on by Bingham LJ:12 
 
This case nonetheless highlights, yet again, the failure of both 
the common law of England and statute to protect in an effective 
way the personal privacy of individual citizens... If ever a person 
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Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1979] Ch 344. 
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Kaye, above n 9, at 70. 
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At 70. 
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has a right to be let alone by strangers with no public interests to 
pursue, it must surely be when he lies in hospital recovering 
from brain surgery and in no more than partial command of his 
faculties. It is this invasion of his privacy which underlies the 
plaintiff’s complaint. Yet it alone, however gross, does not 
entitle him to relief in English law. 
 
The court acknowledged that the defendant’s act was an invasion of the 
plaintiff’s privacy and yet concluded that only malicious falsehood was 
applicable to the circumstances of the case and decided that the invasion of 
privacy was not actionable and that generally no tort of privacy existed in 
English law. The court chose to apply the inadequate level of protection 
provided under recognised torts rather than take the bold step of recognising a 
tort of privacy. The decision prevented any potential for developing remedies 
against privacy intrusions.  
 
The above status continued in the case of Wainwright v Home Office13 where 
the Law Lords refused to recognise the existence of a separate and free-
standing tort of privacy, relying upon the progressive extension of the existing 
breach of confidence action to protect privacy interests. In that case, counsel 
for the plaintiffs attempted to obtain a remedy for the intrusive strip-search to 
which they had been subjected, by arguing that various torts of intentional 
interference with the body of a person should be given an expanded definition 
to protect personal privacy, or alternatively, that an autonomous tort of 
privacy should finally be recognised in English law.  
 
Since the incident had taken place in 1997, before the HRA came into force, 
art 8 of the Convention could not be directly invoked against the authorities 
responsible for the detention, and no alternative avenue was available to the 
                                                          
13
Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53; [2004] 2 AC 406 (HL) (Wainwright). Lord 
Hoffmann who gave the leading judgment for the House of Lords, held that although the 
breach of confidence action provides some protection against the disclosure of personal 
information, there is no general tort of invasion of privacy in English law, at [30-35]. 
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plaintiffs in English law. The court held that there was no common law tort of 
invasion of privacy and that the creation of such a tort required a detailed 
approach which could be achieved only by legislation rather than the broad 
brush of common law principle. 14  On that basis, the court concluded that 
protection for such situations should be left to Parliament to fill the gap with a 
statutory provision. 
   
A Common law 
 
Although it is settled that the current legal position now for the protection of 
privacy under the English law is the utilisation of breach of confidence action, 
it is necessary to briefly discuss the role of common law principles in 
protecting privacy before the HRA came into force. The discussion is relevant 
because reliance on common law principles in addressing privacy cases has 
been the means of protecting privacy in Malaysia and was confirmed in Ultra 
Dimension.  
 
The common law has always offered piecemeal protection to many aspects of 
private life. This raises the question as to the extent the existing laws protect 
infringement of privacy. In the absence of a tort of privacy, the courts are able 
to develop the common law by depending on existing principles in the law of 
trespass, nuisance, copyright, defamation, malicious falsehood, the law of 
passing off, breach of confidence and the like to fashion a common law right 
to privacy.15 Analysing each principle that constitutes a common law action, 
shows that none of them are able to protect privacy beyond what a breach of 
confidence law can provide.  
 
This Part discusses those common law principles that illustrate Malaysia’s 
inadequacy to provide protection to aspects of privacy interests. It confirms 
                                                          
14
At [33]. 
15Jonathan Morgan in “Privacy, Confidence and Horizontal Effect: “Hello” Trouble” (2003) 
62 Cambridge LJ 444 at 458. 
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that reliance on them does not remedy the inadequacies of privacy protections 
and thus, that a different approach needs to be undertaken to protect privacy 
of individuals.   
 
The law of trespass to a person and to land requires direct physical 
interference with the person or the land. A remedy for physical intrusion may 
be sought only by an owner or a person who is in the possession of the land. 
Thus in Kaye, a claim for physical intrusion could have been brought by the 
hospital authorities, but not by the patient, against the journalist and 
photographer who entered the patient’s room without permission from the 
hospital’s staff. Here, the common law principle of trespass could not serve 
the purpose for which an action for privacy intrusion is brought because in 
certain circumstances, privacy intrusion takes place without any direct 
physical interference. 
 
The ability of private nuisance to provide protection for privacy was also 
examined. The Younger Report found that private nuisance was not a 
particularly effective cause of action for the protection of privacy interests. It 
stated:16 
 
An action for private nuisance is normally brought for some physical 
invasion of the plaintiff’s land by some deleterious subject matter…in 
circumstances that would not amount to trespass to land. It is much 
more doubtful if it would cover an activity which had no physical 
effect on the plaintiff’s land, although it detracts from the plaintiff’s 
enjoyment of that land. 
 
Further, only the person who has an interest in the land affected by the 
nuisance can bring the action, and accordingly this tort is of little use in 
protecting victims of infringement of privacy. In Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd 
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Report of the Committee on Privacy (Cmnd 5012) (1972). 
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the court held that the law of nuisance would not provide any protection to 
any guests or friends visiting of the property owner, if they had no interest in 
the surveyed land.
17
  
 
The tort of defamation which consists of libel and slander focused on the 
claimant’s public reputation and not his personal honour or dignity. Thus 
publication to a third party is a prerequisite before an action can be sustained. 
Defamation and invasion of privacy have some elements in common but are 
not identical. The Younger Committee recommended that “the concept of 
defamation and privacy should be kept distinct from one another.” 18  The 
defamation case of Tolley v Fry & Sons Ltd 19  led Winfield to argue that 
English law should recognise a right to privacy.20 The main problem is that 
truth is a complete defence to an action in defamation yet it is often the 
publication of true personal information which causes the greatest distress. 
 
Some commentators have agreed that among other causes of action, the law of 
confidence has a close connection to privacy and is therefore, more able to 
flexible to protect it. 21  Lord Hoffman in Campbell stated that despite the 
absence of a general tort of invasion of privacy as confirmed in Wainwright, 
the right to privacy is in a general sense one of the values, and sometimes the 
most important value, which underlies a number of more specific causes of 
action, both at common law and under various statutes. He emphasised that an 
                                                          
17
Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd  [1997]AC 655. 
18
Report of the Committee on Privacy, above n 19, at [71]-[72]. 
19
[1931] AC 33. 
20P Winfield, “Privacy” (1931) LQR 23. 
21See Helen Fenwick and Gavin Phillipson, “Confidence and Privacy: A Re-Examination” 
(1996) 55 Cambridge LJ 447; Ng-Loy Wee Loon “Emergence of a right to privacy from 
within the law of confidence?” (1996) 18(5) European Intellectual Property Rev 307, at 310 
“The law of confidence is probably the one which has the closest relation to privacy 
interests”. The author also referred to the Younger Report on Privacy (1972) at 26, ‘The law 
on breach of confidence offers the most effective protection of privacy in the whole of our 
existing law, civil and criminal. The same view is shared by Gurry F Breach of Confidence 
(Oxford University Press, Clarendon, 1984) at 13 “The function of the action [for breach of 
confidence] in protecting personal confidences is closely associated with the notion of 
privacy”.   
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equitable action for breach of confidence has long been recognised as capable 
of being used to protect privacy.22 
 
An action for breach of confidence has, therefore, long been available to a 
plaintiff whose confidential information has been or threatened to be disclosed 
to a third party.23 However, with the passing of the HRA, the inherent function 
of breach of confidence in protecting confidential personal information has 
shifted to a broader protection for privacy of personal information. It has been 
the means by which courts could restrain the publication of personal 
information. Privacy authors argue that the equitable action for breach of 
confidence provides much fuller protection of privacy than other common law 
principles.
24
  
 
B Traditional breach of confidence action 
 
In an action for a traditional breach of confidence, there are three important 
elements as established by Megarry J in Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) 
Limited:25  
 
First, the information itself…must have the necessary quality of 
confidence about it. Secondly, that information must have been 
imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence. 
Thirdly, there must be an unauthorised use of that information to the 
detriment of the party communicating it.  
 
                                                          
22
Campbell, at [43]. 
23
For example in Pollard v Photographic Co (1888) 40 Ch D 345, the plaintiff successfully 
sued the photographer for incorporating her image onto Christmas cards for general sale on 
the basis of a “gross breach of faith”. 
24Tanya Aplin “The Relationship between Breach of Confidence and ‘The Tort of Misuse of 
Private Iinformation’” (2007) 18(2) King’s Law Journal 329; see also Fenwick and 
Phillipson, above n 22 and Gavin Phillipson “Transforming Breach of Confidence? Towards a 
Common Law Right of Privacy under the Human Rights Act” (2003) 66 Modern L Rev 726.  
25
[1969] RPC 41 at 47 (Coco). The conditions for a claim for breach of confidence are 
summarised by Megarry VC in Malone, above n 10. 
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The elements for the action show that the focus of breach of confidence was 
the protection of commercial information. The information is not protected if 
the public interest served by disclosing the information in question outweighs 
the interest in preserving confidentiality, even though all the elements are 
satisfied. A claim for breach of confidence can be sustained if the information 
obtained in the course of a relationship with an obligation of confidence is 
subsequently published and no public interest exists in that information is 
being made public.26  
 
In order to establish a traditional breach of confidence action, one must first 
show that the information in question is confidential in the sense that it is 
available to one person (or a group of people) and not generally available to 
others, provided that the person or group who possesses it does not intend that 
it should become available to others. 27  Personal information is a type of 
confidential information protected by personal confidences. Confidentiality is 
thus the basic attribute used to determine whether the information possesses 
the necessary quality of confidence. In Douglas v Hello Ltd, the Court of 
Appeal defined “private information” to include information that is personal 
to the person who possesses it and that person does not intend it to be 
imparted to the general public.
28
 The nature of the information, or the form in 
which it is kept, may suffice to make it plain that the information satisfies 
these criteria.29  
 
However, personal information is only capable of being protected by breach 
of confidence if it has been imparted in circumstances importing an obligation 
of confidence. In contrast, not all breach of privacy cases result from duty or 
relationship. Within the scope of the information, personal information is 
entitled to similar protection because it could have the necessary quality of 
                                                          
26
See Seager v Copydex Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 923. 
27
See Douglas v Hello Ltd  [2006] QB 125 (CA). 
28
At [55]. 
29
At [83]. 
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confidence about it.30  The requirement of the quality of confidence was raised 
in Schering Chemicals v Falkman in which the court found that the test was 
subjective because widely known facts were still the object of a duty of 
confidence.
31
  
 
The second element in which confidential information be “imparted in 
circumstances importing an obligation of confidence” implies that such 
information must be voluntarily disclosed or communicated by the confider.  
The existence of a confidential relationship is a key factor in determining 
whether a breach exists. In the absence of a pre-existing relationship of trust 
such as that of doctor-patient, lawyer-client or employer-employee from 
which an obligation of confidence could be inferred, an action for redress by a 
person whose personal information had been disclosed would fail. Thus, it is 
necessary to establish a relationship of confider and confidant before an action 
for a breach of confidence may be sustained.32 
 
The relationship of confidence is observed to be the essential feature of the 
law of confidence. However, the requirement of a pre-existing relationship 
was largely been done away in Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd 
(No 2). 33  The principle that omits the requirement of a prior confidential 
relationship was accepted in Earl Spencer v United Kingdom 34  and was 
applied in A v B plc.35 Lord Woolf CJ formulated the principle:36  
 
                                                          
30
This is evidenced in the case Prince Albert v Strange (1849) ER 1171 where etchings of 
family life of Prince Albert and Queen Victoria were protected on the basis of breach of trust, 
confidence or contract. In Argyll v Argyll [1967] Ch 302, breach of confidence was used to 
protect information communicated within a marriage.  
31
Schering Chemicals v Falkman [1981] 2 All ER 321 (CA). 
32
See Coco, above n 28. Megarry J’s test explained the second requirement at 48, “if the 
circumstances are such that any reasonable man standing in the shoes of the recipient of the 
information would have realised that upon reasonable grounds the information was being 
given to him in confidence, then this should suffice to impose upon him the equitable 
obligation of confidence.” 
33
[1990] 1 AC 109 (HL) (Spycatcher).  
34
[1998] 25 EHRR CD 105. 
35
[2003] QB 195 (CA) (A v B plc). 
36
At 207, [11] (ix) and (x). 
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The need for the existence of a confidential relationship should 
not give rise to problems as to the law because a duty of 
confidence will arise whenever the party subject to the duty is in 
a situation where he knows or ought to know that the other 
person can reasonably expect his privacy to be protected. The 
difficulty will be as to the relevant facts, bearing in mind that, if 
there is an intrusion in a situation where a person can reasonably 
expect his privacy to be respected, that intrusion will be capable 
of giving rise to liability unless the intrusion can be justified. 
 
The third element requires the claimant to prove that there was unauthorised 
use of the information and the communicating of it to others was detrimental 
to the claimant. This element raises no difficulties in circumstances resulting 
in breach of an individual’s privacy because both torts of privacy recognised 
in the UK and New Zealand concern publication of private information to 
third parties. 
 
Having discussed the requirements of an action for breach of confidence, the 
question is does traditional breach of confidence protect privacy? If it does, a 
breach of privacy could adequately be protected through a breach of 
confidence action and could be easily followed by Malaysia. However, as 
discussed in Chapter Three, the existing common law principles including the 
law of confidence are not capable of providing remedies for breach of privacy.  
 
The Malaysian courts have so far not seen fit to expand the traditional scope 
of the breach of confidence doctrine. This action continues to be available 
only where confidential information has been made available in breach of a 
relationship of confidentiality. Furthermore, the Malaysian courts have not 
accepted the Spycatcher extension in deciding breach of confidence cases. 
Their inadequacies require another method of protection than that provided by 
a traditional breach of confidence action.  
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Conceptually, a claim for breach of confidence is quite different from a claim 
for infringement of privacy since it depends upon the obligation of confidence 
imposed on both parties. A claim for infringement of privacy on the other 
hand, focusses on the nature of the information: it would be because the 
information in question is of a personal or domestic nature, and the person 
whom it concerned would normally expect it not to be revealed to third 
parties. 
 
However, there is an overlap between confidence and privacy. Where 
information of a confidential and personal nature is given or received in 
circumstances in which an obligation of confidence is imposed, the victim of 
the infringement of privacy can utilise the law of breach of confidence.37 This 
is illustrated in Stephens v Avery.38 In that case, the plaintiff wanted to prevent 
further publication by the press of information given by a friend about the 
plaintiff’s sexual conduct. She claimed that she had given the information in 
confidence. However, it was argued that there was no claim in confidence 
because there was no pre-existing relationship or contract between the parties. 
While rejecting the approach, Sir Nicolas Browne Wilkinson VC stated that it 
was not the relationship between the parties that determined whether there 
was a claim for breach of confidence but rather the acceptance of the 
information on the basis that it would be kept secret that affected the 
conscience of the recipient of the information.39 
 
He also commented on the relationship between privacy and freedom of 
information. He found it difficult to draw a line between the aggressive 
intrusion of sectors of the press into private lives of individual and its ability 
to obtain and publish information of genuine public interest, as opposed to 
                                                          
37Arden “The Future Law of Privacy” (1998-1999) 9 King College LJ 1 at 5. 
38
[1988] Ch 449. 
39
 At 456. 
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general public titillation which might be impaired if information obtained in 
confidence were too widely protected by the law.40 
 
Another difference between privacy and confidence is that breach of 
confidence would cover any kind of confidential information, including 
commercial information. A claim for infringement of privacy would in 
general only cover information of a personal nature. Breach of confidence 
focuses on the need to uphold the obligation of confidence whereas in 
enforcing a claim for infringement of privacy the court would be concerned 
with damage to the plaintiff as a result of an unauthorised publication.41  
 
Breach of confidence and the tort of privacy serve different purposes. A 
breach of confidence action is largely (but not wholly) concerned with 
preserving and engendering respect for relationships of trust and confidence. 
In the context of personal information, there may be particular kinds of 
confidential relationships, such as doctor-patient, lawyer-client, or employer-
employee that society wants to reinforce. A right to privacy, on the other 
hand, is concerned with protecting the dignity and autonomy of individuals 
and providing them with informational control critical to human well-being.42 
  
The differences in aim and purpose were made clear when Gurry 
distinguished a number of ways in which these elements of the traditional 
action fail to protect disclosure of private information.
43
 According to Gurry, 
rights under the traditional cause of action operate only against the confidant, 
and not against the world at large. This means that where private information 
                                                          
40
At 456-457. This issue has also been highlighted in “The Future Law of Privacy” above n 
37.  
41
Arden, above n 37 at 6. 
42
See Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1, per Tipping J: It is of the essence of the dignity 
and personal autonomy and wellbeing of all human being that some aspects of their lives 
should be able to remain private if they so wish, at [58]. 
43
See Tanya Aplin [et al] Gurry on Breach of Confidence: The Protection of Confidential 
Information (2
nd
 ed, Oxford University Press, 2012); see also Francis Gurry Breach of 
Confidence (Oxford University Press, Clarendon, 1984).   
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about an individual is gained from a public source, the confider has no rights 
of action in breach of confidence against that person. The need for an 
identifiable, pre-existing relationship of trust in the traditional cause of action 
from which an obligation of confidence could be inferred, has made it nearly 
impossible for persons whose personal information had been disclosed to have 
any redress, in the absence of such a relationship.44 
 
The above discussion illustrates that the traditional breach of confidence 
action is not capable of protecting privacy which involves private rather than 
confidential information. The absence of a prior relationship of trust and 
confidence between the parties in a privacy action does not sit well with the 
second requirement established in Coco.  The artificiality of distinguishing 
between information obtained through the abuse of a confidential relationship 
with similar information obtained in some other way has led the English 
courts to recasting the traditional breach of confidence action.45 As a result, 
there are now two types of breach of confidence action in English law.46  
 
The next Part shows how the shift in determining confidentiality of personal 
information has taken place. Instead of questioning whether the information is 
“confidential”, the question now is whether the information is “private”. The 
post-HRA cases demonstrate this change and accordingly the altered 
landscape of privacy protection in English law. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
44Rebecca Taseff “The Protection of Personal Privacy: The Differences between A Privacy 
Tort and The Action for Breach of Confidence” (2005) 10 Media and Arts Law Review 208 at 
211. The author also referred to Gurry, above n 43. 
45
Lord Hoffman in Campbell at [46]. 
46
Taseff, above n 44, at 211. 
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III Breach of Confidence Post-HRA 
 
A The Impact of the HRA 1998 on the Law of Privacy 
 
This section examines the role of the HRA in providing protection against 
breach of privacy and how English courts interpret its provisions in order to 
give effect to cases between private individuals. It has greatly influenced the 
development of the law of confidence and its relationship to privacy in 
England. Information no longer needs to be transmitted via a confidential 
relationship in order to create an obligation of confidentiality.  
  
The HRA 1998 came into force on 2 October 2000 having brought together all 
Convention rights enforceable in the UK courts. The Act promotes 
compatibility between English domestic law and European Convention in 
three main ways:47 
 
i) it requires all legislation to be interpreted and given effect as far as 
possible compatibly with the Convention rights.  
ii) it makes it unlawful for a public authority to act incompatibly with 
the Convention rights and allows for a case to be brought in a UK 
court or tribunal against the authority if it does so.  
iii) UK courts and tribunals must take account of Convention rights in 
all cases that come before them. The common law must be 
developed in compatibility with the Convention rights by taking 
into account of Strasbourg case law. 
 
Under the HRA, the courts or judges have no power to overrule statutes which 
contravene Convention rights.48 By virtue of s 6, though, courts at all levels 
are under a duty to do everything possible to interpret legislation in 
                                                          
47See Department for Constitutional Affairs “A Guide to the Human Rights Act 1998: Third 
Edition” (2006) <http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/human-rights/act-studyguide.pdf> 
48
Section 6 of the HRA 1998. 
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conformity with Convention rights. In other words, the HRA functions to give 
further effect in UK law to most of their rights under the European 
Convention on Human Rights. It affects the way Government and other public 
authorities deal with individuals and promotes a new culture of rights and 
responsibilities.  
 
The term “horizontal effect” is used to describe the impact of the Convention 
rights in legal relations between two private parties. It is distinguished from 
vertical proceedings brought by an individual to enforce the obligations by the 
state. The main effect of the HRA is vertical, affecting cases between 
individuals and state or public authorities rather than disputes between private 
parties. However, the Act requires all legislation and courts, as far as possible, 
to give effect compatibly with the Convention rights. This means that the Act 
has some horizontal effect, allowing the Convention rights to be invoked in 
proceedings between private parties.49  
 
Article 8(1) protects only against interference with privacy by a public 
authority where it has “vertical effect” between the state and the citizen. After 
the passage of the HRA 1998 there was much debate as to the extent to which 
the positive obligation meant that the Convention, via the 1998 Act, had a 
“horizontal effect” between private persons. Although the equivalent of art 8 
has been enacted as part of English law, it is not directly concerned with the 
protection of privacy against private persons or corporations. It is, by virtue of 
s 6 of the 1998 Act, a guarantee of privacy against public authorities only.50 
 
Section 6(3) defines “public authority” to include “a court or tribunal”. Thus, 
it follows that if the case involved a Convention right, a court must decide in 
accordance with it, either in a case between private parties or a case against a 
public authority.  
                                                          
49See “A Guide to the Human Rights Act 1998: Third Edition”, above n 48. 
50
 Campbell, at [49]. 
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Indirect horizontal effect means that although a claimant cannot invoke a 
Convention right directly against another private party, the court regards 
Convention principles as relevant to the continuing development of the law.51 
Indirect horizontal effect gained judicial support in Campbell:52 
 
The 1998 Act does not create any new cause of action between 
private persons. But if there is a relevant cause of action applicable, 
the court as a public authority must act compatibly with both 
parties’ Convention rights. 
 
Although Baroness Hale supported the duty of the court to develop the tort of 
breach of confidence to protect the Convention rights of privacy and freedom 
of expression, she stated explicitly that the court was not required to create a 
new tort of privacy.53 
  
When considering any relief in a privacy action, the court acts under s 12 of 
the HRA. The court must have particular regard to freedom of expression in 
any case where the relief sought might affect that right. In other words, the 
effect of s 12 is to impose an obligation on the courts to have exercise a 
balance between the right of privacy and the right of freedom of expression. 
Section 12(4) provides: 
 
The court must have particular regard to the importance of the 
Convention right to freedom of expression and, where the 
proceeding relate to material which the respondent claims, or 
which appears to the court, to be journalistic, literary or artistic 
material (or to conduct connected with such material), to: 
                                                          
51
See Gavin Phillipson “The Human Rights Act, ‘Horizontal Effect’ and the Common Law: a 
Bang or a Whimper?” (1999) 62 MLR 824; R Singh “Privacy and the Media after the Human 
Rights Act” (2000) EHRLR 712; M Hunt “The ‘Horizontal Effect’ of the Human Rights Act 
(1998) PL 423; Ivan Hare “Vertically challenged: Private Parties, Privacy and the Human 
Rights Act” (2001) EHRLR 526. 
52
 Campbell, at[132]. 
53See also Alison  L Young “Mapping Horizontal Effect” in David Hoffman (ed) The Impact 
of the UK Human Rights Act on Private Law (Cambridge University Press, UK, 2011). 
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(a) the extent to which- 
(i) the material has, or is about to, become available to the public; or 
(ii) it is, or would be, in the public interest for the material to be 
published; 
(b) any relevant privacy code. 
 
Thus, following the enforcement of the HRA 1998, as far as private 
information is concerned, a breach of confidence action has been the vehicle 
used by the courts in performing its obligation under the Convention. In this 
regard, the court should develop the action for breach of confidence in such a 
way as will give effect to both arts 8 and 10. The court also must take into 
account Strasbourg jurisprudence in considering private information issues 
pursuant to art 8.54 
 
Having examined the impact of the HRA on the development of the law of 
privacy, it is pertinent to discuss the Convention rights relevant for the 
protection of privacy enshrined in arts 8 and 10 of the ECHR.  
 
B Balancing Competing Convention Rights 
 
This section discusses the content of the art 8 right to respect for private and 
family life55 and the art 10 right to freedom of expression.56 It also explains 
                                                          
54
Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3) [2006] QB 125 (CA) (Douglas No 3) at [53]. 
55
Article 8 provides “(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence. (2)There shall be no interference by a public authority with the 
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interest of national security, public safety or the economic well-
being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals or for the protection of the rights and freedom of others”. 
56
Article 10 provides “(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall 
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent 
States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.  (2)  The 
exercise of these freedom, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to 
such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary in a democratic society, in the interest of national security, territorial integrity or 
public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 
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how balancing of these rights is carried out when issues of privacy are 
involved.  
 
Article 8 protects an individual’s privacy. What actually constitutes the scope 
of private life is broad. When applying the concept, English courts refer to 
decisions of the European court. Moreham examined the category of private 
life contained in art 8. According to her, the right is acknowledged to go 
beyond the “right to privacy, the right to live as privately as one wishes and to 
be protected from publicity”.57  
 
Lord Nicholls acknowledged the values enshrined in arts 8 and 10 as part of 
the cause of action for breach of confidence.58 He detailed the role of art 8 in 
connection with privacy and free speech. Art 8(1) recognises the need to 
respect private and family life. Art 8(2) recognises circumstances in which 
intrusion into private and family life may be justified. One such intrusion is 
for the protection of the rights and freedom of others. To safeguard these 
rights, art 10(1) recognises the importance of freedom of expression but limits 
the right when protection of the rights of others is justified and makes it 
necessary for freedom of expression to give way. Lord Nicholls refers to the 
engagement of both articles as proportionality.59 In this regard, art 10 is part of 
privacy right by virtue of the restrictions provided by art 8(2). 
 
According to Lord Hope, the effect of both provisions is that the right to 
privacy which lies at the heart of an action for breach of confidence must be 
balanced with the right of the media to impart information to the public. 
                                                                                                                                                       
for the protection of the reputation of rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of 
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the 
judiciary.” 
57NA Moreham “The Right to Respect for Private Life in the European Convention on Human 
Rights: A Re-examination” (2008) EHRLR Issue 1, 44 at 45 [“The Right to Respect for 
Private Life”]. The author referred to a number of cases, see Peck v United Kingdom [2003] 
36 EHRR 41 at [57]; Niemietz v Germany [1992] 16 EHRR 97 at [29]; Pretty v United 
Kingdom [2002] 35 EHRR 1 at [61]. 
58
Campbell, at [17]. 
59
 At [20]. 
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Similarly, the right of the media to impart information to the public must be 
balanced against the respect for private life.60 In other words, public interest in 
disclosure must be balanced against the right of the individual to respect for 
their private life. The test to be applied is whether publication of the material 
pursues a legitimate aim and whether the benefits achieved by its publication 
are proportionate to the harm that may be done by the interference with the 
right to privacy.61 
 
However, another standard of proportionality also applies. Baroness Hale 
stated that:62 
 
The application of the proportionality test is more straightforward 
when only one Convention right is in play: the question then is 
whether the private right claimed offers sufficient justification for 
the degree of interference with the fundamental right. It is much 
less straightforward when two Convention rights are in play, and 
the proportionality of interfering with one has to be balanced 
against the proportionality of restricting the other. As each is a 
fundamental right, there is evidently a “pressing social need” to 
protect it. 
 
The importance of arts 8 and 10 in relation to the development of privacy law 
in the UK is paramount. The court has a duty to strike a fair balance between 
the competing rights of the claimant to respect for private life under art 8 and 
of the defendant to freedom of expression. Although this balancing exercise is 
not new under English law,63 European court decisions must be taken into 
account when interpreting Convention rights.  
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At [105]. 
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At [113]. 
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At [140]. 
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See Spycatcher, above n 34. 
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The two versions of breach of confidence branches, namely the classic Coco 
or “old fashioned” version and the “new version” are clearly recognised in 
Douglas64 where Lord Nicholls said:
65
 
 
Breach of confidence…now covers two distinct causes of action, 
protecting two different interests: privacy and secret (confidential) 
information. It is important to keep these two distinct. 
  
It is essential to examine the “new version” and its impact on the development 
of the law of privacy. This is discussed in the following section.  
 
C Douglas and the New Methodology 
 
The most vital change to a breach of confidence action in response to the 
enactment of the HRA was the extension of the requirement of a confidential 
relationship between parties which is the key element of a confidence action. 
As discussed in Part II (B), the breach of confidence action has been used to 
protect confidential relationship but had no comprehensive protection for 
private information. However, Spycatcher confirmed that need for an initial 
confidential relationship between the parties no longer applied in a breach of 
confidence action. This was later reinforced in Douglas, Campbell and 
Murray.
66
 
 
1 Background 
 
The first case post-HRA to consider the significance of the Act for breach of 
confidence was Douglas. The case has changed the question of whether a 
right to privacy exists in English law to how protection should be provided. In 
the celebrated case of Michael Douglas and Catherine Zeta-Jones, an 
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Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2007] UKHL 21 (HL). 
65
At [255]. 
66
Murray v Express Newspaper Plc [2008] EWCA Civ 446 (CA) (Murray). 
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agreement was entered between them and OK! magazine for the exclusive 
rights of the magazine to take photographs of their wedding and the right to 
publish the photographs with an accompanying article. The couple had 
restricted all staff at the wedding and the guests from taking photographs by 
their signing a confidentiality agreement as well as having security checks 
around the hotel. However, unauthorised photographs of the wedding were 
taken and offered for sale a few days afterwards. They were bought by Hello! 
magazine, a competitor of OK! magazine. The couple and OK! magazine 
applied for an interim injunction to prevent Hello! from publishing the 
photographs and it was granted. The defendant appealed.  
 
In the Court of Appeal, the claimant relied upon establishing a cause of action 
in breach of confidence in order to obtain an interlocutory injunction. 
However, the injunction was discharged and the court recorded that the case 
had more to do with privacy than confidentiality.67  The issue was whether Mr 
Douglas and Ms Zeta Jones had a right to privacy which English law would 
recognise.68 
 
2 The articulation of the right to privacy 
 
The important question for this section is to what extent was the development 
in Douglas dependent on the HRA? The discussion below explains the court’s 
articulation of the right to privacy which is relevant for constitutional 
development of privacy right in Malaysian law.  
 
Brooke, Sedley and Keene LJJ conducted an analysis of the position by 
reference to the development of the common law, the doctrine of breach of 
confidence, its effect upon the enforcement of the HRA 1998, and the right to 
respect for private life in art 8 of the Convention. It led to the recognition 
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At [164]. 
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At [60]. 
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from the English court that there is a right to privacy in England. Sedley LJ 
confirmed the birth of a right to privacy:69 
 
The court have done what they can, using such legal tools as 
were to hand, to stop the more outrageous invasions of 
individual’s privacy; but they have felt unable to articulate their 
measures as a discrete principle of law. Nevertheless, we have 
reached a point at which it can be said with confidence that the 
law recognises and will appropriately protect a right of personal 
privacy. 
  
The question was how the right to privacy could be refashioned from common 
law and equity to be explicitly recognised by the courts because the 
ingredients of the law of confidence, in reality, contained all that was 
necessary for the protection of the right to privacy. Sedley LJ expressed the 
view that articulation of the right in these terms was a small step and one 
which had been taken obiter by Laws J, in Hellewell v Chief Constable of 
Derbyshire:70 
 
I entertain no doubt that disclosure of a photograph may, in 
some circumstances, be actionable as a breach of confidence. If 
someone with a telephoto lens were to take from a distance and 
with no authority a picture of another engaged in some private 
act, his subsequent disclosure of the photograph would, in my 
judgment, as surely amount to a breach of confidence as if he 
had found or stolen a letter or diary in which the act was 
recounted and proceeded to publish it. In such a case the law 
would protect what might reasonably be called a right of 
privacy, although the name accorded to the cause of action 
would be breach of confidence.   
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At [110]. 
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[1995] 1 WLR 804 at 807. 
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Sedley LJ’s pronouncement on the existence of a right to personal privacy 
was as a result of the development of common law and equity in response to 
infringements to privacy and private life.71 His analysis of common law led 
him to the conclusion that Michael Douglas and Catherine Zeta-Jones had, at 
least, a powerfully arguable case to advance at trial of rights to privacy which 
should be recognised and protected in appropriate circumstances. His 
Lordship sought to distinguish the notion of the breach of law of confidence 
as previously understood, from the right to privacy:72 
 
What a concept of privacy does, however, is accord recognition 
to the fact that the law has to protect not only those people 
whose trust has been abused but those who simply find 
themselves subject to an unwanted intrusion into their personal 
lives. The law no longer needs to construct an artificial 
relationship of confidentiality between intruder and victim: it 
can recognise privacy itself as a legal principle drawn from the 
fundamental value of personal autonomy. 
 
In His Lordship’s view, to recognise a right to privacy grounded in the 
equitable doctrine of breach of confidence did little more than say “by way of 
label” what courts have been saying over the years.73 However, recognising a 
concept of privacy permitted this interest to be protected more directly as an 
independent legal principle.74  
 
Having recognised a right to privacy, Sedley LJ also considered the position 
of the HRA and stated that if the shift from confidentiality to privacy 
amounted to more than a modern restatement of the scope of confidence, this 
was “precisely the kind of incremental change for which the Act is 
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designed”. 75  Moreover, Sedley LJ interpreted s 12(4) as allowing privacy 
interests to be taken into account. He stated that when a court was considering 
whether or not to grant relief which might affect the right to freedom of 
expression, the fact that particular regard must be given to this right, as 
required by art 12(4), in turn required particular regard of art 8. 76 This is 
because art 10 is itself qualified in favour of reputation, the rights of others 
and the protection of information received in confidence.77 
 
On the other hand, Brooke LJ felt it unnecessary for the Court to decide the 
extent of the right and its basis whether as a new tort or an extension of breach 
of confidence. His Lordship was clear, however, that “the task of definition 
and enforcement fell clearly within the judiciary’s domain and that the 
concern to establish and protect a right to privacy was one for which the 
judiciary had good credentials.”78 It appeared that his confidence in the future 
protection of a right to privacy stemmed from the positive obligations deemed 
to flow from the Convention itself. Yet, his optimism was clearly tempered by 
the difficulty confronting a court in the future with the problem of 
determining the extent to which a horizontal right of privacy exists as a matter 
of law. At the end of his analysis, Brooke LJ said:79 
 
…where Parliament in this country has been so obviously 
content to leave the development of the law to the judges, it 
might seem strange if the absence of art 1 from our national 
statute relieved the judges from taking into account the positive 
duties identified by the Court at Strasbourg when they develop 
the common law. In this judgment, however, I have the luxury of 
identifying difficult issues. I am not obliged to solve them. 
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Keene LJ was reluctant to express a definitive view that s 6 could in fact 
justify the creation of a new cause of action by judicial pronouncement, given 
certain limitations in the Act. His Lordship’s view was that the creation of a 
new cause of action between private persons and bodies is controversial, as to 
do so it would appear to circumvent the restrictions on proceedings contained 
in s 7(1) of the Act and on remedies in s 8(1).80 
 
His Lordship preferred an approach of fresh analysis of the common law and 
equity assisted by the impetus of the interpretative obligation under the 
HRA:81 
 
…it is unnecessary to determine the above issue in these 
proceedings, where reliance is placed on breach of confidence, 
an established cause of action, the scope of which may now need 
to be approached in the light of the obligation on this court 
arising under s 6(1) of the Act.  
 
Keene LJ further commented on the exemption of a pre-existing confidential 
relationship between the parties:82 
 
The nature of the subject matter or the circumstances of the breach 
and the defendant’s activities may suffice in some instances to 
give rise to liability for breach of confidence. That approach must 
now be informed by the jurisprudence of the Convention in respect 
of art 8. Whether the resulting liability is described as being for 
breach of confidence or for breach of a right to privacy may be 
little more than deciding what label is to be attached to the cause 
of action, but there would seem to be merit in recognising that the 
original concept of breach of confidence has in this particular 
category of cases now developed into something different from the 
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commercial and employment relationships with which 
confidentiality is mainly concerned. 
 
All three Lord Justices concurred in discharging the injunction against Hello! 
having regard to the competing considerations relating to prior restraint of 
such publication. There was a strong balance of convenience argument for 
such discharge because OK! magazine could more readily be compensated in 
damages for any breach which was subsequently established at trial, whereas 
Hello! would suffer very serious consequences difficult to assess financially if 
it were not permitted to publish its printed edition of the magazine. But it is 
also significant that the Court of Appeal did not feel hindered in carrying out 
their own balancing exercise as between the privacy rights of Michael 
Douglas and Catherine Zeta-Jones and the freedom of expression rights of 
Hello! magazine.  
  
Significantly, the decision in Douglas confirmed the development of a right to 
privacy and introduced a new methodology extended from the law of breach 
of confidence. It also applied the HRA and highlighted the horizontal issue in 
relation to it. Though the analysis was based on an interlocutory decision, it 
had canvassed issues that had not been dealt with before.  The reluctance of 
both Brooke and Keene LJJ to accept the creation of a full-fledged right to 
privacy meant that the issue remained to be determined by subsequent 
proceedings.83 
 
The judges’ analysis in Douglas, in particular that of Sedley and Keene LJJ 
revealed that the establishment of a right to privacy developed under the 
common law was stimulated by the duty to act compatibly with the 
Convention’s right. The combination of the common law, equity and the 
obligations under the HRA ensure that development of the right to privacy 
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does not proceed in a vacuum and without regard to the high value accorded 
to art 10. 
 
Shortly after Douglas, the case of Venables and Thompson v Newsgroup 
Newspapers and Associated Newspapers Ltd84 brought into question again the 
status of the right to privacy in English law. In that case, two children who 
had been convicted of the murder in 1993, of James Bulger, a two-year old 
boy, brought an action seeking continuation of injunctions preventing 
publication of further information about them. These injunctions had 
previously been granted under s 39 of the Children and Young Persons Act 
1933. The claimant sought effective continuation of the injunctions relating to 
publication of their identities, appearances, location and history in the secure 
units, in light of their eighteenth birthdays and their imminent release from 
secure units. 
  
The injunction was granted against the publication of information about the 
identity of the two boys. Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P said:85 
 
The duty of confidence may arise in equity independently of a 
transaction between the parties. In this case it would be a duty 
placed upon the media. A duty of confidence does already arise 
when confidential information comes to the knowledge of the 
media, in circumstances in which the media have notice of its 
confidentiality…The issue is whether the information leading to 
disclosure of the claimants’ identity and location comes within 
the confidentiality brackets…In my judgment, the court does 
have the jurisdiction, in exceptional cases, to extend the 
protection of confidentiality of information, even to impose 
restriction on press, where not to do so would be likely to lead to 
serious physical injury, or to death, of the person seeking that 
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confidentiality, and there is no other way to protect the 
applicants other than by seeking relief from the court.  
 
Again in A v B plc 86  the court accepted that a pre-existing confidential 
relationship between the parties was no longer necessary in an extended 
breach of confidence action. Lord Woolf stated that the range of situations in 
which protection could be provided was extensive and, therefore, the 
necessary relationship could be expressly created. Its existence could also be 
inferred from the facts and circumstances between the parties at the time of 
the threatened or actual breach of alleged duty of confidence.87  
 
Douglas and subsequent cases have, therefore, confirmed that an invasion of 
privacy could be protected through the extended version of breach of 
confidence action in which there was no longer a need to establish that a 
relationship of confidence existed. Although there was some suggestion that 
this step could have been taken without the influence of the HRA,
88
 the Act 
was ultimately crucial in transforming the landscape of privacy protection in 
English law into a new category of privacy breach. This finally led the House 
of Lords in Campbell to accept that breach of confidence was the appropriate 
means of protecting privacy. 
 
Further, debate about whether the privacy action to have emerged from within 
breach of confidence and whether invasion of privacy is a tort or an equitable 
action has been settled in Vidal Hall and Ors v Google Inc
89
 where Tugendhat 
J confirmed that misuse of private information is now a tort. The judge 
concluded that there was a distinct “tort of misuse of private information” 
which was a tort within the meaning of the Civil Procedure Rules. 
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IV Privacy Post-HRA 
 
This part examines the tort of misuse of private information effected by the 
utilisation of breach of confidence action and the formulation of the privacy 
action in Campbell. Although it is not possible for Malaysia to shift from 
breach of confidence action to an action of misuse of private information in 
the same way, now that there is a privacy action and its contents and 
substance provide some interesting points for Malaysia.  
 
A The Tort of Misuse of Private Information 
 
In any claim based on the misuse of private information, two conditions need 
to be satisfied: the nature of the information and the balancing of arts 8 and 10 
which favours the protection of the claimant’s right to privacy. For the first 
condition, the starting point is to consider whether the information is 
sufficiently private in nature to engage art 8 of the Convention. Whether 
information is “private” depends on whether the claimant had a reasonable 
expectation that the information would remain private. The reasonableness of 
the expectation should be assessed from the perspective of a reasonable 
person of ordinary sensibilities placed in the same position as the claimant and 
faced with the same publicity.90 
 
As for the second, a balance must be struck between the competing rights of 
privacy and freedom of expression. The important question is whether the 
publication of private information complained about by a claimant forms part 
of a legitimate public interest which outweighs the claimant’s right to privacy. 
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Campbell v MGN Ltd created a new privacy tort in English law referred to as 
“misuse of private information”.91 In that case, a well-known fashion model 
sought damages for the publication of an article disclosing details of her drug 
addiction including the time, place and frequency of treatment she was 
receiving, and of a photograph showing her outside one of her therapy 
meetings. Although she accepted that the newspaper was entitled to correct 
public statements she had made about managing to stay away from drugs, 
Campbell claimed that publication of the photograph and the additional details 
interfered with her right to privacy. All five members of the House agreed that 
there was a tort protecting against the misuse of private information, although 
only a majority held that the action succeeded on the facts of the case.92  
 
The majority ruled that publication of the details of the photographs and 
information relating to the treatment Miss Campbell was receiving for drug 
addiction constituted a considerable intrusion into her private affairs. The 
press had published more private information than was necessary to pursue 
the legitimate aim of correcting incorrect statements made by Miss Campbell 
regarding her use of drugs. In doing so, the press had therefore, overstepped 
the margin of appreciation, to which it was entitled under art 10 of the ECHR, 
so as to have disproportionately infringed Miss Campbell’s rights under art 
8.93 
 
Campbell is not only important for recognising a tort of misuse of private 
information, it also resolved many issues of importance in the development of 
the law of privacy, such as the use of breach of confidence action to protect 
privacy, how the court formulates the privacy action, the employment of the 
                                                          
91
At 458. 
92
The minority (Lord Nicholls and Lord Hoffman) held that the publication of the 
photographs and the extra details were within the margin of editorial judgment and something 
for which appropriate latitude should be allowed.  
93
The majority decision by Lord Hope, at [124-125], Baroness Hale, at [154-155], and Lord 
Carswell, at [170-171]. 
194 
 
reasonable expectation of privacy test and the balancing exercise between arts 
8 and 10. These matters are discussed in the following sections.   
 
1 Utilisation of breach of confidence action 
 
The principles formulated by Lord Nicholls are the basis for the development 
of the right to privacy. His Lordship acknowledged that the freedoms in arts 8 
and 10 of the Convention are vitally important rights which lie at the heart of 
liberty in a modern state and that neither has precedence over the other.94 
Although the origin of the cause of action relied upon is breach of confidence, 
the more natural description of the position today is that such information is 
private and the essence of the tort is better encapsulated now as misuse of 
private information since information about an individual’s private life would 
not, in ordinary usage, be called “confidential”. 95  
 
His Lordship added that by virtue of the HRA 1998, the value enshrined in 
arts 8 and 10 is now part of the cause of action and should be treated as of 
general application and as being as applicable to disputes between individuals 
as to disputes between individuals and a public authority. 96  
 
The minority in Campbell expressly acknowledged that the concepts of 
privacy and confidence have merged in cases involving the disclosure of 
personal information. Lord Hoffman said that development of the breach of 
confidence action meant that there:97 
 
has been a shift in the centre of gravity of the action for breach 
of confidence when it is used as a remedy for the unjustified 
publication of personal information… Instead of the cause of 
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action being based upon the duty of good faith applicable to 
confidential personal information and trade secret alike, it 
focuses upon the protection of human autonomy and dignity – 
the right to control the dissemination of information about one’s 
private life and the right to the esteem and respect of other 
people. 
 
His Lordship further argued for the use of breach of confidence action for 
privacy action and suggested the use of the phrase “misuse of private 
information” to avoid confusion in the future:98 
 
The continuing use of the phrase “duty of confidence” and the 
description of the information as “confidential” is not altogether 
comfortable. Information about an individual’s private life 
would not, in ordinary usage, be called “confidential”. The more 
natural description today is that such information is private. The 
essence of the tort is better encapsulated now as misuse of 
private information.  
 
In acknowledging a new claim for wrongful publication of private information 
as deriving from an equitable doctrine of breach of confidence, Lord Nicholls 
declared:99 
 
In the case of individuals this tort, however labelled, affords respect 
for one aspect of an individual’s privacy. This is the value 
underlying this cause of action. An individual’s privacy can be 
invaded in ways not involving publication of information. Strip-
searches are an example. The extent to which the common law as 
developed thus far in this country protects other forms of invasions 
of privacy is not a matter arising in the present case. It does not 
arise because, although pleaded more widely, Miss Campbell’s 
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common law claim was throughout presented in court exclusively 
on the basis of breach of confidence, that is, the wrongful 
publication by the “Mirror” of private information. 
 
The judgment provided an impetus towards protection of private information 
in English law. The central issue in Campbell is on the type of information 
disclosed: whether it can be regarded as private or otherwise. The case set up 
the tests for determining when information is regarded as private in nature. In 
order to successfully claim under the new tort, the claimant had to show that 
she had a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the facts that were 
published. This test has prevailed in the subsequent case law. The alternative 
approaches employ the test of “highly offensive to a reasonable person or 
ordinary sensibilities” and the “obviously private” test.100   
 
2 The formulation of the privacy action. 
 
The most important question in Campbell was how the court formulated the 
privacy action. There are two versions of the test adopted in determining 
privacy action. The simple one adopted by Lord Nicholls is the test of 
reasonable expectation of privacy – whether the claimant has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in respect of the information disclosed. The second is 
the “highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities” test put 
forward by Lord Hope.  
 
(a) Reasonable expectation of privacy test 
 
Lord Nicholls was the main proponent of the reasonable expectation test in 
Campbell. His approach of the reasonable expectation of privacy test was: 
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In deciding what was the ambit of an individual’s “private life” 
in particular circumstances courts need to be on guard against 
using as a touchstone a test which brings into account 
considerations which should more properly be considered at the 
later stage of proportionality. Essentially the touchstone of 
private life is whether in respect of the disclosed facts the person 
in question had a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
 
Baroness Hale was of the view that an objective reasonable expectation test 
was simpler and clearer than the test sometimes quoted from the judgment of 
Gleeson CJ in the High Court of Australia.101 The question to be asked was 
whether the defendant knew or ought to have known that the claimant had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. The judge added:102 
 
It should be emphasised that the “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” is a threshold test which brings the balancing exercise 
into play. It is not the end of the story. Once the information is 
identified as “private” in this way, the court must balance the 
claimant’s interest in keeping the information private against the 
countervailing interest of the recipient in publishing it. Very 
often, it can be expected that the countervailing rights of the 
recipient will prevail. 
 
(b) Highly offensive to a “reasonable person of ordinary 
sensibilities” test 
 
Lord Hope was of the view that, in determining a case of wrongful publication 
of private information, the principle was whether the information disclosed 
was private and not public. It was an objective question and His Lordship 
emphasised that the reasonable expectation to be considered was not that of 
the reader in general, but of the person affected by the publicity. If the 
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information is not obviously private, the question to be asked is what a 
reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities would feel if placed in the same 
position as the claimant and faced with the same situation.103  
 
However, if the information is “obviously private”, the test of highly offensive 
is not relevant because the person to whom the information relates can 
reasonably expect their privacy to be respected. His Lordship said that the test 
was not needed where the information could easily be identified as private.104 
 
Lord Hope’s formulation of the highly offensive test was supported by the so-
called Gleeson test. In Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game 
Meats Pty Ltd105 Gleeson CJ differentiated between “public” and “private” 
information. He held that information relating to health, personal 
relationships, and financial status are easily identified as private as are other 
kinds of activity that a reasonable person would want to be unobserved. Thus, 
the test of what is highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary 
sensibilities is useful for determining what is private.106 
 
A privacy action, therefore, according to Lord Hope concerns the nature of the 
information before an appropriate test may be applied to determine reasonable 
expectation of privacy. The test of “highly offensive” is employed in 
situations where the information disclosed is of a private nature that the 
claimant does not want made public. 
 
3 Rejection of the “highly offensive element” 
 
The test of “highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities” 
is similar to that employed by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Hosking v 
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Runting.107  The difference lies only in the formulation of the question. In 
Campbell, Lord Hope suggested that the question to be asked is what a 
reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities would feel if he or she were placed 
in the same position as the plaintiff and faced the same publicity.108 The same 
test in New Zealand operates on the question of whether publication of 
photographs or facts would be offensive to the ordinary person. 
 
However, Lord Nicholls advocated caution when using “the highly offensive” 
test:109 
 
This particular formulation should be used with care, for two reasons. First, 
the “highly offensive” phrase is suggestive of a stricter test of private 
information than a reasonable expectation of privacy. Second, the “highly 
offensive” formulation can all too easily bring into account, when deciding 
whether the disclosed information was private, considerations which go 
more properly to issues of proportionality; for instance, the degree of 
intrusion into private life, and the extent to which publication was a matter of 
proper public concern. This could be a recipe for confusion. 
 
Although Baroness Hale did not expressly reject the “highly offensive” test, 
she preferred the reasonable expectation of privacy test. She was certain that 
the Gleeson test was not the only test of determining such information, but she 
was referring to the sensibilities of a reasonable person placed in the situation 
of the claimant, rather than to the recipient of the information.110  
 
It is submitted that the “highly offensive” test should not be part of the 
methodology when determining the private character of the information 
because a claimant in a privacy action is not really offended with the 
publication of the information, rather “embarrassed” or “humiliated” as a 
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result of the breach.111 The facts that are “truly humiliating and distressful”112 
are not necessarily offensive because there are many instances of breach of 
privacy that has nothing to do with offensiveness. To illustrate, to publish 
facts about B who suffered from syphilis is not offensive but is very 
humiliating, as a result of which B would be avoided by those who have 
knowledge about the facts.   
 
With the rejection in Campbell, subsequent cases have made it clear that the 
test in breach of privacy actions is whether the plaintiff had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. As a result, there is now in English law a law 
protecting wrongful publication of private information. Since Campbell, the 
courts have gone on to give further direct horizontal effect to the right to 
privacy, embracing the guidance of the ECtHR’s von Hannover113 ruling and 
expanding the range of situations in which relief is given for interference with 
an individual’s privacy.  
 
B The Development of Privacy Actions since Campbell  
 
Campbell confirmed that an action for breach of confidence is capable of 
providing extensive protection to privacy. Confidential information has been 
extended to protect private information in the absence of a confidential 
relationship.  
 
The relationship between “traditional” breach of confidence and protection of 
privacy was also dealt in Associated Newspapers Ltd v HRH Prince of 
Wales.114 In that case, the Prince brought an action for breach of confidence 
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and copyright infringement in respect of articles published by the appellant in 
the Mail on Sunday which included extracts from his journals. The journal 
contained his impressions of an official visit to Hong Kong in 1997. The issue 
was whether the journal containing his personal views and impressions was 
private.  
 
The Court of Appeal held that the disclosure by the employee was in breach 
of an express contractual duty of confidentiality and in breach of a well-
recognised relationship of confidence, and that the newspaper knew that the 
disclosure of the journal to them was made in breach of confidence.115 The 
court concluded that the judge was correct to hold that the Prince had an 
unanswerable claim for breach of privacy, and that both the nature of the 
information and the relationship of confidence under which it was received 
weighed heavily in favour of the Prince.116  
 
However, in Lord Browne of Madingley v Associated Newspaper Ltd117 Lord 
Browne sought to enjoin, on grounds of breach of confidence, publication by 
the Mail On Sunday of information and allegations of a homosexual 
relationship he had with a Mr Chevalier. The court held:118 
 
The first question under art 8 is whether in respect of the 
disclosed facts the claimant has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the particular circumstances of the case. That is the 
relevant question: whether there was a previous confidential 
relationship between the parties or not. 
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The case showed that in determining whether the claimant has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in respect of the information disclosed, the nature of the 
relationship between parties is of considerable potential importance.119 
 
In McKennitt v Ash120 Loreena McKennitt brought an action for invasion of 
privacy against Ms Ash, who had once been a close friend and associate. The 
first defendant published a book which contained information of the 
claimant’s personal and sexual relationships. At first instance, Eady J held that 
the claimant had a reasonable expectation of privacy, such as to engage art 8 
and this was not outweighed by the art 10 rights of the first defendant. A 
declaration and an injunction were granted to restrict further publication of 
infringing passages of the book along with damages of £5,000 in respect of 
the claimant’s hurt feelings and distress. On appeal, the court upheld the claim 
and granted an injunction preventing further publication of a significant part 
of the work on the grounds that it constituted private information under art 8. 
The court further held that the claimant’s right under art 8 outweighed the 
defendant’s right to freedom of expression under art 10.  
 
McKennitt was a significant case in which the court held that it was necessary 
to have regard to the ECtHR case of von Hannover when deciding post-
Campbell privacy cases. This was because the Court of Appeal in A v B plc 
had not ruled definitively on the content and application of art 10 but instead 
addressed the balancing exercise effectively in the former English domestic 
terms of breach of confidence.121  
 
Buxton LJ’s summary is very helpful in illustrating the position of the law of 
privacy post-Campbell. First, His Lordship confirmed that there is no English 
domestic law of invasion of privacy. Secondly, in developing a right to protect 
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private information, including the implementation in the English courts of arts 
8 and 10 of the ECHR, as adopted by HRA 1998, the English courts have had 
to proceed through the tort of breach of confidence, into which the 
jurisprudence of arts 8 and 10 has been “shoehorned”. Thirdly, that a feeling 
of discomfort arose from an action for breach of confidence being employed 
where there was no such pre-existing relationship between the parties, but that 
“confidence” arose from the defendant’s having acquired by unlawful or 
surreptitious means information that he should have known he was not free to 
use.122  
 
McKennitt’s approach in a case of wrongful publication of private information 
is two-fold. The requirements of the action are first, the nature of the action in 
which the recipient’s perception of its confidential nature imposes an 
obligation on him. 123  Second, the nature of the relationship between the 
claimant and the defendant gives rise to an expectation of confidence.124 Thus, 
in determining whether there has been a breach of confidence or misuse of 
private information the court must ask two questions: (i) Is there a reasonable 
expectation of privacy or in other words is art 8 is engaged? and (ii) If there is, 
does the balance between privacy and freedom of expression favour the 
individual’s privacy or is it in favour of publication?125 In other words, the 
threshold test is whether the claimant has a reasonable expectation of privacy, 
as formulated in Campbell is applied.  
 
Another dimension of Campbell can be seen in Murray.126 An action was 
brought on behalf of David Murray, JK Rowling’s infant son, for breach of 
confidence and David’s right to privacy in relation to the publication of a 
photograph of him as a toddler being pushed in a buggy that showed his face 
in profile, his clothes, his size, the style and colour of his hair and the colour 
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of his skin. The Murrays did not consent to the publication of the photographs 
and sought an injunction to restrain further publication and any similar taken 
by Big Pictures. They also claimed damages or an account of profit for breach 
of confidence, infringement of David’s right to privacy and misuse of private 
information resulting from taking, recording, holding and publishing of the 
photograph.  
 
The issue was whether David, who is not a public figure but the child of one, 
is entitled to protection from being photographed, even if the photograph 
shows nothing embarrassing or unpleasant. The Court of Appeal granted the 
appeal and found that the child arguably had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in relation to the publication of the photograph, notwithstanding his 
mother’s fame and the fact that the picture merely showed him and his parents 
in a public street.  
 
In Murray, the court said that the question of whether there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy is a broad one and suggested that all relevant 
circumstances of the case be considered:127 
 
They include the attributes of the claimant, the nature of the 
activity in which the claimant was engaged, the place at which it 
was happening, the nature and purpose of the intrusion, the 
absence of consent and whether it was known or could be 
inferred, the effect on the claimant and the circumstances in 
which and the purposes for which the information came into the 
hands of the publisher. 
 
The test suggested in Murray requires consideration of all circumstances 
surrounding the facts of the case before a breach can be established. 
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Guidelines will make it easier for the court to ascertain whether a claimant has 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances of a case. 
 
Anthony Clarke MR, however, noted that, the “highly offensive test” was 
rejected as being stricter than Lord Nicholls’s “reasonable expectation of 
privacy”:128  
 
It seems to us, therefore that, in so far as it is or may be relevant 
to consider whether publication of information or matter was 
“highly offensive”, it is relevant to consider it in the context, not 
of whether art 8 is engaged, but of the issues relevant to 
proportionality, that is to the balance to be struck between art 8 
and art 10. 
 
The Court of Appeal’s decision in Murray confirms that English privacy law 
is now in line with ECtHR jurisprudence: that the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR, past and future, is binding on English courts when assessing privacy 
claims and other related Convention rights.  
 
C Protection against Intrusion 
 
The development of the tort of misuse of private information has ensured 
effective protection of private information. What remains is whether 
protection could be extended to cover other aspects of privacy interests, 
namely those of physical privacy or bodily intrusion. 
 
The House of Lords in Wainwright declined to recognise a general right to 
privacy which would extend to physical privacy interferences not involving 
the dissemination of information. However, a good observation was made by 
Lord Keith in Spycatcher when His Lordship said that “…breach of 
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confidence involves no more than an invasion of privacy.” In a similar vein, 
Lord Nicholls also predicted that a comprehensive principle for the protection 
of privacy would exist in the near future though he did not decide whether a 
right of privacy existed in the case before him.129 
 
Apart from that, it is submitted that the most effective legislative protection 
against privacy interference by intrusion is conferred by the Protection from 
Harassment Act 1997 (PFHA).130  Though “harassment” is not defined in the 
Act, it potentially covers a wide range of actions including oppressive and 
unreasonable conduct that cause distress, annoyance and threat. 
 
However, the Act is primarily concerned with providing protection against 
media intrusion such as unwanted photography, observation, following, 
telephoning and obtaining access to another’s home and property. To 
constitute harassment within the meaning of the Act, the conduct must have 
been:131  
 
(a) Occurring on at least two occasion 
(b) Targeted at the claimant 
(c) Calculated in an objective sense to cause distress and  
(d) Objectively judged to be oppressive and unreasonable 
 
It is thus clear that in order to bring an action under the Act the action or an 
act of harassment must occur at least.132  
 
If physical privacy is protected by common law principle, the tort of 
harassment provides some measure of protection for a person’s privacy. In 
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R v Khan [1997] AC 558.  
130
Hipgrave v Jones [2004] EWHC 2901 (QB), at [21], Tugendhat J has expressly recognised 
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Khoransandjian v Bush,133 the majority in the Court of Appeal upheld an 
injunction granted to restrain the defendant from inter alia, “harassing, 
pestering or communicating with” the plaintiff. The harassment and pestering 
by the defendant, who could not accept that the plaintiff wished end their 
friendship, took the form of telephone calls to the plaintiff’s parents’ home. 
The plaintiff, not having any proprietary interest in her parents’ home, could 
not sustain a claim under the tort of nuisance which originated to protect a 
person’s right to enjoy his property. The judges justified the granting of the 
injunction on the basis that English law had developed to recognise a tort of 
harassment.  
 
Apart from the harassment tort, the principle of Wilkinson v Downton134 would 
to a certain extent be applicable in protecting against physical intrusion. In 
that case, Wright J observed that since there was no physical touching, there 
could be no grounds for a claim in battery, and as the plaintiff did not 
apprehend any immediate physical violence, no claim would exist in common 
law assault. The judge held that there was a valid claim for the intentional 
infliction of mental shock. However, the principle of Wilkinson v Downton 
requires an intention to inflict physical injury including psychiatric harm, 
whereas physical privacy can be intruded upon although no harm is involved; 
for example, in situations of unwanted touching by a stranger. 
 
D Remedies  
 
1 Injunctions 
 
Injunctions have been a very popular remedy in breach of privacy cases, and 
in fact the only effective remedy, especially in cases concerning publication of 
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sensitive personal information or photographs. 135  An interim injunction is 
normally obtained to prevent information from being published at the very 
moment before it is disclosed.  A v B plc has laid down the principles to be 
taken into account when determining application for interim injunctions:136 
 
The application for interim injunction have now to be considered 
in the context of art 8 and 10 of the Convention...Actions for 
breach of confidence are usually brought at short notice and are 
followed by an immediate application for an interim injunction...If 
an interim injunction is to be granted it is essential that it is 
granted promptly because otherwise the newspaper will be 
published and then, from the claimant’s point of view, the damage 
will have been done.  
 
The granting of an interim injunction is a matter of the judge’s discretion 
which is exercised in accordance with well-established principles, for 
example, it is likely that an injunction would be granted after a substantive 
hearing and would determine the outcome of the entire proceedings. 137  It 
follows that the fact that, if the injunction is not granted the claimant may be 
deprived of their only remedy, is required to be weighed against the 
defendant’s right of freedom of expression.138 Once art 10 is engaged, s 12 of 
the HRA comes into play, in particular s 12(4) which requires the court to 
have particular regard to the importance of the right to freedom of expression, 
and to take into account any relevant privacy code. 
 
Thus, A v B plc principles pointed out above are vital in assisting the court to 
balance between both Convention rights when hearing an application for 
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Gavin Phillipson “Max Moslley goes to Strasbourg: Article 8, Claimant Notification and 
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A v B plc, at [4]-[7]. 
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At [11] (i). 
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injunction. If the balance does not point clearly in either direction then 
interim relief should be refused.
139
 Lord Woolf CJ explained that:
140
 
 
There is a tension between the two articles which requires the 
court to hold the balance between the conflicting interests they 
are designed to protect.  This is not an easy task but it can be 
achieved by the courts if, when holding the balance, they attach 
proper weight to the important rights both articles are designed to 
protect.  Each article is qualified expressly in a way which allows 
the interests under the other article to be taken into account.  
 
In the final appeal of Douglas v Hello!141 the Court of Appeal granted an 
interim injunction having found that the Douglases had a virtually 
unanswerable case that their privacy was infringed:142 
 
Only by grant of an interlocutory injunction could the 
Douglases’ rights have been satisfactorily protected. Further, the 
interests of Hello! at the interlocutory stage, which were 
essentially only financial, could have been protected by an 
appropriate undertaking in damages by the Douglases. 
 
Eady J in Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd also acknowledged the 
effectiveness of injunction as an adequate remedy in a privacy action. The 
judge said:
143
 
 
...it has to be accepted that an infringement of privacy cannot 
ever be effectively compensated by a monetary award. Judges 
cannot achieve what is, in the nature of things, impossible. That 
                                                          
139
At [12]. 
140
At [6]. 
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 [2006] QB 125 (Douglas No 3). 
142
 At [259]. 
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[2008] EMLR 679 (QB), at 684 (Mosley). 
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unpalatable fact cannot be mitigated by simply adding a few 
noughts to the number first thought of...  
 
2 Damages 
 
Damages also have been awarded in infringement of privacy actions, but in a 
relatively small number of cases. In Mosley the court stated that damages for 
infringement of art 8 could include damages for distress, hurt feelings and loss 
of dignity. Although the court submitted that an infringement of privacy could 
not ever be effectively compensated by a monetary compensation, an award of 
£60,000 was awarded to Mosley:144 
 
Once privacy had been infringed, the damage was done and the 
embarrassment was only augmented by pursuing a court action. 
The Court had to pick a figure which marked the fact that an 
unlawful intrusion had taken place, while affording some degree 
of comfort to the injured party. The figure selected ought not to 
be such that it could be interpreted as minimising the scale of the 
wrong done. 
 
In Douglas No 3 for example, the court said that the £14,600 damages 
awarded was relatively small compared to the legal costs involved. However, 
the court explained that the categorisation of the sum as “relatively small” was 
not intended to indicate that the level of damages should have been greater, 
but to describe that damages in that sum could not fairly be regarded as an 
adequate remedy. By considering the nature of the injury that the Douglases 
suffered, that is mental distress, a modest sum by way of damages does not 
represent an adequate remedy.145 
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Similarly, Eady J in McKennitt v Ash146 awarded Ms McKennitt a relatively 
modest £5,000 for hurt feelings and distress. Ms Campbell was also entitled to 
the small amount of £2,500 as general damages for distress and injury to 
feelings and which were described by Morland J as “damages on a modest 
scale”.147 
 
In relation to an award of damages in a claim for infringement of privacy, it is 
essential to highlight that exemplary damages are not available since no 
authority exists to justify such an extension and because it is said a claim 
would fail the test of necessity and proportionality.148 
 
VI Conclusion 
 
It is now settled under English law that the means by which privacy interests 
are protected is through the extension of the law on breach of confidence. The 
passing of the HRA which gives effect to the Convention rights has altered the 
English courts’ approach towards privacy. In Campbell the House of Lords 
confirmed that the development of the law of confidence to provide a remedy 
for invasions of personal privacy had established a new cause of action, 
clearly distinct from traditional breach of confidence, which is now better 
described as “misuse of private information”. The new cause of action takes a 
different view of the underlying value which the law of confidence protects.  
  
Although the introduction of a privacy tort has not been the mechanism for 
protecting privacy in English law, the courts have considerably interpreted 
and developed the breach of confidence action to remedy their refusal to 
recognise the action. The formulation of appropriate tests in determining 
liability in privacy has greatly developed the law to the extent that an 
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individual whose privacy has been invaded can claim a remedy to protect his 
privacy. The reasonable expectation of privacy test is a well-established test in 
deciding whether art 8 is engaged in relation to the information. 
 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the experience of the English 
courts in developing and recognising the tort of misuse of private information 
is useful for Malaysia in its effort to deal with privacy problems and provide 
adequate remedies for the breach. It is suggested, in particular, that Malaysia 
should use features of the English tort such as the test of reasonable 
expectation of privacy, and the public interest defence when developing its 
own privacy protection.  As will be seen in Chapter Seven, these elements 
form a part of the proposed Malaysian Privacy Bill.   It will also be 
recommended that Malaysian privacy law adopt popular remedies such as 
injunction and damages which are widely granted in England. Other remedies 
like declaration, account of profits, declaration order and apology are among 
other remedies provided under the Bill. The adoption of rules and principles 
from English law will certainly have implications for the future development 
of the law and will influence the courts’ approach to the kind of information 
entitled to protection, the extent and form of publication which attracts a 
remedy, and the circumstances in which publication can be justified.  
 
The English court’s formulation of a privacy action is an important guide for 
Malaysia in its preparation of a Privacy Act. Analysis of the New Zealand 
privacy law provides similar guidance. This is discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
PROTECTION OF PRIVACY INTERESTS IN NEW 
ZEALAND 
 
I Overview 
 
The English development of privacy, which emerged from the extended 
version of the action for breach of confidence to encompass misuse of private 
information, did not prevent New Zealand courts from acknowledging a 
common law tort of privacy. New Zealand has become the first and only 
Commonwealth country to recognise a stand-alone privacy tort. The two 
important requirements of the tort formulated in Hosking v Runting
1
 will be 
constructively relevant for the proposed statutory tort of privacy for Malaysia.  
 
Before 2004, the tort of invasion of privacy was not part of New Zealand’s 
law. At that time, the protection available for privacy intrusion was piecemeal 
and derived from the existing common law principles that indirectly protected 
privacy interests by actions for interference with property rights, liberty and 
bodily integrity. The common law torts of trespass, assault, nuisance and 
defamation, harassment, malicious falsehood and passing off were the 
measures to protect privacy. However, these common law causes of action 
provide, as in Malaysia, only limited protection against intrusions into 
privacy. The plaintiff must depend on the coincidence that one of the causes 
of action fits the facts of the case involved because not all situations of 
intrusive conduct are covered by the established principles.  
 
The inadequacy of common law principles to address privacy issues has been 
compensated for by sanctions and remedies from criminal law. From statutes, 
the protection for privacy interests can be seen through various provisions 
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protecting against intrusive conduct.
2
 The law available has to some extent 
regulated certain types of privacy invasions such as criminal offences for 
actions or behaviours that interfere with an individual’s privacy. 
  
As discussed in Chapter Two, privacy and dignity are closely related. The 
essence of dignity is the basis for the protection of privacy and is clearly 
identified and recognised in case law.
3
 Its importance requires a clear law and 
a measure to safeguard the interest. It seems that recent development of the 
law in this area provides means of protecting the interests and overcomes 
issues of inadequacies of protection in the existing laws.  
 
This chapter evaluates the state of privacy protection in New Zealand. Part II 
discusses the constitutional support for privacy torts provided under the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA). Part III evaluates the protection 
of private information brought about by Hosking. The status of the privacy 
tort before and after Hosking is discussed in light of the nature of the tort, its 
scope, requirements and further implication of the development of the tort in 
the future. Although it is argued that the status of the tort of invasion of 
privacy is uncertain,
4
 it has, nevertheless, transformed the landscape for 
privacy protection since Tucker.
5
 Part IV examines the protection against 
intrusion in the legislation as well as case law. A new tort of intrusion upon 
seclusion recognised in C v Holland
6
 is discussed in this Part. Part V 
concludes the discussion of privacy protection in New Zealand and 
summarises important values for development in Malaysia.  
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For example ss 216G-216N of the Crimes Act 1961 renders it an offence to covertly make a 
visual recording of someone while in an intimate situation, ss 29 and 30 of the Summary 
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3
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To give a constitutional bearing on the right to privacy will enhance the right 
as a fundamental one, and thus the question of why it should be protected 
becomes irrelevant. The following discussion examines the status of the 
privacy tort in New Zealand’s constitutional framework.  
 
II Constitutional Support for Privacy Tort 
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, there is potential for Malaysia to expand the 
protection of privacy rights from an entrenched right to life and personal 
liberty. It is, therefore, useful to examine the extent to which similar 
constitutional developments have been supported in New Zealand. 
 
Unlike Malaysia, New Zealand does not have a written constitution which has 
the status of superior law, governing all other law of the country and outlining 
the rights and fundamental freedoms of the citizens.
7
 In New Zealand, the 
New Zealand Bill Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) is an ordinary statute and is 
not entrenched as supreme law.
8
 The Act is best described as a quasi-
constitutional instrument.
9
 Tipping J pointed out that the NZBORA is 
designed to operate between citizen and State but that it is often appropriate 
for the values recognised in that context which inform the common law in its 
function of regulating relationships between citizen and citizen.
10
  
 
The long title of the NZBORA states that its purpose is to affirm, protect and 
promote human rights and fundamental freedoms in New Zealand and to 
affirm New Zealand’s commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and 
                                                          
7
See Chapter Three, Part II. 
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Political Rights (ICCPR).
11
 Nothing equivalent to art 17 of the ICCPR or any 
statement of the general right to privacy which is recognised in the ICCPR, 
can be found in the NZBORA. According to A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: 
A White Paper published in 1985:
12
 
 
The Bill (like the Canadian Charter) gives no general 
guarantee of privacy. There is not in New Zealand any 
general right to privacy, although specific rules of law and 
legislation protect some aspects of privacy. It would be 
inappropriate therefore to attempt to entrench a right that is 
not by any means fully recognised now, which is in the 
course of development, and whose boundaries would be 
uncertain and contentious. 
 
The above acknowledged that the right to privacy is not specifically provided 
for in the NZBORA. Burrows commented on New Zealand’s human rights 
framework and the uncodified right of privacy:
13
 
 
Our jurisprudence is becoming more rights-based. That 
movement is international, and is evidenced in New Zealand 
in particular by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
Although our Bill of Rights Act does not specifically codify a 
right of privacy, it has sensitised us to the essential dignity of 
the individual. 
 
However, as pointed out by Gault P in Hosking, the omission of the right to 
privacy in the NZBORA does not imply the rejection of privacy as an 
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Article 17 of the ICCPR provides a right to privacy. “(1) No one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to 
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internationally recognised fundamental value. In fact, His Honour accepted 
that the scope for privacy law should be left for incremental development. 
Because of the broadness of the concept of privacy, issues of definition, scope 
of protection and relationship with other human values clearly would have 
defeated any attempt to comprehensively delineate the legal principles.
14
 
 
The non-recognition of the right to privacy in the NZBORA suggests that 
rights and freedoms expressly contained within it have a different status from 
rights and freedoms that are excluded. However, this statement is 
complemented by s 28, where an existing right or freedom is not abrogated or 
restricted because it is not included or not fully included in NZBORA.
15
 Thus, 
the omission of the right to privacy does not mean that it does not exist or is of 
less weight. Furthermore, New Zealand remains obliged at international law 
to protect the citizen’s right to privacy and to ensure an effective remedy for 
its breach.  
 
A Privacy and Freedom of Expression 
 
 The fact that the right to privacy is not a right in the NZBORA does not 
diminish its value or the importance of individual dignity. Despite the absence 
of express recognition, considerations of privacy may arise from other 
recognised rights established under the NZBORA such as freedom of 
expression,
16
 freedom from discrimination
17
 and freedom from unreasonable 
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Section 28 provides that an existing right or freedom shall not be held to be abrogated or 
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grounds of discrimination in the Human Rights Act 1993. (2) Measures taken in good faith for 
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search and seizure.
18
 Section 14 provides that “Everyone has the right to 
freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, and impart 
information and opinions of any kind in any form.” 
 
It is generally accepted that freedom of expression is one of the fundamental 
liberties of a modern democracy. However, the rights established under the 
NZBORA are not absolute and are subject to limitations. This is stated in s 
5:
19
 
 
The rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights may be 
subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can 
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.  
 
The above provision sets out “reasonable limits prescribed by the law” and 
“demonstrably justified” elements before freedom of expression gives way to 
privacy. Freedom of expression, therefore, is fundamental, not absolute. It 
may be limited by other rules and statutes that are reasonable and 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society as prescribed by s 5.  
Concerning this limitation, Gault P and Blanchard J observed:
20
 
 
While developments in the common law must be consistent with the 
rights and freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights Act, such 
developments are not precluded merely because they might 
encroach upon those rights and freedoms. It becomes a matter of 
                                                                                                                                                       
the purpose of assisting or advancing persons or groups of persons disadvantaged because of 
discrimination that is unlawful by virtue of Part 2 of the Human Rights Act 1993 do not 
constitute discrimination.” 
18
Section 21 Unreasonable search and seizure provides “Everyone has the right to be secure 
against unreasonable search or seizure, whether of the person, property, or correspondence or 
otherwise.” 
19
 Article 19(3) of the ICCPR is of the same effect where it states “the exercise of the rights 
provided for in paragraph 2 of this art carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It 
may, therefore, be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided 
by law and are necessary (a) for respect of the rights or reputation of others; (b) for the 
protection of national security or public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.” 
20
 Hosking at [111]. 
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whether such common law encroachment meets the test of a 
reasonable limit on the applicable right or freedom which is 
demonstrably justified in a democratic society in s 5. 
  
Although no further explanation was given as to how privacy might provide a 
reasonable limit on freedom of expression, the court resolved this by 
suggesting a balancing mechanism between the competing values. Gault P and 
Blanchard J recommended the reconciliation between the desirability of 
protecting from publication and the necessity for dissemination of 
information. A balance must be struck so that the competing interests 
accommodate personal and private information.
21
 
 
However, the minority in Hosking argued that the general tort of privacy 
would have a chilling effect on freedom of expression. Keith J stated:
22
 
 
the proposed tort of public disclosure of private facts would 
place a generally stated limit on the centrally important right to 
freedom of expression; it would depart, without good reason, 
from long established approaches to the protection of personal 
information; those approaches are based on identifying particular 
privacy interests which call for protection and determining the 
components of the protection... and involve making particular 
choices of remedy; and finally, the proposed limit has not been 
demonstrably justified, as s 5 of the Bill of Rights requires. 
 
Thomas J in his dissenting judgment in Brooker v Police
23
 asserted that both 
freedom of expression and privacy should be recognised as fundamental 
values and accorded neither presumptive nor paramount status but weighed 
                                                          
21
At [116]. 
22
Hosking, at [222]. 
23
[2007] 3 NZLR 91; [2007] CRNZ 346 (SC) (Brooker). 
220 
 
one against the other in a manner designed to afford greater protection to 
both.
24
  
 
Thus, in Hosking, the judges were divided on the issue of the effect of the 
privacy tort on free speech. While the majority strongly accepted that the 
resulting limitation was prescribed by the law and justified, the minority 
rejected the argument and submitted otherwise. In this regard, Tipping J’s 
analysis of s 5 on freedom of expression and privacy is of great importance. 
His Honour held that privacy values would not normally constitute a justified 
limitation on freedom of expression if the information being imparted was a 
matter of legitimate public concern.
25
 If the public has a right to know matters 
that related to the maintenance of democratic process, then the dissemination 
of the information is not subject to limitation. Tipping J finally concluded 
that:
26
 
 
When privacy values are found to outweigh the right to freedom 
of expression, that limitation will, in terms of s 5 of the Bill of 
Rights, be a limit prescribed by law. It will also be a limit which 
is reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society. 
 
B Privacy and Unreasonable Search and Seizure 
 
Another right under the NZBORA which relates to privacy is the scope of the 
right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure in s 21. This has been 
considered in the light of “reasonable expectations of privacy”. The New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, unlike the ECHR, does not contain any 
guarantees for the protection of individuals’ privacy apart from the s 21 right 
to be secure from unreasonable search and seizure.  
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Section 21 permits searches which are reasonable to interfere with a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, and even where the search is unreasonable, 
other competing factors may outweigh the privacy interest involved. In 
respect of s 21, which has been considered to have an implicit recognition of 
the right to privacy, in particular intrusion into personal privacy, Tipping J in 
Hosking said:
27
 
 
…the values that underpin s 21 and which are reinforced by 
New Zealand’s international obligations can, by reasonable 
analogy, be extended to unreasonable intrusions into personal 
privacy which may not strictly amount to search and seizure. 
The lack of any express recognition of a right to privacy in the 
Bill of Rights should not inhibit common law developments 
found to be appropriate.  
 
The earlier case of R v Jefferies
28
 also touched on the importance role of s 21 
to recognise the right to privacy in modern times:
29
 
Essentially, s 21 is concerned to protect those values or 
interests which make up the concept of privacy. Privacy 
connotes a variety of related values; the protection of one’s 
property against uninvited trespass; the security of one’s person 
and property, particularly against the might and power of the 
state; the preservation of personal liberty; freedom of 
conscience; the right of self-determination and control over 
knowledge about oneself and when, how and to what extent it 
will be imparted; and recognition of the dignity and intrinsic 
importance of the individual. While necessarily phrased in 
terms of individual values, the community has a direct interest 
in the recognition and protection of this broad right to privacy. 
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It is a valued right which is esteemed in modern democratic 
societies. 
 
The discussion in this Part acknowledges the importance of the right to 
privacy along with other rights provided by the statute. Although there is no 
direct privacy right enforceable against the state in the NZBORA as compared 
to England, the court is free to develop a common law protection. The 
omission of the right to privacy as a recognised right similar to that of 
expression does not prevent the Act from affirming commitment to a 
Covenant that includes privacy as one of its fundamental rights. This position 
indicates that it is appropriate for the judiciary to recognise the broad concept 
of privacy within the values upheld by s 21.
30
  
 
The absence of a general right to privacy in the NZBORA does not 
necessarily mean that the New Zealand legal framework lacks protection for 
certain aspects of privacy interests. The next Part discusses the protection of 
private information in New Zealand.  
 
III Protection of private information 
 
The non-existence of an express protection of privacy in New Zealand law 
until the last quarter of the 20
th
 century is not an indication that privacy failed 
to gain its place in New Zealand legal framework. In fact, it is a value which 
is present in certain situations, but indirectly. Burrows suggests that “privacy 
has been recognised for a long time as an underlying value worth protecting, 
even if that protection has been partial and very poorly articulated”.31  
 
                                                          
30See Stacey Lulham “What Is, and What Should Be, The Extent of New Zealand’s New Tort 
of Breach of Privacy?” (2005) 11 Canterbury Law Rev 91, at 98. 
31
Burrows, above n 13 at 938.  
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In this Part, the judicial development of privacy protection is discussed, 
particularly the position before Hosking. The discussion shows that a greater 
protection of privacy has been achieved through case law. The next sections 
discuss fundamental characteristics of Hosking tort and the impact of the 
Hosking on privacy law in New Zealand. 
 
A Common Law Privacy Tort: Pre-Hosking 
  
It is now settled that a common law tort of infringement of privacy involving 
the unwarranted publication of private facts existed in New Zealand.
32
 Before 
it was recognised in Hosking, privacy gained the attention of the courts which 
became increasingly aware of privacy as a value. In the case of Auckland 
Medical Aid Trust v Taylor
33
, the court declared a search warrant to be 
unlawful as it interfered with a person’s privacy. Although Taylor was not a 
tort case, the protection for privacy against intrusion as a value worth 
protecting was considered by the court in its decision. In the words of 
McCarthy P:
34
 
 
In my view, it would be contrary to the role which Courts of 
our tradition have always adopted of protecting the integrity 
of a man’s premises and of viewing in a conservative way 
the extension of statutory powers to interfere with privacy, if 
we were to uphold the warrant in this case. 
 
The above position had its basis in the leading case Entick v Carrington
35
 in 
which the court stressed the link between property and privacy. Lord Camden 
stated that: 
                                                          
32Rosemary Tobin “Invasion of Privacy” [2000] NZLJ 216, at 222. She said that “it is beyond 
doubt that a tort of privacy exists in New Zealand” when commented on P v D [2000] 2 
NZLR 591.  
33
[1975] 1 NZLR 728 (CA). 
34
At 737. 
35
(1765) 19 State Trials 1029. 
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The great end, for which men entered into society, was to 
secure their property. That right is preserved sacred and 
incommunicable in all instances, where it has not been taken 
away or abridged by some public law for the good of the 
whole ... If no excuse can be found or produced, the silence 
of the books is an authority against the defendant, and the 
plaintiff must have judgment.  
 
The development of a privacy interest can be seen further in the case of 
Tucker v News Media Ownership Ltd
36
 where the judge was of the view that a 
person had a right to be left alone and to live the private aspects of their life 
without being subjected to unwarranted or undesired publicity or public 
disclosure. It was arguable whether a tort of invasion of privacy did exist. The 
case concerned the application of an interim injunction sought against certain 
media organisations from publishing details of the criminal past of a man who 
sought public donations for a life-saving heart transplant operation. Jeffries J 
said
37
 that the gist of a privacy action is not injury to character or reputation 
but to a person’s feelings and peace of mind as a result of the unwarranted 
publication of intimate details of a plaintiff’s private life which are outside the 
realm of legitimate public concern or curiosity.   Consequently, the right to 
privacy in the circumstances before the court may provide the plaintiff with a 
valid cause of action in New Zealand. McGechan J said that he supported “a 
tort covering invasion of personal privacy at least by public disclosure of 
private facts”.38  
 
In P v D,
39
 P sought an interim injunction to prevent the defendant journalist 
and newspaper publishing information that he or she had been treated at a 
psychiatric hospital and had been attended to by a police officer in an 
emergency situation. Nicholson J considered that a tort of infringement of 
                                                          
36
[1986] 2 NZLR 716 (HC). 
37
At 716. 
38
At 733. 
39
[2000] 2 NZLR 591. 
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privacy encompassing public disclosure of private facts did exist in New 
Zealand, and he awarded an injunction to the plaintiff on that basis. A claim 
for breach of confidence would not have succeeded because the information 
obtained by the journalist could have been received from a person who was 
not under a duty of confidence, such as a member of the public, and, 
therefore, could not be said to have been imparted in circumstances importing 
an obligation of confidence. Nicholson J said that:
40
 
 
The right of freedom of expression is not an unlimited and 
unqualified right and in my view is subject to limitations of 
privacy as well as other limitations such as indecency and 
defamation.  
 
The judge said that treatment at a psychiatric hospital was clearly a private 
fact, and disclosure of that information by a newspaper or other media would 
be public disclosure. The “highly offensive” requirement involved an 
objective test and the publication that someone had been a patient in a 
psychiatric hospital would be highly offensive and objectionable to a 
reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. In granting the injunction the 
judge concluded that disclosure of the fact of a psychiatric disorder in the 
current social climate could be considered highly objectionable to a 
reasonable person. There was no legitimate public interest in publication of 
the information. The decision was based on the formulation of the tort of 
breach of privacy set out earlier by Gallen J in Bradley v Wingnut Films Ltd.
41
 
The tort consisted of four factors: 
a) That the disclosure of the private facts must be a public disclosure and 
not a private one; 
b) Facts disclosed to the public must be private facts and not public ones; 
c) The matter made public must be one which would be highly offensive 
and objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities; and 
                                                          
40
At 599. 
41
[1993] 1 NZLR 415. 
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d) The nature and extent of legitimate public interest in having the 
information disclosed must be weighed. 
 
Gallen J followed McGechan J in Tucker on the existence of a new tort but 
added that the extent of the development of the tort should be regarded with 
caution. Such caution was necessary because of the difficulty of formulating 
boundaries on the tort to ensure that the rights and concerns of the individual 
are balanced against the significance in a free country of freedom of 
expression.
42
 The facts of Bradley failed to satisfy the private fact and highly 
offensive requirement as it did not involve a matter of public concern.   
 
In the District Court, Abbott DCJ in L v G
43
 said that it was apparent that New 
Zealand law recognised that breach of privacy is an actionable tort.
44
 The 
plaintiff who was a sex worker had sexual relations with the defendant client. 
The client published photographs of the plaintiff in an adult lifestyle magazine 
without the plaintiff’s consent. Although the plaintiff could not be identified 
in the photograph, Abbott J had no hesitation in concluding that breach of 
privacy is an actionable tort in New Zealand, and that the defendant’s action 
had destroyed her personal shield of privacy.
45
 On holding that the 
requirements of a tort of breach of privacy were fulfilled, damages were 
awarded to the plaintiff.  
 
There has been growing authority in New Zealand that there is a separate tort 
of invasion of privacy which provides a cause of action independent from 
other branches of privacy-related protection under common law. 
 
In terms of remedies, the High Court judges had been granting interim 
injunctions on the basis that it was arguable that there was a tort of invasion of 
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privacy.
46
 However, L v G
47
 was the first case in New Zealand where damages 
instead of injunction were granted for the breach. The development of a tort of 
public disclosure of private facts that had preceded this was later affirmed by 
a majority of 3:2 in the Court of Appeal in Hosking v Runting. The majority 
decided that there was indeed a tort of invasion of privacy in New Zealand. It 
protected against offensive publicity being given to private facts. The 
recognition of the tort should not be regarded as settled,
48
 rather this is just the 
beginning of the evolution of a privacy tort. 
 
B Hosking v Runting 
 
1  Background of facts and decision 
 
The Court of Appeal in Hosking confirmed the existence of a tort protecting 
information privacy in New Zealand. This was a significant decision as 
Randerson J in the High Court
49
 had rejected the reasoning of earlier cases 
that had recognised a tort of privacy.
50
 He had expressed a preference for New 
Zealand to develop the breach of confidence action as had occurred in the 
United Kingdom. The judgment was criticised for throwing the development 
of the tort of invasion of privacy into reverse.
51
 
 
In Hosking, a photographer was commissioned by New Idea! magazine to 
photograph the 18-month-old twin daughters of television personality Mike 
Hosking, after his separation from his wife. Magazines had previously 
published articles about the Hoskings, touching on a range of personal 
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This trends can be seen in Tucker v News Media Ownership Ltd [1986] 2 NZLR 716 and P v 
D [2000] 2 NZLR 591. 
47
Above n 43. 
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matters. However, following the birth of the twins, the Hoskings declined 
further publicity including giving interviews or allowing photographs of the 
twins to be taken. The couple separated in August 2002. During that year, 
New Idea! proposed an article on the change to Mr Hosking’s personal life, 
and the fact that he would be spending Christmas without the company of his 
children. Photographs of the children in the street being pushed in their 
stroller by their mother supplemented the article that was to be published in 
the 2002 Christmas edition. On learning that the photographs had been taken 
and were to be published, the Hoskings sought an injunction restraining the 
magazine from taking and publishing photographs of the twins, arguing that 
photographing the children and publishing the photographs without consent 
amounted to a breach of the twins’ privacy. 
 
In the High Court, Randerson J said that a claim in breach of confidence could 
not be sustained, because the photographs were taken while the children were 
in a public place. The judge, therefore, concerned himself solely with whether 
a freestanding tort of privacy existed in New Zealand and, if so, whether it 
would cover this situation so as to provide a remedy for appellants. He 
examined a number of New Zealand authorities that had cautiously recognised 
a separate tort of privacy then considered the approach of the courts in the 
UK, where a common law privacy tort was not recognised. Instead, the 
English Court of Appeal had developed the equitable cause of action of 
breach of confidence which prevented the publication of private information 
in certain circumstances. Randerson J reviewed authorities from Australia, 
Canada and the US, finding that only the US recognised a separate tort of 
privacy, and that the right to privacy is generally outweighed by the First 
Amendment right to freedom of expression.
52
  
 
Randerson J concluded that New Zealand courts should not recognise a 
privacy tort, and that any gaps in privacy law should be filled by the 
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legislature not the courts.
53
 He considered that, in any event, granting a 
remedy preventing public disclosure of photographs of children taken in a 
public place went beyond the scope of previous New Zealand authority and 
did not fit the tort of privacy set down in the judgment of Nicholson J in the 
High Court in P v D.
54
 Randerson J considered that there was no public 
disclosure of private facts. In addition, the photographs could not be described 
as offensive to persons of ordinary sensibilities and thus, the claim failed.
55
  
 
On appeal, the Court of Appeal unanimously agreed that the Hoskings must 
fail on the facts. The photographs were taken in a public place; there was no 
risk to the children and the photographs disclosed no further facts about them. 
Thus, no reasonable person could treat their publication as highly offensive or 
objectionable. The court dismissed the appeal and held that it was not strictly 
necessary to decide whether a right of action for wrongful publication of 
private information existed in common law in New Zealand.  
 
However, a majority (Gault P, Blanchard and Tipping JJ) stated that a tort of 
invasion of privacy by publicity given to private facts did exist in New 
Zealand. The judges highlighted certain aspects of the newly acknowledged 
tort of invasion of privacy covering the unjustified publication of private 
information.
56
  
 
They added that a defence existed enabling publication to be justified by a 
legitimate public concern for the information. The burden of proving the 
defence is on the defendant, and is not available where the matter is of no 
more than general interest or titillation, or gives rise to curiosity. 
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The recognition of the privacy tort was very much influenced by the third 
formulation of the privacy tort identified by Prosser and developed in the US 
cases.
57
 Hosking changed the New Zealand legal framework of protecting 
privacy by the application of common law principles to a separate tort of 
public disclosure of private facts. Once a prima facie breach of privacy is 
established, a defence of “legitimate public concern” is available. The 
recognised action, however, does not deal with unreasonable intrusion into 
solitude. The tort concerns itself with publicity (not facts) highly offensive to 
the reasonable person. The harm protected against is humiliation and distress.  
 
Tipping J’s formulation of the privacy tort is slightly wider than that of Gault 
P and Blanchard JJ’s. His summary of the tort is essential for describing its 
position in New Zealand privacy law:
58
 
 
It is actionable as a tort to publish information or material in respect 
of which the plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy, 
unless that information or material constitutes a matter of legitimate 
public concern justifying publication in the public interest. Whether 
the plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy depends largely 
on whether publication of the information or material about the 
plaintiff’s private life would in the particular circumstances cause 
substantial offence to a reasonable person. Whether there is 
sufficient public concern about the information or material to justify 
the publication will depend on whether in the circumstances those 
to whom the publication is made can reasonably be said to have a 
right to be informed about it.  
                                                          
57
Section 652D of the Second Restatement Tort (1977) states that  “privacy tort protection 
exists where (3) One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is 
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judges of the majority who support the existence of the tort of invasion of privacy, His 
Honour slightly differs from the joint judgment of Gault P and Blanchard J in the formulation 
of the action and its requirements.  
231 
 
The minority did not support the existence of the tort:
59
 
 
The approach of Parliament in leaving issues of “privacy” to be 
developed by expert bodies and in deliberately excluding the 
news media in its news gathering capacity from the scope of the 
general privacy legislation militates against the finding of a new 
tort of giving unreasonable publicity to private facts. 
 
Anderson J, in the minority, expressed the view that there was no 
demonstrable need for an extension of civil liability and in fact the extended 
liability could be incidentally harmful to the right of freedom of expression 
for two reasons. First, there is the ability of a plaintiff, aggrieved by the 
prospective publication of truth, to be able to prevent publication by an 
injunction. Second, the new tort is imprecise in its definition, both 
semantically and in terms of its application in reality. His Honour found that 
the new liability was created “in a side wind”, is amorphous, unnecessary, a 
disproportionate response to rare, almost hypothetical circumstances and fell 
manifestly short of justifying its limitation on the right to freedom of 
expression affirmed by the NZBORA.
60
 
 
Keith J, also in the minority, noted that a separate cause of action for giving 
unreasonable publicity to private facts does not exist in the common law of 
New Zealand. He said the proposed tort would place a limit on the centrally 
important right to freedom of expression and would depart without good 
reason from long established approaches to the protection of personal 
information. Those approaches are based on identifying particular privacy 
interests which call for protection and determine the components of the 
protection and involve making particular choices of remedy. This final reason 
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was that the proposed limit had not been demonstrably justified, as required 
by s 5 of the NZBORA.
61
  
 
2  The rejection of the UK approach  
 
The English approach in Douglas influenced New Zealand in developing its 
privacy law. In the High Court, Randerson J in Hosking v Runting62 indicated 
a preference to follow the UK approach of protecting privacy:63 
 
I see no reason why our courts should not develop the action for 
breach of confidence to protect personal privacy through the 
public disclosure of private information where it is warranted. In 
so doing, it should be informed by the recent developments in 
the UK and elsewhere while taking into account New Zealand 
law and conditions.  
 
At the end of his judgment, Randerson J concluded that the law of privacy 
could be developed by the courts on the equitable action for breach of 
confidence. Further treatment to privacy outside the boundary of the law of 
confidence should be left to Parliament. 
 
In response to the High Court view on applying breach of confidence to 
privacy action, Keith J noted some difficulty in applying the law of 
confidence to situations in which there is no relationship between the parties:64  
 
The very word “confidence”, its origin and the body of law 
surrounding it appear to me all to require that an element of trust 
or something equivalent exist between the parties. 
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233 
 
Gault P stated that privacy and confidence are different concepts. His Honour 
found it confusing to utilise a breach of confidence action based on trust and 
confidence to a case of unwarranted exposure of information about the private 
lives of individuals. He said:65 
 
If breach of confidence is to be used as the privacy remedy in 
New Zealand, then the requirement of a confidential relationship 
must necessarily change. ..The English authorities seem largely 
to ignore the fact that Lord Goff’s dictum was only directed at 
exceptional cases where the relevant information was “obviously 
confidential”, yet no confidential relationship existed. The 
expansion of the focus of the cause of action was not 
contemplated by him to change the nature of the information 
disclosed, but rather the nature of the relationship or 
circumstances of the parties.  
 
Tipping J while supporting the existence of a privacy tort, acknowledged the 
circumstances in which reasonable expectation of privacy would arise, 
including conventional confidentiality issues. However, His Honour held that 
although confidence and privacy are capable of overlapping, they are 
essentially different concepts:66 
 
Breach of confidence, being an equitable concept, is conscience 
based. Invasion of privacy is a common law wrong which is 
founded on the harm done to the plaintiff by conduct which can 
reasonably be regarded as offensive to human values. 
 
His Honour also allowed for the possibility of developing the equitable cause 
of action to achieve the aim of privacy protection, but preferred a self-
contained and stand-alone common law cause of action known as invasion of 
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privacy, and thus rejected the UK method of extending the breach of 
confidence action.  
 
3 Requirements of the privacy tort 
 
(a) Reasonable expectation of privacy 
 
The first requirement of the tort of public disclosure of private facts is 
“reasonable expectation of privacy”. This formulation also appeared in 
English cases when determining privacy cases.
67
 The expression “facts in 
respect of which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy” is not easy to 
define. Gault P said that in many instances the identification of private facts 
will be analogous to the test of “information with the necessary quality of 
confidence” employed in breach of confidence cases and that there was no 
simple test for what constitutes a private fact. “Private facts” are those that 
may be known to some people, but not to the world at large.
68
 According to 
Burrows, “private facts” suggest inherently intimate personal facts about a 
person, such as personal relationships, financial matters and medical 
conditions. They may cover any facts that can be reasonably expected will not 
be published.
69
  
 
The court in Hosking referred to ABC v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd where 
Gleeson CJ gave his comments on what is private fact:
70
 
 
There is no bright line which can be drawn between what is private 
and what is not. Use of the term “public” is often a convenient 
method of contrast, but there is a large area in between what is 
necessarily public and what is necessarily private. An activity is not 
private simply because it is not done in public. It does not suffice to 
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make an act private that, because it occurs on private property, it 
has such measures of protection from public gaze as the 
characteristics of the property, the nature of the activity, the locality, 
and the disposition of the property owner combine to afford. Certain 
kinds of information about a person, such as information relating to 
health, personal relationships, or finances, may be easy to identify 
as private; as may certain kinds of activity, which a reasonable 
person, applying contemporary standards of morals and behavior, 
would understand to be meant to be unobserved. 
 
Tipping J supported the concept of a reasonable expectation of privacy and 
commented that a precise concept of a reasonable expectation of privacy is not 
possible at an early development of the tort.
71
  
 
His Honour believed that the fundamental ingredient of the tort should be that 
the plaintiff must be able to show a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
respect of the information or material the defendant has published or wishes to 
publish. In this circumstance, the expectation can arise from the nature of the 
information or material the defendant came to possess. His Honour described 
how the test works:
72
 
 
The plaintiff must show first an expectation of privacy and, more 
importantly in most cases, that such expectation is a reasonable 
one. The latter dimension of reasonableness, familiar in any field 
of law, controls the subjective expectation of the individual. It 
introduces an objective element upon which, as with all 
questions of reasonableness, in the end the Court has to make a 
value judgment. It is a very familiar exercise and cannot, in my 
view, validly be criticised on the basis of uncertainty. The 
concept is clear. The fact that its application in a marginal case 
                                                          
71
At [249]. 
72
At [250]. 
236 
 
may be difficult is not a valid reason to regard the concept as 
possessing objectionable uncertainty.  
 
The test of reasonable expectation of privacy is determined objectively by the 
facts and whether they were actionable or not from the perspective of the 
reasonable person. Thus, in Hosking the test is purely objective: what would a 
reasonable person considering the matter think and feel. Similarly, the same 
applies in Campbell where the test is assessed from the perspective of a 
reasonable person looking at the facts and circumstances of the case: how 
would a reasonable person in the position of the subject of the photograph feel 
about the publication of the photograph. All factors surrounding the 
photograph: whether it was taken surreptitiously or otherwise, should be taken 
into account in determining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
matters concerned exists. 
 
Gleeson CJ’s guidelines of private facts provide important criteria on how to 
distinguish between public and private facts. However, it does not settle 
related issues to private facts when they involve public figures. Hosking 
involved the children of public figures. Earlier at the High Court, Randerson J 
examined what reasonable expectations of privacy Hosking families were 
entitled to. His Honour stated that the reasonable expectation of privacy of 
public figures will necessarily be lower since it is inevitable the media subject 
celebrity figures to close scrutiny because the public has a natural curiosity 
and interest in the personal lives and activities of celebrities and those close to 
them.
73
 
 
The question posed by Gault P and Blanchard J is, “Should public figures 
have lower expectations of privacy in relation to their private lives, and how 
does this impact on the families of public persons”?74 The judges observed 
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that US jurisprudence provides that the right of privacy of public figures is 
held to have been lost because (1) by seeking publicity they have consented to 
it; (2) their personalities and affairs are already public facts not private ones; 
(3) there is a legitimate public interest in the publication of details about 
public figures
75
 It is not entirely clear to what extent the judges were 
endorsing the US position. It is clear that the third factor was recognised in 
Hosking as part of the public interest defence for the tort.
76
  The judges also 
stress, though, that not all of public figures’ activities are of concern to the 
public, it is just that the level of expectations of privacy is reduced in cases 
involving public figures. Gault P and Blanchard J recognised:
77
 
 
It is a matter of human nature that interest in the lives of public 
figures also extends to interest in the lives of their families. In such 
cases the reasonable expectations of privacy in relation to at least 
some facts of the family’s private lives may be diminished. 
 
UK courts acknowledged that a public figure is entitled to a private life and 
submitted that an individual in a public position must expect his actions to be 
more closely scrutinized by the media. In A v B plc Lord Woolf CJ 
commented on the level of expectation:
78
 
 
The right of privacy is not automatically lost when a person is a 
public figure, but his or her reasonable expectation of privacy in 
relation to many areas of life will be correspondingly reduced as 
public status increases. Involuntary public figures may also 
experience a lessening of expectation of privacy, but not ordinarily 
to the extent of those who willingly put themselves in the spotlight.  
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In Hosking, Gault P and Blanchard JJ acknowledged the vulnerability of 
children and the courts might be expected to be more sensitive to the interests 
of the children of “celebrities” but in the context of the protection of privacy, 
the test of reasonable expectation of privacy provides adequate flexibility to 
accommodate that special vulnerability of children. 
 
In exceptional cases, a reasonable expectation of privacy can arise in relation 
to information gathered in a public place.
79
 However, the expectation did not 
arise in Hosking because the public activities of Mrs Hosking and her children 
were not exceptional. 
The second requirement of the tort which concerns the test of material of a 
“highly offensive” nature and its application to a reasonable expectation of 
privacy is discussed in the next section. 
 
(b) Highly offensive to an objective reasonable person 
 
In order to safeguard other interests that may collide with the new tort, 
especially freedom of expression, the Court of Appeal prescribed that not only 
that must there be a reasonable expectation of privacy, but also that the 
publication of the facts must be highly offensive to an objective reasonable 
person.
80
 The test assumes a high threshold for a plaintiff to surmount. The 
primary concern is with publicity “that is truly humiliating and distressful or 
otherwise harmful to the individual concerned”. Therefore, the right of action 
should be only in respect of publicity determined objectively by reference to 
its extent and nature, to be offensive by causing real hurt or harm.
81
 It is 
offensive publicity that is the gist of the action, rather than that the facts are 
offensive in themselves.
82
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Gault P and Blanchard J considered the test of highly offensive to the 
reasonable person is appropriate as it relates to publicity and is not part of the 
test to determine whether information is private.
83
 The test is also necessary as 
a control mechanism over the types of publicity within the scope of the 
privacy action. It will exclude legal liability for all publications of private 
information.
84
 
 
Tipping J
85
 although in general agreement with the joint judgment preferred 
that the level of offensiveness to be a substantial, not a high level of offence 
and to be dealt with within the requirement of a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, and in fact that the highly offensive test should not be a requirement 
at all. This is more flexible while at the same time capturing the essence of the 
matter. His reason was that disclosure must be at least substantially offensive 
so that expression is not too readily limited and that trivial breaches are not 
actionable. His Honour envisaged circumstances where it would be unduly 
restrictive to require a high level of offence, for example that the publication 
served little or no public good, save an abstract upholding of the liberty 
theory.
86
 
 
Moreham suggested that “offence” is an inappropriate way to describe what is 
suffered.
87
 She submitted that the highly offensive publicity test is not 
necessary to keep the privacy action within bounds because the test of 
reasonable expectation of privacy itself operates to exclude non-serious 
claims.
88
 Instead, she recommended tests of substantial distress
89
 or of 
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humiliation or affront to dignity.
90
 She also highlighted four reasons why the 
highly offensive test should not be an element of the New Zealand privacy 
tort. According to her, the highly offensive publicity requirement obfuscates 
the dignitary nature of privacy interest and encourages the court to examine 
the wrong issues. It is also be inconsistent with the requirements of other 
dignitary torts. Therefore, the test should be removed as it is unnecessary and 
unpredictable.
91
 The English courts also rejected the highly offensive 
publicity test and developed the action through the reasonable expectation of 
privacy test and the balancing between privacy and freedom of expression.
92
  
 
This thesis submits that the offensive element should not be included as part 
of the privacy action. This is because breaches of privacy are about dignity 
and humiliation, and the highly offensive test obscures the dignitary nature of 
privacy interests.
93
 Moreover, because the nature of the interest protected by 
the law of privacy is the protection of dignity and human value, the effect on 
the claimant of a breach is humiliation and embarrassment and not necessarily 
offence.
94
 The highly offensive test is therefore inappropriate.  
 
The significant value attached to freedom of expression requires the defendant 
to prove that the information disclosed is more than a matter of general 
interest or curiosity. The next section discusses the defence of legitimate 
public concern. 
 
(c) The defence of legitimate public concern 
 
The joint judgments in Hosking held that legitimate public concern in cases of 
interference with privacy should be available as a defence rather than an 
element of the tort itself. It would be for the defendant to provide the evidence 
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and to prove that public interest exists. A defence of legitimate public concern 
would ensure that the scope of privacy protection should not exceed such 
limits on freedom of expression as is justified in a free and democratic 
society.
95
 The defence emphasises that the matter be one of legitimate public 
concern, about which the public needs to know and not enough to be merely 
of general curiosity.
96
  
 
The onus is on the defendant to establish the defence. The expression used in 
the judgment is “legitimate public concern” not “public interest”. “Public 
interest” is well-known in defamation and breach of confidence cases and 
distinct from “public concern”. The word “concern” is deliberately used, to 
distinguish between matters of general interest or curiosity to the public, and 
matters which are of legitimate public concern.
97
 The greater the infringement 
of privacy, the greater the public concern needed to override it, and vice 
versa.
98
  Gault P and Blanchard J commented on the defence:
99
 
 
The level of legitimate public concern would have to be such as 
outweighs the level of harm likely to be caused...if the 
publication was going to cause a major risk of serious physical 
injury or death, a very considerable level of legitimate public 
concern would be necessary to establish the defence. 
 
If the defendant fails to prove that the publication of plaintiff’s private 
information is a matter of legitimate public concern, then an action in privacy 
is maintained and the plaintiff entitled to the remedies discussed in the 
following section. 
 
 
                                                          
95
Hosking, at [129]-[130]. 
96
At [133]-[134]. 
97
At [133]. 
98
At [257].  
99
At [134]. 
242 
 
(d) Remedies 
 
The Court of Appeal in Hosking emphasised that the primary remedy for a 
breach of privacy is damages, but injunctive relief may be appropriate too.
100
 
The court concluded that an injuction to restrain publication in the face of an 
alleged interference with privacy is only available where there is compelling 
evidence that intended publication of private information is highly offensive 
and of little legitimate public concern in the information. In most cases, 
damages would be an adequate remedy.
101
  
 
Tipping J agreed that damages should be a primary remedy for invasion of 
privacy. He argued that prior restraint by injunction could be possible only in 
cases which are both severe in likely effect and clear in likely outcome. He 
commented:
102
 
 
Freedom of expression values will ordinarily prevail at the 
interlocutory stage. I am mindful of the chilling effect which 
potential claims for damages for invasion of privacy might have 
on the activities of news media organisations and perhaps others. 
But against that I am mindful too of the considerable distress 
which unwarranted invasion of privacy can cause. The right to 
freedom of expression is sometimes cynically invoked in aid of 
commercial advantage. Of course the right to freedom of 
expression exists in the commercial field, but it should not be 
allowed to become a justification for what may be little more 
than a desire to boost circulation or ratings when that legitimate 
commercial objective has a substantial adverse impact on the 
personal dignity and autonomy of individuals and serves no 
legitimate public function. 
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Hosking finally confirmed that there is a stand-alone tort of invasion of 
privacy that in appropriate circumstances covers the publication of private 
facts. The decision leaves open the question of whether a remedy should be 
available for unreasonable intrusion into a person’s solitude or seclusion. One 
thing that is clear, is that in New Zealand, an individual, even a celebrity, will 
in circumstances where the elements of the tort exist, have a cause of action 
against the media for invasion of privacy.  
 
C Development after Hosking 
  
This section explains how the requirements of the actions have been applied 
in subsequent cases. Post-Hosking cases are worthy of discussion as they 
show how the tort has been applied in individual cases and how its 
requirements are developing. Issues like the scope of the reasonable 
expectation of privacy, the desirability of the highly offensive test, the 
limitation on freedom of expression, and the defence of legitimate public 
concern examined by courts in subsequent cases and are discussed below. 
 
The previous cases and the decision in Hosking itself showed the potential 
breadth of privacy claims. Since Hosking, there has not been a great deal of 
case law on the privacy tort.
103
 Burrows claimed that the lack of paradigm 
privacy cases may be due to the media’s attitudes which have not been as 
intrusive as overseas colleagues in this respect. Another reason is because of 
the ability to complain to the Press Council, the Broadcasting Standards 
Authority (BSA) or Online Media Standards Authority (OMSA) which is 
simple and cheap.
104
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In Brown v Attorney-General,
105
 the plaintiff had recently been released on 
parole after serving three-and-a-half years for the kidnapping and indecent 
assault of a five-year-old boy. Police arrived at the plaintiff’s residence and 
took photographs of him. The photographs were taken with the consent of the 
plaintiff who believed that they were for police records only. Subsequently, 
the police circulated a flyer containing the plaintiff’s photo and warned locals 
to be aware of the plaintiff’s activities. As a result, the plaintiff received 
verbal abuse and continued to be the victim of harassment even after he 
moved from his apartment.  
 
He successfully sued the Attorney-General for damages and was awarded 
$25,000 for invasion of privacy. In this case, the court said that the plaintiff 
must first establish that the information is such that there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. According to Spear DCJ, the test is simply whether, at 
the time that the privacy is alleged to have been invaded, there is a reasonable 
expectation that the relevant information should be considered private.
106
 In 
other words, what is required is an objective appraisal as to whether, in any 
particular case, there could reasonably be an expectation that the information 
was private as against public.
107
  
 
The judge found that the flyer did not comply in several respects with police 
guidelines on the public naming of persons, and that the flyer was in the 
circumstances unjustified. The facts demonstrated that the plaintiff could 
reasonably expect that his likeness and whereabouts would not be published in 
this way, and that the publicity given to his private facts would be considered 
highly offensive to an objective reasonable person.  
 
In relation to the “highly offensive test” Tipping J in Hosking considered that 
the second element of the tort should probably be part of the considerations as 
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to whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy.
108
 However, Spear J 
stated that any approach adopted to the highly offensive test did not matter 
because the outcome was still the same.
109
 There is no doubt that the private 
information contained in the flyer was made public and it is clear that there 
was sufficient publicity to warrant the more extensive enquiry that such 
publicity would be considered “highly offensive to an objective reasonable 
person”.110 
 
Spear DCJ regarded the second limb of the tort as a threshold over which 
publicity given to private information must pass before it becomes 
objectionable. This is in line with the nature of publicity indicated by the 
majority in Hosking
111
 that: 
 
the concern is with publicity that is truly humiliating and 
distressful or otherwise harmful to the individual concerned. 
 
There was no doubt that the publication of the conviction in combination with 
the plaintiff’s photograph and address satisfied the “highly offensive” 
requirement. In relation to this requirement, the judge stated:
112
 
 
The test of course is not for the objective reasonable paedophile 
but of a reasonable person in the shoes of the person that the 
publication is about…I am just able to find that an objective 
reasonable person, standing in the shoes of the plaintiff, should 
be highly offended by the publication of that information about 
the plaintiff. That person should find the resultant vilification to 
be highly alarming and offensive.  
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The court, having weighed up all the arguments, concluded that the 
publication of the flyer and the information contained within it could not be 
considered of legitimate public concern, and accordingly found that the claim 
alleging an invasion of privacy was proved.  
 
Brooker v Police
113
 was an appeal against conviction for disorderly behaviour. 
However the case provides a good illustration of the balance between the right 
to privacy and freedom of expression. In this case, Mr Brooker had carried out 
a public protest outside a constable’s house on the grounds that the police 
constable had acted unlawfully towards him when a search warrant of forensic 
examination of a car for the purposes of a court case was executed at his 
house.  The Supreme Court considered whether a protest unduly impacted on 
the spatial privacy of the policewoman to whom the protest was directed and 
whether privacy was therefore a justifiable limitation of the protester’s 
freedom of expression. 
 
The majority overturned the decision of the Court of Appeal and found that 
the privacy intrusion did not justify a limitation on freedom of expression. 
Thomas J in his dissenting judgment stressed that both freedom of expression 
and privacy should be recognised as fundamental values and weighed one 
against the other in a manner designed to afford the greatest protection to 
both. The judge regarded privacy as an existing right which had not been 
abrogated or restricted by reason only that it was not expressly referred to in 
the NZBORA.
114
 Thomas J concluded that the value of a resident’s seclusion 
far outweighed the value to be placed on Mr Brooker’s exercise of his right to 
freedom of expression.  
 
The court held that in this case, privacy is a right as fundamental as the right to 
freedom of expression. However, a peaceful protest or picket which is simply 
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annoying or embarrassing and does not seriously interfere with use of the 
neighbourhood by others does not become disorderly simply because it is 
conducted in a residential street.
115
 There was no suggestion that the messages 
Mr Brooker was conveying were objectively alarming or threatening. The 
right to freedom of expression held more weight than the right to privacy in 
one’s home located in a residential neigbourhood and accordingly allowed the 
appeal.  
 
The majority decision in Brooker can be contrasted with the majority decision 
of the Court of Appeal in Hosking that the tort of invasion of privacy is a 
reasonable limit on free expression in terms of s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act in 
certain circumstances involving the publication of private facts. Tipping J 
concluded that in certain circumstances, privacy values could outweigh the 
right to freedom expression.
116
 
 
Another post-Hosking case is Rogers v Television New Zealand.
117
 This case 
is important because it clarifies the scope of the tort of privacy and the 
defence of public interest. Elias CJ accepted that the scope of the tort 
recognised in Hosking required consideration on a case-by-case and fact-
specific basis and did not purport to establish the limits of the tort in all 
circumstances.
118
 Thus, a generalization of the scope of the tort would not 
resolve issues indirectly relevant to the Hosking facts, such as the questions 
about proper use of police authority which were involved in Rogers. 
 
In Rogers, a reasonable expectation of privacy arose in relation to a 
videotaped murder confession made for the police, even though it had been 
produced for use in a public trial. This was because the plaintiff had given up 
privacy rights for the trial process but not for all time. Further, the tape would 
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have been under the control of the court during that time, and in any event, it 
had been ruled inadmissible on the grounds that the plaintiff’s right had not 
been properly protected when it was obtained. He was acquitted at trial. 
TVNZ wanted to show a video of the confession in a documentary to 
demonstrate a failure of the justice system. Rogers sought an injunction to 
prevent the broadcast on the ground of privacy. Nevertheless, this privacy 
interest was held to be minimal compared with that arising from inherently 
private facts.  
 
The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the appeal and found that once the 
confession was held inadmissible, Rogers had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in relation to it. However, the Supreme Court disagreed and the 
majority of the judges were of the view that Rogers must have known that the 
confession might be given in evidence in open court and thus he should have 
understood that the public would learn of it. It could not be said that he had a 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” in relation to it.   
 
One of the issues considered in this case was about the time during which 
expectations of privacy must be assessed. The court seemed to be of the view 
that the relevant expectation of privacy must have been present at the time the 
video was filmed. This approach largely determines the question of 
expectation because it must have been understood by Mr Rogers that the 
interview could be admitted in evidence in the public forum of the court. 
However, the Court of Appeal considered that an expectation of privacy 
should be assessed at the time the video was ruled inadmissible and 
concluded, therefore, that there was a reasonable expectation of privacy.
119
 
Her Honour also referred to overseas authorities that considered expectations 
of privacy at the time of proposed publication and concluded that the New 
Zealand court should resolve this matter so that liability could be determined 
clearly. 
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With regard to the recognition of the privacy tort and its requirement, the 
court in Rogers considered that Hosking was not the solution for all questions 
about liability where privacy interests were adversely affected.
120
 In fact the 
Hosking line of cases only provides an appropriate approach in dealing with 
wrongful disclosure of private information. The Supreme Court in Rogers 
confirms that such development should be considered with caution. An issue 
left for further deliberation was the requirement of “highly offensive 
publicity”, because the test was debated and received much criticism in 
Campbell.
121
  
 
However, most of the judges noted that the facts in Rogers were very different 
from those in Hosking and thus, the decision did not really deliberate on 
significant issues of the nature of privacy tort recognised in Hosking. McGrath 
J stated that:
122
  
 
It is unnecessary for this Court to give any detailed consideration 
to the Court of Appeal’s decision in Hosking v Runting in this 
case. Accepting for present purposes... that there is a privacy 
tort, the limits which are stated in the judgments of a majority of 
the Court of Appeal in that case, it is plain that the circumstances 
of Mr Rogers’s case do not establish the private nature of the 
factual information which he seeks to protect his claim. 
 
In exceptional circumstances, a reasonable expectation of privacy can arise 
even though the facts have been recorded in public place as illustrated in 
Andrews v Television New Zealand Ltd.
123
 Mr and Mrs Andrews were injured 
in a car accident. TVNZ filmed Mr Andrews being carried from the wrecked 
car on the side of the road, with his wife beside him. A private conversation 
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between the husband and wife was recorded and broadcast on a documentary 
about the work of the fire service. 
 
The plaintiffs claimed that the conversation and the scenes broadcast in the 
defendant’s television programme gave rise to a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. They contended that they were unaware that they were filmed or that 
Mrs Andrews’ conversation would be recorded and published. The couple 
also pleaded that the broadcast was highly offensive to them and to an 
objective reasonable person. It was alleged that they suffered substantial 
humiliation, pain and suffering and sought general and punitive damages.
124
  
 
The defendants denied the claim and contended that the plaintiffs were not 
identifiable to the general public in the broadcast, and pleaded specifically 
that the scenes and conversations broadcast all occurred in a public place. 
Thus, there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the conversations and 
scenes relied upon by the plaintiffs and the broadcast would not be considered 
highly offensive by an objective reasonable person. They added that in fact 
the broadcast was related to a matter of legitimate public concern and was, 
therefore, in the public interest.
125
 
 
Allan J was of the view that there was no right to privacy because the accident 
and the circumstances surrounding it occurred in public. However, His 
Honour stated that the communications between plaintiffs were private and 
intimate and of an altogether more personal nature than the information 
involved in Hosking.
126
 Thus, the plaintiffs were reasonably entitled to expect 
that their conversation would not be heard beyond those within earshot.
127
 
Allan J held that although everything had taken place in public, the couple 
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nonetheless had a reasonable expectation of privacy of their conversation. He 
said:
128
 
 
I accept however that an expectation of privacy otherwise 
reasonable may in certain circumstances be lost by reason of 
culpability on the part of the plaintiff. It is to be observed that the 
same consideration might well arise in a given case in the course of 
an assessment of whether the publication of private facts is highly 
offensive and further in relation to the assessment of a defence of 
legitimate public concern. 
 
However, the Andrews were denied a remedy because what was published 
could not be said to be “highly offensive”. Allan J referred to the second limb 
in Hosking and concluded that although the conversations were of intimate 
and highly personal character, they were not humiliating and embarrassing 
because there was no reference whatever in the programme to the precise 
cause of the accident, and no mention of the fact that the driver of the vehicle 
was intoxicated.
129
 Mrs Andrews herself acknowledged that nothing she said 
to her husband could be regarded as humiliating or embarrassing to either of 
them. Thus, the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the “highly offensive” test, and 
accordingly the claim failed.  
 
The pre- and post-Hosking cases show that the new tort is a very useful cause 
of action in cases involving invasion of privacy. It is the responsibility of the 
court to shape the common law for future development of privacy law. The 
court in Hosking held that statutes also have their role to lay down firm and 
detailed rules and to predict more potential problems.
130
 However, the 
inherent need for the development of the law through courts’ activities has 
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proved to be a better vehicle than a legislative approach in matters concerning 
private life, such as privacy.  
 
New Zealand’s development of privacy law has demonstrated that a legal 
framework of privacy law is still developing and needs to be constantly 
scrutinised to protect freedom of expression. The tort formulated in Hosking 
has brought a new dimension for the development of privacy law as a 
preferable alternative to a breach of confidence action as a means of 
protecting privacy interests in New Zealand. 
 
As for the new tort, Burrows commented that it is a common law tort and 
therefore has flexibility which is the major strength of the common law. But it 
also possesses that common law’s disadvantages: uncertainty of scope and 
incompleteness.
131
 This comment conforms to Anderson J in the Supreme 
Court who is in agreement with Elias CJ, who states in Rogers:
132
  
 
As to the issue of breach of privacy I will assume, without wishing 
to be taken as endorsing it, the law as elucidated by the majority of 
the Court of appeal in Hosking v Runting. I share the concern 
expressed by the Chief Justice that the jurisprudence of Hosking 
should not be regarded as settled. It was decided by a bare majority 
and both the existence of the tort and the scope of it, if it continues 
to be recognised, will fall to be reviewed by this Court in an 
appropriate case. 
 
The Hosking case did create a tort of public disclosure of private facts. 
Despite its ambiguity in nature and scope as commented on in Rogers, it has 
provided a remedy for persons whose private facts are published in a highly 
offensive manner and when the defence of legitimate public concern does not 
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outweigh their publication. The disclosure tort has no application to intrusion. 
However, an incremental extension of the tort can be seen in the High Court 
case analysed in the following discussion.
133
 
 
IV Protection against Intrusion  
 
 
This Part discusses relevant statutory law for the protection against intrusion 
and the new category tort of intrusion into solitude or seclusion and private 
affairs emerged from Holland. 
 
A Legislation and Case Law 
 
This section addresses the legislative context of the protection against 
intrusion tort. Such protection could be sought from harassment law, criminal 
law and also laws relating to search and surveillance. 
 
The Harassment Act 1997 introduces both civil and criminal penalties for a 
pattern of conduct such as watching another person’s residence, entering a 
person’s property, or making contact with a person by telephone, 
correspondence, or in any other way. It is also an offence to covertly film 
someone in an intimate situation. Section 3 defines “harassment”: 
 
For the purpose of this Act, a person harasses another person 
if he or she engages in a pattern of behaviour that is directed 
against that other person, being a pattern of behaviour that 
includes doing any specified act to the other person on at least 
two separate occasions within a period of 12 months. 
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The definition sets out the key feature of a harassment claim: that the 
complainant must establish a pattern of behaviour directed at a person and it 
was not actionable for a single incident. The specified acts must have occurred 
on at least two separate occasions within a period of 12 months. The Act lists 
specified acts that amount to harassment such as watching, loitering near or 
preventing or hindering access to or from, that person’s place of residence, 
business, employment, or any other place frequented by the person for any 
purpose.
134
  
 
The nature of the specified acts is in essence privacy interferences into the 
physical space and bodily integrity of the victim which clearly interfere with 
the comfort and enjoyment of an individual to lead his or her life free from 
unwanted access. The Act does, to a certain extent provides protection against 
intrusion in circumstances where a person is continually followed, watched at 
and listened to. However, the Act has no application to the wrongful 
publication of private information. It also only applies if the act occurs more 
than once.  
 
Part 9A of the Crimes Act 1961 under the heading of “Crimes against 
personal privacy” provides protection against unauthorised interception, 
unlawful disclosure of private information and unauthorised intrusions into 
intimate personal spaces.   Section 216H prohibits the making of intimate 
visual recording. It prescribes punishment for a term not exceeding three years 
imprisonment for those who intentionally or recklessly make an intimate 
visual recording of another person. Section 216G defines intimate visual 
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recording as “a visual recording that is made in any medium using any device 
without the knowledge or consent of the person who is the subject of the 
recording”.135  
 
Section 46 of the Search and Surveillance Act 2012 also affirms freedom 
against intrusion. It states: 
 
(1) Except as provided in s 47 and 48, an enforcement officer who 
wishes to undertake any 1 or more of the following activities must 
obtain a surveillance device warrant (c) observation of private 
activity in private premises, and any recording of that observation, 
by means of a visual surveillance device; 
 
The right of an individual to have enjoyment of the land is part of freedom 
from intrusion. Section 38 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 provides: 
 
(1) The tenant shall be entitled to have quiet enjoyment of the premises 
without interruption by the landlord or any person claiming by, 
through, or under the landlord or having superior title to that of the 
landlord. 
(2) The landlord shall not cause or permit any interference with the 
reasonable peace, comfort, or privacy of the tenant in the use of the 
premises by the tenant. 
(3) Contravention of subsection (2) of this section in circumstances that 
amount to harassment of the tenant is hereby declared to be 
unlawful act. 
(4) In this section premises include facilities. 
 
The intrusion legislation discussed above can, therefore, be used to protect 
against unwanted photography, spying, following, filming, bugging, searching 
and other interferences with a person’s physical privacy. They seem to offer 
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adequate protections against physical intrusion defined in this thesis. Similar 
protections have also been provided under the criminal law in Malaysia as 
discussed in Chapter Four although they are not as comprehensive as what 
have been offered under the New Zealand law. However, the acknowledgment 
of the seriousness of the offence under the criminal law suggests that such 
interference should be part of a civil tort, so to enable a victim to claim for 
compensation against the perpetrator. This justifies the inclusion of the 
unwanted access to the physical body or space of an individual to be an aspect 
of privacy protection under the Bill. 
 
The Broadcasting Standards Authority’s Privacy Principles recognise claims 
of intrusion against an interest in solitude or seclusion where material has 
been publicly disclosed. Principle 3 provides that: 
 
 (a) It is inconsistent with an individual’s privacy to allow the 
public disclosure of material obtained by intentionally 
interfering, in the nature of prying, with that individual’s interest 
in solitude or seclusion. The intrusion must be highly offensive 
to an objective reasonable person. (b) In general, an individual’s 
interest in solitude or seclusion does not prohibit recording, 
filming or photographing that individual in a public place (‘the 
public place exemption’). (c) The public place exemption does 
not apply when the individual whose privacy has allegedly been 
infringed was particularly vulnerable, and where the disclosure is 
highly offensive to an objective reasonable person. 
 
An analysis of intrusion law in New Zealand has been made by Whata J in C v 
Holland.
136
 His Honour held that the leading judgment on the concept of 
intrusion related to privacy is R v Williams
137
 where the Court of Appeal 
stated: 
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A touchstone of s 21 of the Bill of Rights is the protection of 
reasonable expectations of privacy. It is thus only where a person’s 
privacy interest has been breached that his or her rights under s 21 
have been breached and a personal remedy is available.  
 
The Court said that s 21 provided protection of the rights of the general 
public. Privacy interests in premises should thus be assessed objectively 
without any concentration on property rights, or the activities of the 
accused.
138
 His Honour accepted the value of freedom from unwanted 
intrusion into private spheres and that was emphasised in Brooker v Police.
139
 
McGrath J said: 
 
Privacy is an “an aspect of human autonomy and dignity”. 
Although, as a police constable, the complainant is a public official, 
in her private life she is entitled to enjoyment of the rights of an 
ordinary citizen. Her privacy interest in the present appeal is her 
right to be free from unwanted physical intrusion into the privacy of 
her home.  
 
The above discussion acknowledges that the concept of privacy has been dealt 
with extensively in New Zealand law and some legislation provides sanctions 
and protections against intrusion. 
 
B The Tort of Intrusion upon Seclusion: C v Holland 
 
In August 2012, the High Court in C v Holland held that a tort of intrusion 
upon seclusion is part of New Zealand law. This development expanded the 
Hosking tort to provide protection to spatial privacy. It protects individuals 
from unauthorised intrusion into personal space or seclusion. The judge 
commented on the lack of authority in New Zealand for the proposition that 
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an intrusion upon an individual’s seclusion in breach of a reasonable 
expectation of privacy gives rise to an actionable tort in New Zealand.
140
 The 
post-Hosking cases have not given any indication as to whether the Hosking 
privacy tort would be applicable in cases of unreasonable intrusion and where 
no publication of private information is involved.  
 
C v Holland involved a surreptitious installation of a recording device in the 
roof cavity above a bathroom. In that case, a C lived in the house owned by 
her boyfriend and the defendant, Mr Holland.  The defendant recorded two 
separate video clips of C undressing and showering using a hidden small 
camera in the roof cavity.  The videos were not published but the defendant 
did download them onto an external hard drive.  C and her boyfriend 
subsequently discovered the recordings.  C did not consent to the defendant’s 
act of watching her in the shower or taking the video clips. She was extremely 
distressed and made a police report.  Holland was charged under s 216H of the 
Crimes Act 1961 and pleaded guilty to the criminal charge of making an 
intimate visual recording. He was ordered to pay $1,000 in emotional harm 
reparation and discharged without penalty.  C then commenced an action for 
breach of privacy to recover damages.  The issue was whether the Hosking 
tort could provide a remedy to the present case where no publication was 
involved.  
 
On the facts, Whata J found that an intrusion into C’s solitude and seclusion 
had occurred when the defendant successfully recorded C in the bathroom 
partially undressed or naked. The conduct was highly offensive to a 
reasonable person and thus, infringed C’s reasonable expectation of 
                                                          
140
Holland, at [8]. The judge also referred to New Zealand Law Commission Invasion of 
Privacy: Penalties and Remedies: Review of the Law of Privacy Stage 3 (NZLC R 113, 2010) 
at 92-93. See also Stephen Penk “Future Directions and Issues” in Stephen Penk and 
Rosemary Tobin (eds) Privacy Law in New Zealand (Brookers, Wellington, 2010) at 15.5.4. 
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privacy.
141
 The central issue to be determined by the court was whether a tort 
of intrusion upon seclusion should form part of the law of New Zealand.
142
 
 
Counsel for the defendant advanced three key objections to the transformation 
of privacy values into actionable rights at common law:
143
 
  
(a) Privacy per se is not justiciable; 
(b) It is for Parliament, not the Judiciary to resolve the weight to be accorded 
to privacy as a value within a complex matrix of competing values, 
interests and rights;  
(c) A privacy tort is not necessary. 
 
However, His Honour strongly believed that the objections did not prevent the 
recognition of a tort of intrusion upon seclusion in New Zealand law. Privacy 
is a value worth protecting and linked to personal autonomy. When addressing 
the first objection, the judge accepted that a general claim to privacy may not 
be conformable to the rules of law or be transformed into a rule of law thus 
giving rise to an actionable claim. Based on the development since Hosking, 
the transformation of aspects of privacy into rights and unwanted intrusion 
into a wrong was already in place and judges were capable of adjudicating on 
the content and boundaries of a privacy right to be free from intrusion upon 
seclusion.
144
  
 
His Honour gave six reasons to support this conclusion. Firstly, the existing 
rules that regulate intrusion into personal affairs as both a civil and criminal 
wrong affirmed the status of freedom from intrusion into personal affairs as a 
recognised value in New Zealand. Secondly, the freedom was in conformity 
with justified limitations including a defence of legitimate public concern. 
                                                          
141
Holland, at [6] and [7]. 
142
At [5]. 
143
At [65]. 
144
At [74]. 
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Thirdly, a tort of intrusion upon seclusion was entirely compatible with, and a 
logical adjunct to the Hosking tort of unauthorised publication of private facts 
because the same underlying wrong of unwanted intrusion into a reasonable 
expectation of privacy was at issue in both types of cases. Fourthly, freedom 
of speech affirmed by s 14 of the NZBORA was only infringed when 
publication was also contemplated. Fifthly, there were similarities in structure 
between the intrusion tort and the traditional tort based on protection of 
property and the person which involve unwanted acts causing harm to a 
person’s possession or to the person. Sixthly, common law has the capacity to 
adapt in the light of a changing social context.
145
 
 
Having scrutinised the existing laws, the court found that the existing 
protections from intentional intrusion into personal space were coherent but 
not comprehensive. In the absence of publication, the Hosking privacy tort 
had no direct application to the facts in Holland. 
146
 In fact, the role of breach 
of confidence was far from clear in intrusion cases. Moreover, an action based 
on intentional infliction of emotional distress was unlikely to succeed as 
shown by Wainwright. A criminal sanction was triggered, but that relied 
somewhat fortuitously on the specific facts fitting the statutory criteria.
147
  
 
In holding that a tort of intrusion upon seclusion is part of New Zealand 
law,
148
 and taking into consideration the consistency with the North America 
tort and domestic privacy law and principles, Whata J held that in order to 
establish a claim based on the tort of intrusion upon seclusion a plaintiff must 
show:
149
 
 
(a) An intrusion must be intentional and unauthorised one, 
(b) Into seclusion (namely intimate personal activity, space or affairs), 
                                                          
145
At [75]. 
146
At [89]. 
147
At [89]. 
148
At [93]. 
149
At [94]. 
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(c) Involving infringement of a reasonable expectation of privacy, 
(d) That is highly offensive to a reasonable person. 
 
His Honour described “intentional act” to mean an affirmative act, not an 
unwitting or simply careless intrusions. “Unauthorised” excluded consensual 
and/or lawfully authorised intrusions.
150
 Thus, an intrusion that is reckless or 
negligent will not satisfy the requirement. The reference to intimate personal 
activity in the second element acknowledges the need to establish intrusion 
into matters that most directly impinge on personal autonomy.
151
 
 
The third and fourth elements resemble the Hosking requirements and remain 
in harmony with the existing privacy tort in New Zealand. Both torts share a 
similar aim of protection, in which the disclosure tort protects plaintiffs from 
humiliation and distress caused by publication of embarrassing private 
information,
152
 and the intrusion tort arises in respect of an intrusion that is 
objectively determined, due to its extent and nature, to be offensive by 
causing real hurt or harm. A legitimate public concern for the information 
may provide a defence to the privacy claim.
153
 
 
When commenting on the test of reasonable expectation of privacy, Whata J 
did not agree with the plaintiff’s counsel who suggested a simple reasonable 
expectation of privacy in intrusion cases. His Honour stated:
154
 
 
In my view however, a one-step reasonable expectation of 
privacy test comparable to the art 8 test applied in the United 
Kingdom for breach of confidence is not sufficiently 
prescriptive. The capacity for conflict between the right to 
seclusion and other rights and freedom is very significant. This 
                                                          
150
At [95]. 
151
At [95]. 
152
See Hosking, at [126], [128] and [138]. 
153
Holland, at [96]. 
154
At [97]. 
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demands a clear boundary for judicial intervention. Furthermore, 
a highly offensive test will also set a workable barrier to the 
unduly sensitive litigant that seemed to trouble Lord Hoffmann 
in Wainwright. 
 
The court in Holland concluded that an action for intrusion is part of the law 
of New Zealand. Thus, Mr Holland intruded into C’s intimate personal space 
and activity when he videoed her in the shower without her consent and 
without legislative authority. The intrusion infringed a reasonable expectation 
of privacy and was highly offensive to the reasonable person. C was entitled 
to damages.  
 
V Conclusion  
 
The protection of privacy interests in New Zealand is developing fast. The 
fact that there is no general right to privacy in the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 is not a barrier to courts identifying and recognising the emergence 
of a common law tort of breach of privacy. As long as the s 5 conditions of a 
reasonable limitation demonstrably justified in a democratic society are met, 
the court is free to develop the law to protect legitimate claims to privacy. 
 
Unlike the position in the UK, the New Zealand law of privacy began with the 
premise that a tort of invasion of privacy existed.
155
 The refusal to affirm the 
tort by Randerson J in Hosking
156
 did not survive after the Court of Appeal 
confirmed that a new tort of invasion of privacy existed in New Zealand. 
Gault P and Blanchard J preferred to articulate a distinct tort rather than rely 
on a claim for breach of confidence.
157
 The shortcomings of New Zealand’s 
                                                          
155
See Tucker [1986], Bradley [1993], P v D [2000], and L v G [2002].  
156
[2003] 3 NZLR 285 (HC). 
157
At [46], Their Honours observed that privacy cases do not fit within a breach of confidence 
action which requires information to be confidential, communication of that information to 
another in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence and unauthorised use or 
disclosure. 
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privacy tort formulated in Hosking can be seen from the terminology used for 
the tort itself. It deals only with the “public” disclosure of “private” facts. It 
does not cover invasions of privacy by intrusions where no information is 
published. 
 
It is not surprising that the Court of Appeal in Hosking did not decide whether 
a tortious remedy should be available for unreasonable intrusion into solitude 
or seclusion. The concern of the court at the time was to recognise the 
existence of a privacy tort as identified by Prosser and developed in US cases. 
The boundaries of a cause of action cannot be ascertained in a single decision 
and thus will evolve through future decisions as Courts assess the nature and 
impact of particular circumstances.
158
 
 
In fact, the Law Commission Report had recommended that development 
under the common law should continue on the basis that the common law 
itself has the great advantage to tackle fact specific privacy issues in a fast-
moving area of law and that the judges can make informed decisions on actual 
cases as they arise. Furthermore, the flexibility of the common law suggests 
that it will develop with the times. The report also thought that the number of 
cases on privacy would be unlikely to increase with the enactment of the 
statute, and thus it will be of little use and not worth enacting it as such.
159
 
This thesis agrees that the reasons are acceptable and strong for New Zealand 
which has a clearly-established tort at common law, but not for Malaysia 
which is now at the very early development of privacy law.  
 
The Court, however expressed the view that the introduction of any high level 
and wide tort of invasion of privacy should be a matter for the legislature.
160
 
Their Honours held that the development of a privacy tort is best achieved 
through specific legislation. However, judicial intervention a few years later 
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 Hosking at [118]. 
159
New Zealand Law Commission Report, above n 140, at 90-91.   
160
Hosking, at [110]. 
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in Holland opened a new dimension and broadened the scope of privacy 
protection of information to cover intrusion as well. The position is now that 
if the photos have not been published, an action is maintained under the new 
tort, and if it involved publication, the Hosking tort could provide remedy for 
the breach. These developments complement each other and offer a 
comprehensive protection of privacy in New Zealand.    
 
These significant developments in the area of privacy law provide a good 
example for Malaysia in developing a privacy tort, and at the same time, 
acknowledge the importance of the existence of a statutory tort of privacy. 
Matters such as the characteristics of the privacy tort, its tests, defence, 
remedies and balancing exercise are fundamental considerations for the 
development of a good privacy law. However, as discussed earlier in this 
chapter, not all features of the New Zealand privacy tort will be applied in the 
proposed statutory tort. The Bill excludes the highly offensive test for the 
reasons discussed previously and instead relies solely on the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test. As regards to defence in privacy action, the Bill 
uses public interest defence because “legitimate public concern” is not a 
phrase used in Malaysia. New Zealand law provides useful guidance for 
lawmakers in Malaysia on these matters. The following chapter examines the 
proposed law for Malaysia.  
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PART IV: PROPOSAL 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
A PRIVACY LAW FOR MALAYSIA 
 
I Overview  
 
Having discussed the development of privacy law and the structure of the 
legal protection provided in England and New Zealand, this thesis suggests 
that Malaysia should have a statute on privacy. The Personal Data Protection 
Act which applies to the handling and processing of personal data in 
commercial transactions does not provide protection for individuals whose 
personal information has been published or intrusion into physical body or 
space. Thus, the thesis recommended a statute that covers other aspects of 
privacy protection that are currently unprotected in the Malaysian legal 
framework.  Although neither England nor New Zealand has pursued the 
statutory path apart from their data protection legislation which protects only 
against specific types of privacy interference, the current state of privacy 
protection in both jurisdictions and its incremental development informs the 
likely nature and scope of privacy law for Malaysia. 
 
The preceding chapters revealed that the protection of privacy may take 
several forms. First, the extension of breach of confidence action to provide 
protection for the wrongful use of private information.
1
 Second, the 
recognition of a separate cause of action for invasion of privacy.
2
 Third, the 
establishment or recognition of a constitutional right to privacy,
3
 and fourth, 
                                                          
1
This development can be seen in Douglas, A v B plc and Campbell.  
2
An independent tort of invasion of privacy was created in Hosking and the tort of intrusion 
upon seclusion was confirmed by Whata J in Holland. 
3
The right to privacy in India was established by the Supreme Court when dealing with arts 19 
and 21 of the Indian Constitution. In Kharak Singh v State of UP & Ors [1963] AIR 1295, the 
court recognised that there was a right to privacy implicit in the Constitution under art 21. The 
same development was followed in Sivarasa. 
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specific legislation for privacy.
4
 These routes have all been used by various 
countries in the development of the protection for privacy. 
 
The courts in the United Kingdom preferred to absorb any cause of action in 
privacy into the doctrine of confidentiality and to utilise an existing principle 
rather than create a new limb of law. The establishment of the new 
methodology adopted from the doctrine of breach of confidence to extend 
protection for privacy actions proved the unwillingness of the UK Parliament 
to introduce a statutory privacy tort. On the other hand, the New Zealand 
Court of Appeal recognised a separate tort of privacy. 
 
The establishment or recognition of a constitutional right to privacy and 
specific legislation for privacy are not new approaches but will continue to 
grow and be adopted by various jurisdictions in their journey to provide 
adequate protection for breach of privacy. Although none of the countries of 
the courts that proposed a statutory tort of privacy have actually done so, they 
have at least suggested an alternative approach for the development of privacy 
law.  
 
This chapter discusses the proposed law for privacy in Malaysia.
5
 It provides 
detailed explanation of the Bill. Part I reviews the shape of privacy protection 
                                                          
4
The courts in other jurisdictions agree that legislation is the best approach to dealing with 
breach of privacy. For example in Kaye at [66] Glidewell LJ said that “It is well-known that 
in English law there is no right to privacy, and accordingly there is no right of action for 
breach of a person’s privacy. The facts of the present case are a graphic illustration of the 
desirability of Parliament considering whether and in what circumstances statutory provision 
can be made to protect the privacy of individuals”. See also Hosking (HC) at [118],  
Randerson J concluded that New Zealand courts should not recognise a tort that would 
provide a remedy for the public disclosure of photographs of children taken while they were 
in a public place for five broad reasons and one of them was “to the extent there might have 
been gaps in privacy law, they should be filled by the legislature, not the Courts”. A statutory 
tort of privacy has been developed in Ireland (Privacy Bill 2006) and some states of Australia. 
See Australian Law Reform Commission, Report 108: For Your Information: Australian 
Privacy Law and Practice (2008), New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Report 
120: Invasion of Privacy (2009) and Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in 
Public Places: Final Report 18 (2010).  
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in certain jurisdictions. Part II emphasises the importance of privacy 
legislation as an appropriate means of protecting privacy. Part III explains all 
provisions of the Bill and presents comments and discussion in support of the 
statutory cause of action. Part IV briefly summarises the discussion of this 
chapter. 
 
II Need for a Bill 
 
The common law of privacy is continually developing to supplement gaps 
providing protection, but legislation is generally identified as the preferable 
form of privacy protection.
6
  
In the words of Gault P: 7 
 
The Courts are at pains to ensure that any decision extending 
the law to address a particular case is consistent with general 
legal principle and with public policy and represents a step 
that it is appropriate for the Courts to take. In the last respect 
there are matters that involve significant policy issues that 
are considered best left for the Legislature.  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
5
See the proposed privacy law for Malaysia in the Appendix, at 302. For the purpose of 
consistency, the thesis uses “Bill”, “section” and “subsection” when referring to the proposed 
law and the provisions in the Privacy Bill 2014. 
6See also John Burrows “The News Media and the Law” (2003) 9 Canterbury Law Review 
229, at 238; Tucker v News Media Ownership Ltd [1986] 2 NZLR 716 at 733; Greg Taylor 
and David Wright “Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats: Privacy, 
Injunctions and Possums: An Analysis of the High Court’s Decision” (2002) 26 Melbourne 
University LR 702, at 711; Greg Taylor “Why is there no Common Law Right of Privacy?” 
(2000) 26 Monash University LR 235, at 269.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
7
Hosking, at [5]. Earlier in Tucker v News Media Ownership Ltd [1986] 2 NZLR 716 at 733 
(HC), McGechan J supported the introduction of a common law or tort covering invasion of 
personal privacy at least by public disclosure of private facts and the boundaries and 
exceptions of the tort will need much working out on a case by case basis so as to suit the 
conditions of this country. He said that if the legislature intervenes during the process, so 
much the better.  
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In Douglas v Hello! Ltd, Lindsay J, when declining to hold that a general tort 
of privacy exists in England, felt that the development of a free-standing tort 
in an area as broad as privacy should be left to Parliament.
8
 
 
The New Zealand Law Commission Report considered the question of 
whether the privacy tort should be enacted in statutory form. Although the 
Report ultimately recommended that protection of privacy be left to the 
common law as discussed above in Chapter Six, the Commission 
acknowledged that a statute would render the law more accessible than the 
common law, fill some of the gaps in the current law, and render some of the 
criteria more certain than they currently are.
9
 This is because the common law 
is dependent on the accidents of litigation and develops slowly. In this regard, 
statute law can present a complete and coherent whole straight away.
10
  It is 
suggested that these arguments are particularly compelling in the Malaysian 
context because as discussed in Chapters Three and Four, Malaysia lacks of 
laws protecting aspect of privacy interests and what more of a clearly 
established privacy tort. Due to the nature and different interests of local 
inhabitants, it is also hard for Malaysia to simply rely on the adoption of 
developments on privacy law from the US and the UK. 
 
 
Having identified the lack of protection afforded to privacy in Malaysia, it is 
no longer acceptable that people have no appropriate remedies under existing 
laws against infringements of their territorial or bodily privacy or the privacy 
of communications. The current developments in favour of privacy protection 
in the Malaysian courts are as yet fragile and embryonic, thus the need for a 
statutory cause of action to build on the common law trend. 
 
                                                          
8
Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2003] 3 All ER 996 at [229]. 
9
New Zealand Law Commission Invasion of Privacy: Penalties and Remedies: Review of the 
Law of Privacy Stage 3 (NZLC R 113, 2010) at 90.  
10
At 90. However, after careful deliberation, the Law Commission has decided that the tort 
should be left to develop at common law.   
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This study has concluded that the introduction of a statutory cause of action 
for breach of privacy would provide a comprehensive protection and remedies 
for claimants in privacy actions. A specific privacy law is justified owing to 
its absence both in the common law and the Constitution of Malaysia. Such a 
law would clearly establish privacy as an important human right that warrants 
specific recognition. The law would also make it easier to respond to 
emerging breaches of privacy and provide clearer guidance to both the media 
and the public as to their precise rights and obligations. Furthermore, the Bill 
will remain compliant with the constitutional basis of the right to life and 
personal liberty defined in art 5 of the Constitution.  
 
Legislative protection is desirable. It would establish a general right to privacy 
and define a tort of privacy to cover conduct which includes: 
(a) collecting, publishing or disclosing private information or 
embarrassing personal material without consent; 
(ii) searching private space, violating the peace of another by intruding 
upon him or her, or persistently communicating with him or her or 
intercepting the communication. 
 
It seems that the best way of defining the elements of the new tort would be to 
use the features highlighted in the United Kingdom and New Zealand case 
law. This could be done by developing the breach of confidence action which 
excludes its constraints and reflects generally held views as to the limits of the 
word “private”. One approach would be to define the tort of invasion of 
privacy on the basis of three elements: (1) unwanted access; (2) into a 
person’s life or personal information; (3) unreasonableness in all 
circumstances.  
 
The first element of unwanted access may include observation, recording or 
surveillance by the defendant of the claimant. Matters such as photography, 
films, tape recording and visual or aural observation are also included. 
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Secondly, the tort may involve publication of information about the claimant, 
such as factual information (whether true or false), photographs, films or 
recordings (whether actually or purportedly recording the claimant). Thirdly, a 
breach may entitle an individual to protection to the extent that it is reasonable 
in all circumstances having regard to the rights of others and general interest 
of the public. 
 
The introduction of the Bill would constitute the first legislative attempt in 
Malaysia to protect a general right to privacy. The establishment of this right 
would potentially fill the gaps in the common law of Malaysia. It would focus 
on the protection of personal privacy as opposed to the protection of specific 
personal data provided under the PDPA 2010. The Bill is based on the 
common law development of privacy in the United Kingdom and New 
Zealand. Guidelines and references from international documents such as the 
ECHR, the ICCPR, and Political Rights and Recommendations from 
Australia
11
 and Ireland
12
 were also referred to in preparing the draft Bill. 
These comparisons and references confirm the importance of a specific law on 
privacy. 
 
The proposed Privacy Bill 2014 (“the Bill”) establishes and recognises a 
general right to privacy in Malaysia’s legal framework. It provides protection 
for an individual’s privacy and thereby safeguards the interests of all 
individuals. The law would be directly applied to determine whether the 
breach has taken place by referring to the requirements set up in the Bill. This 
would provide a straightforward solution to cases involving invasion of 
privacy as discussed in Chapter One. 
 
                                                          
11
See Australian Law Reform Commission, New South Wales Law Reform Commission, 
and Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 4.  
12
See Privacy Bill 2006 at 
http://www.oireachtas.ie/documents/bills28/bills/2006/4406/b4406s.pdf.  
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The Bill also provides clear rules not only for determining a breach of privacy 
but also in related matters such as the balancing of rights, remedies and 
defences. With this Bill, inadequacies of privacy protection could be resolved. 
 
III Explanation of the Bill’s provisions 
 
The Bill addresses matters relating to privacy and complements the partial 
protections currently available in Malaysian law. According to s 13 of the 
Interpretation Act 1967, every Act shall be a public Act unless the contrary is 
expressly provided therein. Thus, the Bill can be invoked in cases of breach 
between individuals or between individuals and public and private bodies. 
Public bodies include the Federal and State Governments. The application of 
the Bill is wider than the Personal Data Protection Act 2010 which has no 
application to Federal and State Governments. In order to achieve the purpose 
of this Bill and to provide a comprehensive protection, the Bill has universal 
application and includes the following key features.  
 
Section 3 specifies the purpose of the Bill: To provide for the protection and 
respect of the dignity of every individual in their private and public lives both 
in terms of personal information and freedom from physical intrusion. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, privacy is a basic human need underlying the 
fundamental value of dignity and honour which exist in a democratic society. 
The existence of the Bill relates to these values and the protection it offers 
covers both aspects of privacy, namely protection of personal information and 
physical intrusion. The Bill establishes a general right to privacy and 
promotes the protection of that right. It recognises the non-absoluteness of the 
right and provides a framework for balancing the right with other human 
rights and public interests. The Bill allows redress. 
 
Common law has long hesitated to recognise an actionable tort of privacy; 
there has been much judicial debate on the subject. The introduction of the 
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Bill will provide a statute-based cause of action for individuals whose privacy 
has been breached. The doubts and hesitancy of the common law will be 
superseded. 
 
The following sections analyse all provisions of the Bill.  
 
A Interpretation 
 
Part I of the Bill deals with preliminary matters.  Section 1 concerns the Bill. 
Its title is chosen to emphasise exclusive protection to cases involving breach 
of privacy offered by the Bill and is expressly privacy-driven legislation.
13
  
 
Section 2 is a standard provision defining expressions used in the Bill. One of 
the situations where a breach of the right to privacy takes place is when there 
is a disclosure. To “disclose” means to make information and other material 
concerning an individual known to the public or a section of the public or just 
one person. In a breach of privacy action, the type, manner and extent of 
disclosure are factors taken into consideration in determining the breach. 
 
“Individual” in the Bill refers to a living person. The Bill has nothing to do 
with disclosure of information relating to dead persons or to corporate entities. 
As discussed earlier in Chapter Two, privacy is a dignitary interest, thus it 
cannot apply to corporations and even more difficult to apply to dead persons. 
Although we should not dishonour the dead, the interest that are protecting 
there might not be a privacy one. 
 
“Interference” with an individual’s life results in a breach. It is the action of 
interfering, or actions taken which lead to interference. It covers both the act 
and the process carried out before interference takes place. Thus, if a person 
                                                          
13
By comparison, the same name is used in New Zealand (the Privacy Act 1993) for the 
legislation protecting an aspect of individual privacy namely information privacy.  
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installs a CCTV in a bedroom in order to capture images of other individuals, 
the breach takes place when the CCTV is installed, not when the image was 
captured. 
 
“Personal information” means information which relates to an identifiable 
individual such as name, age, date of birth, identification numbers, financial 
standing, credit records, and convictions if any. Thus, any information or 
opinion of an individual whose identity is disclosed or can reasonably be 
ascertained from the information or opinions is protected. However the 
protection does not include any information about an individual that is readily 
available to the public. 
 
“Physical intrusion” is one aspect of privacy protected by the Bill. Physical 
intrusion means intrusion into an individual’s physical space or solitude. This 
definition allows a claimant to invoke the Bill if his or her state of being alone 
or with a few selected others is interfered with.  
 
B Right to privacy 
 
4. (1)  Every individual has a general right to privacy. 
(2) The right to privacy is the right to the degree of 
privacy which is reasonable in all the circumstances 
having regard to the rights of others and of the public at 
large. 
(3) The right to privacy in this Act complements the 
right to life and personal liberty under article 5 of the 
Federal Constitution and is to be read consistently with 
freedom of speech, assembly and association granted 
under article 10 of the Federal Constitution. 
 
Section 4(1) establishes a general right to privacy and guarantees it to every 
individual. Section 4(2) assures the right to privacy that is reasonable in all the 
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circumstances having regards to the rights of others and of the public at large. 
To complement such assurance, s 4(3) provides that the protection of privacy 
must be read consistently with the right to life and personal liberty under art 5 
of the Federal Constitution. What is envisaged, then, is development of a 
privacy action which is consistent with the rights in art 5 and a permissible 
defensible limitation on freedom of expression in art 10. Reference to art 5 of 
the Constitution is in conformity with the obiter dicta in Sivarasa that the right 
to personal liberty includes the right to privacy.
14
 
 
The Constitution is the supreme law. It is a basic constitutional principle that a 
law inconsistent with the Constitution is void. The object of s 4(3) is to signal 
awareness of that fact and maybe to avert any direct constitutional challenge. 
In one sense subsection (3) is redundant. In any eventual legislative initiative, 
government officials might choose to omit it for that reason. It is retained in 
the draft because it is deemed appropriate to state that the Bill is not intended 
to be inconsistent with constitutional principle – it can be read compatibly 
with arts 5 and 10. The focus of any interpretation should be on working out 
of the relationship of the privacy tort with any constitutional extension of art 5 
to privacy rather than on supporting incompatibilities. The aim is to give some 
direction to the interpretive endeavours of the court to favour as positive and 
expansive interpretation as possible rather than one that unduly restricts the 
range of the tort. 
 
Section 4 also acknowledges the consistency of the right to privacy with 
freedom of speech, assembly and association under art 10. It grants every 
citizen the right to freedom of speech and expression. The right, however, 
does not make the freedom an absolute right. It is a positive right that cannot 
be denied by government but subject to limitations which secure the broader 
                                                          
14
See Sivarasa; See also Zuryati Mohamed Yusoff “Constitutional Protection of Privacy in 
Malaysia: A case study” [2011] 1 LNSA lxxix. For general discussion of art 5, see above 
Chapter Three, Part III.  
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interests of the community. In PP v Ooi Kee Saik
15
 Raja Azlan Shah J quoted 
from AK Gopalan v State of Madras:16 
 
There cannot be any such thing as absolute or uncontrolled 
liberty wholly free from restraint; for that would lead to anarchy 
and disorder. The possession and enjoyment of all rights... are 
subject to such reasonable conditions as may be deemed to be... 
essential to the safety, health, peace and general order and 
morals of the community... What the Constitution attempts to do 
in declaring the rights of the people is to strike a balance 
between individual liberty and social control. 
 
Section 4(3) also provides a caution in order to safeguard the entrenched right 
to life and personal liberty, and the right to speech, assembly and association. 
As the supreme law of the Federation, any rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution enjoy the highest respect and outweigh other rights not expressly 
provided by the Constitution. The establishment of the right to privacy in the 
Bill may interfere with the constitutionally protected rights, but limitations 
and restrictions are acceptable in the interest of the security or public order. In 
these circumstances, Parliament may pass law prohibiting the questioning of 
any matter, right, status, position, privilege, sovereignty or prerogative 
established or protected by the provisions of Part III, arts 152, 153 or 181 of 
the Federal Constitution. It is important to highlight that each and every such 
article except art 7 imposes the caveat “save in accordance with law” or 
something to similar effect
 
.
17
  
 
                                                          
15
[1971] 2 MLJ 108, at [17]. 
16
[1950] AIR SC 27. 
17
Part II of the Federal Constitution provides for the Fundamental Liberties which includes the 
rights as set out in arts 5 -13. See arts 5(1), 6(2), 8(2)(5), 9 (2)(3), 10(2)(3)(4), 11(4), 12(1) 
read together with arts 8 and 13(1).    
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Further restrictions may be imposed for the maintenance of public order,
18
 
morality,
19
 and protection of the privileges of the Parliament or of any 
legislative assembly.
20
 Parliament also can make laws against contempt of 
court,
21
 defamation
22
 and incitement to any offence.
23
  
 
Freedom of expression, therefore, is not absolute and may be qualified by 
ordinary statute. In Asia, there are different ways of deciding how to balance 
rights and restraints. In India, art 19 of the Constitution permits Parliament to 
impose “reasonable restriction” on free speech. Such phraseology gives the 
courts the ultimate power to accept or reject legislation on the ground of 
reasonableness. The framers of the Malaysian Constitution rejected this 
approach and decided in favour of Parliament rather than the court to 
determine the reasonableness, expediency or necessity of legislation. 
However, Parliament’s legislative power is not unlimited. It can enact 
legislation only on permissible grounds and only in order to promote the 
objects enshrined in the constitutional provisions dealing with the freedom.
24
  
 
The protection of privacy provided by the Bill is general because the concept 
itself has still not been addressed widely in Malaysia. As discussed in Chapter 
Three, although some cases on privacy were brought to the court, there has 
been no attempt to define it precisely; thus its scope remains debatable. Some 
commentators stress its importance for the promotion of dignity, some for the 
                                                          
18
Relevant laws for the preservation of public order are the Sedition Act 1948, the Police Act 
1967, the Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984 and the Broadcasting Act 1988.  
19
Legislation permitted under this head includes the Betting FM Ordinance 1953, the Films 
(Censorship) Act 1952, the Indecent Advertisements Act 1953, the Lotteries Act 1952, the 
Medicines (Advertisement and Sale) Act 1956, the Printing Presses and Publications Act 
1984 and Perbadanan Kemajuan Filem Nasional Malaysia Act 1981. 
20
The Houses of Parliament (Privileges and Powers) Act 1952 and the standing orders of each 
House of Parliament are derivable from art 10(2)(a). 
21
The restrictive provisions of the Judicial Proceedings (Regulation of Reports) Act 1962 and 
the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 are justifiable under this exception. 
22
The Defamation Act 1957 is derived from this constitutionally permissible restriction on 
free speech. 
23
Offences like obscenity (ss 292 to 294 of the Penal Code) or causing disharmony, disunity 
on grounds of religion (s 298A).  
24Shad Saleem Faruqi “Free Speech and the Constitution” [1992] 4 CLJ lxiv. 
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development of the autonomous individual; and some for the preservation of 
health, well-being, or the development of relationships, and appropriate social 
interaction.
25
 This variety of interests indicates that privacy is worth 
protecting without limiting its category to a specific type of breach. This is the 
intention of the Bill. 
 
The establishment of the statutory tort of privacy would place great weight on 
privacy rights at the expense of other rights and interests. The availability of 
the public interest defence provides a safeguard to other recognised interests 
and ensures that privacy interests are not privileged over other rights and 
interests.  
 
Thus, the right to privacy as established by the Bill is not absolute. As stated 
in s 3 (2)(b) of the Bill, privacy competes with other rights and interests. In 
McKennit, Eady J noted that balancing of these rights does not occur in a 
vacuum and that public attitudes towards this may change along with societal 
expectations:26 
 
It is clear that [in the United Kingdom] there is a significant shift 
taking place as between, on the one hand, freedom of expression for 
the media and the corresponding interest of the public to receive 
information, and, on the other hand, the legitimate expectation of 
citizens to have their private life protected… Even where there is a 
genuine public interest, alongside a commercial interest in the 
media in publishing articles or photographs, sometimes such interest 
would have to yield to the individual citizen’s right to the effective 
protection of private life. 
 
                                                          
25NA Moreham “Privacy Rights” in Mark Warby, Nicole Moreham & Iain Christie (eds) 
Tugendhat & Christie The Law of Privacy and the Media  (Oxford University Press, 2011) at 
59. 
26
McKennitt v Ash [2005] EWHC 3003 (QB) at [57]. 
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However, the court should recognise and give appropriate effect to the values 
involved in the broad concept of privacy and the right to freedom of 
expression. The introduction of the Bill will strengthen the position of the 
implicit right to privacy developed from art 5.
27
  
 
Explicit constitutional protection gives freedom of expression a higher legal 
standing than privacy interests. This is different from the situation in the 
United Kingdom where privacy and freedom of expression are both 
recognised in the HRA.
28
 Regardless of whether it is protected by a 
constitution or a statute, freedom of expression tends to be conceived, and 
protected, in a manner broadly consistent with the approach taken in art 19 of 
the ICCPR. In other words, freedom of expression is regarded as a right of 
fundamental importance although, in certain circumstances,
29
 it must be 
reconciled with other competing rights or interests.  
 
The range of restrictions on the freedom is in line with art 10 of the ECHR. 
The right is wide enough to cover the freedom to hold opinions and to receive 
and impart information and ideas without interference by the public authority 
and regardless of frontiers. However, the exercise of these freedoms may be 
subject to certain formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are 
prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society.   
 
The constitutional protection accorded to the right to free expression creates 
an expectation that the right can be exercised without undue restrictions. It 
also gives the impression that the right has an exclusionary force that should 
                                                          
27
See above Chapter Three, Part III. 
28
Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) (ss 1, 12 and 13). 
29
For example art 19(3) of the ICCPR provides certain restrictions on the right to freedom of 
expression (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of 
national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals. Similarly, art 
10(2) of Malaysian Constitution restricts freedom of speech as it deems necessary or 
expedient in the interest of the security of the Federation or any part thereof, friendly relations 
with other countries, public order or morality and restrictions designed to protect the 
privileges of Parliament or of any Legislative Assembly or to provide against contempt of 
court, defamation, or incitement to any offence. 
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be protected. However, there are other interests, public or private, that 
require equal protection in order to preserve the socio-political framework of 
the Malaysian democratic society, and those other interests undoubtedly 
include the right to privacy. 
 
C Breach of privacy  
 
5. (1)  A breach of the right to privacy occurs if inter alia- 
(a) there has been unwanted access to personal 
information; or 
(b) there has been unwanted access to the physical 
body or space of an individual; or 
(c) an individual’s correspondence or private written, 
oral or electronic communication has been 
interfered with, misused or disclosed; or 
(d) sensitive facts relating to an individual have been 
disclosed. 
(2)  For the purpose of establishing liability for a breach of 
the right to privacy, a claimant must show that in the 
circumstances of the breach there is a reasonable expectation 
of privacy.   
(3) For the purpose of establishing a reasonable expectation 
of privacy, all relevant circumstances must be taken into 
account including- 
(a) the nature of the activity; 
(b) the place of occurrence of the incident; 
(c) the nature and purpose of the intrusion; 
(d) the attributes of the claimant; 
(e) the effect on the claimant; 
(f) the absence of consent.  
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The Bill does not define privacy; instead it specifies situations in which a 
breach of privacy may occur. The list is not exhaustive and may be developed 
by the courts. 
 
Section 5 deals with breach of the right to privacy. Section 5(1)(a) provides 
that a breach is said to have been taken place if there is “an unwanted access 
to personal information”. “Unwanted access” suggests the state of 
inaccessibility to an individual’s personal information.  As discussed in 
Chapter Two, Gavison defined privacy as “a limitation of others’ access to an 
individual”,30 or “freedom from unwanted access”31 as Moreham put it. Thus, 
if A collects information about B’s private wedding and discloses it to friends, 
B could maintain an action for breach of privacy against A under the Bill.   
 
A breach of the right to privacy may occur where there has been unwanted 
access to the physical body or space of an individual as provided by 5(1)(b). 
Searching private space, intercepting a conversation, unwanted watching and 
spying are examples of unwanted access under this provision.
32
 
 
Section 5(1)(c) provides for situations in which a breach occurs through 
interference, misuse or disclosure of an individual’s privately written 
correspondence, or oral or electronic communication. This safeguards 
situations where personal mail is opened or read without good reason or email 
is hacked. 
 
Section 5(1)(d) provides for a situation where sensitive facts relating to an 
individual have been disclosed. Factors surrounding the disclosure such as the 
nature, the manner and the extent of the disclosure are assessed in determining 
whether such disclosure constitutes a breach of the right to privacy. The 
                                                          
30
Gavison, above ch 2, n 28, at 428. 
31
Moreham, above ch 2, n 89, at 636. 
32These examples are discussed in NA Moreham “The right to respect for private life in the 
European Convention on Human Rights: A re-examination” (2008) 1 EHRLR 44. 
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revelation of a person’s secrets, financial matters, religious and political 
beliefs, sexual fantasies or medical misadventures are categories of sensitive 
facts protected by the Bill.  
 
The action for a breach of the right to privacy is not limited to activities taking 
place in the home or other private places. The test to determine the 
circumstances giving rise to the cause of action is whether the particular 
activity gives rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy, regardless of 
whether it occurs in public or private. The fact that an activity takes place in 
public does not mean that an expectation of privacy cannot arise. For 
example, in Hosking, a reasonable expectation of privacy did not arise 
because the photographs were taken in public and disclosed “nothing more 
than could have been observed by a member of the public in Newmarket on 
that particular day”. On the other hand, the activity photographed in Campbell 
was in public, but it revealed information about Campbell’s health, a category 
that has long been considered sensitive and private. These two cases clearly 
found that the place where the breach took place could not be the sole-
determinant of whether a breach of privacy has occurred.  
 
Section 5(2) provides that a test of reasonable expectation of privacy must be 
satisfied in order for a breach to arise. For the purpose of establishing liability 
for a breach of the right to privacy, a plaintiff must show that in the 
circumstances of the breach, there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. The 
question to be asked is whether the claimant had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in respect of the information disclosed or the activities in question. 
Where the tort of disclosure of information involved, the information must be 
of a private nature. This is essentially the touchstone of private life identified 
by Lord Nicholls in Campbell.
33
 On the other hand, if no disclosure of 
information is involved, an intrusion into seclusion must be intentional and 
unauthorised, adopting the first three elements in Holland. Thus the test of 
                                                          
33
Campbell at [21]. 
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reasonable expectation of privacy chosen by the Bill resembles the practice of 
English courts in deciding whether a breach has taken place.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Five, in order to determine whether a reasonable 
expectation of privacy exists, the underlying consideration is whether the 
information concerned is private and not public. 
34
 Thus, if obviously private 
information is disclosed, the person to whom it relates can bring an action of a 
breach of privacy, and the court will decide accordingly without the need to 
consider other relevant factors.  However, if it is not a straightforward 
disclosure of obviously private information, the court is obliged to consider 
other relevant circumstances as set out in s 5(3). 
 
The circumstances include the attributes of the claimant, the nature of the 
activity, the place of occurrence of the incident, the nature and purpose of the 
intrusion, the absence of consent and the effect on the claimant. These 
considerations are adopted from Murray v Express Newspapers plc.
35
 The test 
suggested in Murray requires consideration of all circumstances surrounding 
the facts before a breach may be established. The guidelines make it easier for 
the court to ascertain whether a claimant has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the circumstances of the case. 
 
In relation to the place of occurrence, Moreham suggested that a reasonable 
expectation of privacy may arise in public where a person involuntarily 
experiences an intimate or traumatic event in public, is in a place where he or 
she expects to be unnoticed, or where the defendant has used technological 
devices to penetrate his or her clothes or other self-protection barriers.
36
 
Therefore, a breach of privacy occurs if a long lens camera is focused on a 
plaintiff sitting beside her loved ones on the road as a result of a fatal accident 
                                                          
34
At [92] and [96].  
35
[2009] 1 Ch 481 (CA) at [36]. 
36
NA Moreham “Privacy in Public Places” (2006) 65 Cambridge LJ 606, at 635. 
283 
 
and the photos are distributed publicly, regardless of the fact that the incident 
occurred in a public place. 
 
The second-tier test of “highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary 
sensibilities” formulated in Hosking was disregarded in the Bill because it 
required a high standard approach and was stricter.    It was largely based on a 
possible collision between tort of privacy and freedom of expression. 
However, in the Malaysian context, this would be unlikely due to the status of 
freedom of expression as an entrenched right. The Court of Appeal 
determined that these two rights must be kept within tight confinement.
37
 
Thus, when prescribing the tort, Gault P and Blanchard J agreed not only that 
there must be a reasonable expectation of privacy, but also that the publication 
of the facts must be highly offensive to a reasonable person. The law in 
Hosking established that both elements must be proved although Tipping J 
was inclined to think that the highly offensive test was a contributing factor 
when deciding whether a reasonable expectation of privacy existed in a 
particular case.  
 
Moreham expresses the view that since privacy is a dignitary tort, it is 
actionable without proof of damage, thus any interference is prima facie 
actionable.
38
 The highly offensive test suggests that injury in the form of 
offence is necessary. It is quite unsatisfactory to regard the disclosure as 
offensive when facts about an individual’s activities are published. For 
example, publication of a photograph of a person having a breakfast with 
someone contains no offensive elements but may be humiliating and 
distressing if that person wishes the photo to remain private.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Five, the English courts do not regard the highly 
offensive test as a separate requirement. The Bill accepts the English courts’ 
                                                          
37
Hosking, at [130]. 
38Moreham “Why is Privacy Important?” above ch 2, n 9, at 231. 
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approach which rejected the test of “highly offensive” element in determining 
the private nature of the information, because “offensiveness” is not an 
appropriate way of characterising the harm caused. In Malaysia, matters of 
offence are dealt with in specific offences relating to modesty. In this regard, 
the Bill treated offensiveness in the same way as the UK do.
39
 The thesis 
submits that, it is quite unsatisfactory to regard the disclosure as offensive, 
rather humiliating and distressing when facts about an individual’s activities 
are published. 
 
A v B Plc, Douglas and Campbell, show that the reasonable expectation test is 
an appropriate vehicle for the protection of privacy. The test not only reflects 
the subjective nature of the privacy interest, but also encompasses physical 
and informational privacy interference.
40
  
 
Following the English position of establishing whether a breach has taken 
place, the Bill adopts the test of reasonable expectation of privacy as the only 
determining factor for the breach. In Malaysia, the standard of the “reasonable 
person” is employed for determining negligence in the law of torts. This thesis 
suggests the same test be applicable in cases of breach of privacy.  Thus, in 
order to ascertain whether a breach exists, the primary consideration is how a 
reasonable person would feel if placed in the position of the claimant and 
faced with the same publicity or intrusion. If the answer is in the affirmative, 
the court would clearly find that a breach has taken place. 
 
D Claims 
 
6. (1)  An individual whose right to privacy has been 
breached may bring an action for relief in accordance with the 
procedures for civil claims.   
                                                          
39
See discussions above in Chapter Five, at 166-167 and Chapter 6, at 201-202.  
40
See Moreham, above ch 2, n 89, at 656. 
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(2) A breach of the right to privacy is actionable - 
(a) without proof of damage; and 
(b) if the breach was either intentional or 
negligent. 
(3) Any action brought under this Act is in addition to 
but not in derogation from the common law, subject only to the rule 
that the same relief may not be granted more than once in respect of 
the same breach. 
(4) The bringing of a claim under this Act has no 
effect on any criminal prosecution in respect of the same facts. 
 
Section 6 provides that an action for a breach of privacy may be brought by an 
individual in accordance with the procedures for civil claims. A breach is 
actionable even though the claimant suffers no damage and has no knowledge 
of the breach as in the case of trespass to land, to person or interference to 
goods.
41
  
 
A key feature of the Bill is that the breach of privacy is actionable without 
proof of damage. This is because an action for a breach of the right to privacy 
is based on humiliation, distress and loss of dignity. That is to say, a plaintiff 
need not have to bring additional facts to constitute a cause of action and is 
not barred from bringing an action solely on the basis of inability to 
demonstrate an injury or loss However, the absence of such injury or loss 
could be a factor in deciding the type of remedy or quantum of damages. The 
breach of privacy will also be actionable where the breach was either 
intentional or negligent. Thus, a claimant’s state of knowledge is not a pre-
requisite for a breach of privacy to be actionable. 
 
With regard to the above issue, Lord Hoffman’s comment is a good 
explanation for s 6:
42
  
                                                          
41
See Norchaya Law of Torts in Malaysia, above ch 3 n 68, at 9. 
42
Wainwright v Home Office [2004] 2 AC 406, at [51]. 
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Although art 8 guarantees a right of privacy, I do not think that it 
treats that right as having been invaded and requiring remedy in 
damages, irrespective of whether the defendant acted intentionally, 
negligently or accidentally. It is one thing to wander carelessly 
into the wrong hotel bedroom and another to hide in the wardrobe 
to take photographs. 
 
E Defences 
 
7. It is a defence to an action under this Act for the defendant 
to prove that the act in respect of which the action was brought - 
(a) was done for the purpose of lawfully defending or protecting a 
person or property, or 
(b) was authorised or required by law or by a court, or 
(c) was done by a public servant in accordance with s 8 - 
(i)  acting in the course of his or her duties, or 
(ii) in circumstances where he or she had reasonable grounds 
for believing that he or she was acting in the course of his or her 
duties, or 
(iii) was an act of newsgathering, where disclosure of material 
obtained as a result of such act was - 
(i) done in good faith; or 
(ii) for the purpose of discussing a subject of public interest; 
or 
(iii) for the public benefit; and 
   (iv) fair and reasonable in all of the circumstances; or 
(v)  was done with the consent of the claimant. 
 
Section 7 provides specific defences available to the defendant in privacy 
action. A defence to a claim of privacy violation may exist if it is deemed that 
the information is of legitimate public interest or otherwise newsworthy. 
Public interest is upheld as a defence, rather than an element for the tort. The 
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Bill retains “public interest” compared with New Zealand’s defence of 
“legitimate public concern” because “public interest” is already a familiar 
term in Malaysia. It is used and recognised in the context of defamation, 
nuisance, contract and other branches of law that require public interest 
considerations to be taken into account. If a breach is established by satisfying 
the test of reasonable expectation of privacy, the next question to consider is 
whether it is justified. If other matters of public interest outweigh the privacy 
of the individual, the claim will not be sustained. In other words, the scope of 
privacy protection should not exceed the limits of freedom of expression and 
other matters of public interest. 
 
In cases of publication of information about activities of public figures that 
may reflect on the position they hold that the public has the right to know, 
such information would not amount to a breach under the Bill. On the other 
hand, a newsworthy defence requires that it is timely, so while the subject and 
information may once have been newsworthy, years later that may no longer 
be the case; and publication of the information may not be protected by this 
defence. 
 
The above provision also allows a defendant in an action for a breach of 
privacy to prove that the action occurred for the purpose of lawfully defending 
or protecting a person or property.
43
 A strong defence exists if the act was 
authorised or required by law or by a court. Public servants have a defence if 
the act took place in accordance with s 8 and they were acting in the course of 
their duties, or in circumstances where they had reasonable grounds for 
believing that they were acting in the course of their duties. A reporter or 
journalist has a defence if disclosure of information occurred in good faith or 
                                                          
43
This provides an exception or immunity to lawyers prosecuting or defending proceeding in 
court. The process of litigation itself requires a lot of information to be discussed between the 
lawyer and clients. If any breach occurs in the process of obtaining the information, it is 
protected by the Bill.  
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for the purpose of discussing a subject of public interest and benefit, and was 
fair and reasonable in all circumstances.  
 
F Exemption from liability 
 
8. No claim can be made for interference with the right to 
privacy where a public authority acts - 
(a) in accordance with the law, and 
(b) as is necessary in a democratic society- 
(i) in the interest of national security; 
(ii)  public safety or the economic well-being of  Malaysia; 
(iii) for the prevention of disorder or crime; 
(iv) for the protection of health and morals; or 
(v) for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
 
As discussed in Chapter Four, the PDPA does not apply to the public sector. 
With a view to remedying that limitation, the Bill applies to everybody. 
However, s 8 gives a public authority
44
 exemption from liability if the 
interference occurs in accordance with the law and is necessary for the interest 
of national security, public safety or economic well-being, prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health and morals or for the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
It is important to acknowledge a public authority’s special position and to 
provide for a necessary exemption in carrying out public duties. This 
exemption, as opposed to defences under s 7, is in line with the exemption 
provided by the ECHR and only applicable to public authority. Therefore, in 
                                                          
44According to art 160 of the Federal Constitution, “public authority” means the “Yang di-
Pertuan Agong (the King), the Ruler or Yang di-Pertuan Negeri of a State, the Federal 
Government, the Government of a State, a local authority, a statutory authority exercising 
powers vested in it by federal or State law, any court or tribunal other than the Supreme Court 
and High Courts, or any officer or authority appointed by or acting on behalf of any of those 
person, courts, tribunals or authorities”. 
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determining a breach of privacy by a public authority, the court will look at s 
8 justifications and the claimant’s privacy rights. On the other hand, in cases 
of a breach between individuals, the defendant may be absolved from the 
liability if any of the defences provided under s 7 justifies the breach. 
 
G Procedural Orders 
 
9. Where a claim is brought under this Act, the High Court 
shall make such orders as it thinks fit for anonymity and 
the protection of the privacy of any individual. 
 
Section 9 provides that the High Court may make such orders as it thinks fit 
for anonymity and the protection of the privacy of any individual. This is to 
preserve individual’s privacy and confidentiality in civil proceedings, and thus 
balancing the privacy right with the principle of open justice.  
 
The principle of open justice is a long-established and fundamental aspect of 
the justice system in any country committed to the rule of law.
45
 In the 
administration of justice, the paramount requirement is that justice should be 
done openly. A fundamental principle of the common law since its origins is 
that justice is conducted, and judgments are given in public.
46
 This principle is, 
as Lord Shaw described it in Scott v Scott,
47
 “a sound and very sacred part of 
the constitution of the country and the administration of justice”. 48  Open 
justice is of constitutional importance because it is “on the whole, the best 
security for the pure, impartial, and efficient administration of justice, the best 
means for winning for public confidence and respect”.49 
                                                          
45Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury “Privacy and Freedom of Expression: A Delicate Balance” 
(2011) 1 LNS(A) lxxii. 
46
Daubney v Cooper (1829) 109 ER 438; 10 B & C 237 at 240; Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417 at 
438 (per Lord Haldane LC); Richmond Newspapers Inc v Virginia 448 (US) 555.   
47
[1913] AC 417. 
48
At  473; see also Attorney General v Leveller Magazine [1979] AC 440 at 449 - 450.   
49
At 463; and Lord Shaw at 476; Axen v Germany [1984] 6 EHRR 195 at [25]- [27].   
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It is also important to emphasise that in this context the proper administration 
of justice has two elements.
50
 First, it refers to the court’s ability to administer 
justice between the parties in a particular case. In the proceeding for the tort of 
misuse of private information or breach of confidence, justice can be done by 
properly protecting private and confidential information which may be fatally 
undermined if the proceedings themselves were conducted entirely in public 
and the judgment were also entirely public. In such a situation, strict 
adherence to the general principle may be inconsistent with the court’s duty to 
do justice.
51
 
  
The second element stemmed from the need to apportion justice between 
parties. Richardson J in the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Moevao v 
Department of Labour
52
 said:  
 
And the due administration of justice is a continuous process, 
not confined to the determination of the particular case. It 
follows that in exercising its inherent jurisdiction the Court is 
protecting its ability to function as a Court of law in the future 
as in the case before it. This leads on to the second aspect of the 
public interest which is the maintenance of public confidence in 
the administration of justice. It is contrary to the public interest 
to allow that confidence to be eroded by a concern that the 
Court’s processes may lend themselves to oppression and 
injustice. 
 
Article 6 of the ECHR provides that open justice in civil proceedings can 
properly yield to privacy: 
                                                          
50
These two elements are discussed in Report of the Committee on Super-Injunctions: Super-
Injunctions, Anonymised Injunctions and Open Justice (Judiciary of England and Wales, 
2011). at [1.20]-[1.21] 
<http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Reports/super-injunction-report-
20052011.pdf> [Super-Injunctions]. 
51
At [1.20]-[1.21]. 
52
[1980] 1 NZLR 464 at 481; Refer also Super Injunctions, above n 47, at [1.21]. 
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Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public 
may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interest of 
morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, 
where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private 
life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in 
the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity 
would prejudice the interests of justice.  
 
This thesis suggests that proceeding of a privacy action should be done in an 
open court but, whenever necessary, the court may make an order for 
claimant’s anonymity that the identification and particulars of that person will 
not be disclosed. In the UK and New Zealand, restrictions on publication are 
often enough to safeguard the claimant’s interest.53  
 
H Appeals 
 
10. Any party who is not satisfied with or is aggrieved by the 
decision of the High Court may appeal to the Court of 
Appeal. 
 
Section 10 allows a party not satisfied with the decision of the High Court to 
appeal to the Court of Appeal on the question of law only. Such a procedure is 
provided by s 67 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 which gives the power 
to the Court of appeal to hear and determine appeals from any judgment or 
order of any High Court in any civil cause or matter, whether made in the 
exercise of its original or of its appellate jurisdiction. Upon hearing an appeal 
of a decision by the High Court, the Court of Appeal may make such orders it 
considers appropriate.
54
 
                                                          
53
See for example, ss 39 and 49 of the Children and Young Persons act 1933 (UK); s 8 of the 
Magistrate’s Court Act 1980 (UK); ss 11B-11D of the Family Courts Act 1980 (NZ) and s 
125 of the Domestic Violence Act 1995 (NZ). 
54
Section 69(1)-(5) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (Malaysia) provides that “appeals to 
the Court of Appeal shall be by way of re-hearing.” On re-hearing, the Court of Appeal may 
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I Remedies  
 
11. (1) The remedies available in respect of a breach of the 
right to privacy include- 
(a) Temporary and perpetual injunctions in 
accordance with section 51 of the Specific Relief 
Act 1950 and mandatory injunctions  specified 
under section 53 of the Specific Relief Act 1950; 
(b) Damages; 
(c) An account of profits; 
(d) Property confiscation or destruction orders; 
(e) A declaration of breach of privacy; 
(f) Apology. 
(2) The court may award any or all of these remedies 
as it sees fit in relation to the specific facts of the case. 
(3) The court shall have power to order costs to be 
borne by either party. 
 
Section 11 lists remedies available in respect of a breach of privacy and 
includes injunctions, damages, an account of profits, property confiscation or 
destruction orders, declaration of breach of privacy, and apology. The award 
may be one or all of the remedies available under this section. The court also 
may order costs to be borne by either party. 
 
Injunction is one of the most popular remedies in privacy actions in New 
Zealand. It has been awarded since invasion of privacy was first mooted as a 
possible tort.
55
 The same position applies in England.
56
 Injunctions are 
                                                                                                                                                       
draw inferences of fact, and give any judgment, and make any order which ought to have been 
given or made, and make such further or other orders as the case requires. 
55
Among other cases where an injunction was awarded were Tucker v News Media Ownership 
Ltd [1986] 2 NZLR 716, Morgan v Television New Zealand (1 March 1990) HC CH CP 67-
90, P v D [2000] 2 NZLR 591 (HC). 
56
For example in McKennitt and others v Ash [2008] QB 73, the court granted an injunction 
preventing further publication of a significant part of the work complained of on the ground 
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awarded because plaintiffs want to stop infringements of their privacy before 
they occur rather than afterwards.  
 
In this Act, temporary and perpetual injunctions are available in the case of a 
breach of privacy in accordance with s 51 of the Specific Relief Act 1950
57
 
and mandatory injunctions are provided by s 53 of the Specific Relief Act 
1950.
58
  
 
Damages may also serve as an appropriate remedy for cases involving 
invasion of privacy. In Hosking, the court made it clear that damages were the 
main remedy for breach of privacy.
59
 In Lee Ewe Poh, the court stated that in 
order to qualify for aggravated damages, the acts must be calculated to injure 
the feelings of the plaintiff.
60
 The court accepted that aggravated damages as a 
form of a higher compensation showed disapproval of the defendant’s acts 
because they were carried out in such a manner that the plaintiff suffered more 
than would normally be expected in such a case.
61
  It is suggested that the 
same approach should be taken in the context of the privacy tort. 
 
The award of exemplary damages, also known as punitive damages may be 
debatable in the context of a privacy action. This is because, in Malaysia, 
exemplary damages aim to reform or deter the defendant and others from 
                                                                                                                                                       
that it constituted private information under art 8 of the ECHR. See also A v B plc, above ch 
5, at 170. 
57
Section 51 provides that temporary injunctions continue until a specified time, or until the 
further order of the court. They may be granted at any stage of a suit, and are regulated by the 
law relating to civil procedure. A perpetual injunction can only be granted by the decree made 
at the hearing and upon the merits of the suit; the defendant is thereby perpetually enjoined 
from the assertion of a right, or from the commission of an act, which would be contrary to 
the rights of the plaintiff.  
58Section 53 provides “When, to prevent the breach of an obligation, it is necessary to compel 
the performance of certain acts which the court is capable of enforcing, the court may in its 
discretion grant an injunction to prevent the breach complained of, and also to compel 
performance of the requisite acts”. 
59
Hosking at [149]. 
60
Lee Ewe Poh, at [18]. 
61
The court in Lee Ewe Poh referred to Catherine Elliot and Frances Quinn Tort Law (7
th
 ed, 
Pearson Longman, England, 2009). 
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engaging in similar conduct. They are, however, often awarded where 
compensatory damages are deemed an inadequate remedy. Malaysian courts 
have followed and applied the law relating to exemplary damages in tort 
expounded by Lord Devlin in Rookes v Barnard.
62
 The principles were 
applied in Solid Gold Publishers Sdn Bhd v Chan Wee Ho & Ors
63
 where the 
judge held that the awards of exemplary damages should be moderate and it 
may properly be awarded to deter the tortfeasor. In awarding such award, 
evidence of the tortfeasor’s means is material not only to show that he can 
afford to satisfy a substantial judgment but to show what sum will be a 
sufficient deterrent against the repetition of the conduct that attract the 
award.
64
 Similarly, in Alfred Templeton & Ors v Low Yat Holdings Sdn Bhd & 
Anor
65
 the judge awarded the plaintiff exemplary damages because the 
defendants’ wrongdoing was committed with a profit making motive, high-
handedly and outrageously, with a contumelious disregard for plaintiffs’ 
rights and the plaintiffs were victims of the defendants’ punishable 
behaviour.
66
  
 
Thus, in defamation action, punitive or exemplary damages are likely to be 
awarded where the defendant has deliberately or recklessly, published the 
defamatory statements with the knowledge that the economic benefit from the 
publication outweigh any sum for which he might be liable in damages. The 
rationale behind such an award is to show that the defendant cannot break the 
law with impunity and it is only made when compensatory damages are 
insufficient to serve this aim of punishment.
67
 Having said so, it is important 
to note that, as the nature of privacy breach and its effect is akin to that what 
                                                          
62
[1964] AC 1129. Lord Devlin laid down three rules for an award of exemplary damages; (i) 
when power to do so is authorised by statute; (ii) when the conduct by government servants is 
oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional and (iii) when the conduct is calculated to result in 
profit.  
63
[2002] 3 MLJ 310. 
64
At 313. 
65
[1989] 2 MLJ 202 (Alfred). See also Cheng Hang Guan & Ors v Perumahan Farlim 
(Penang) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1993] 3 MLJ 352. 
66
See Alfred, at 232-233. 
67
Chong  Siew Chiang v Chua Ching Geh & Anor [1995] 1 MLJ 551. 
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is suffered   by a person defamed, a similar approach should be taken in 
privacy action.  As the Bill in s 6 provides that the breach of privacy is 
actionable regardless of the claimant’s state of knowledge, the court may 
grant an award of exemplary damages which it thinks is most appropriate in 
the circumstances. 
 
However, in Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd
68
,  the court held that 
exemplary damages were not available in a claim for infringement of privacy, 
since there was no existing authority to justify such an extension and because 
it would fail the tests of necessity and proportionality. Similarly, the court in 
Lee Ewe Poh acknowledged that the purpose of exemplary damages was to 
offer a serious punishment to the defendant and to deter others from behaving 
the same way. The court found, however, that the defendant’s conduct was not 
sufficiently outrageous as to warrant exemplary damages that might punish 
and deter him.
69
    
 
In assessing damages, the court may take into account factors including the 
extent of publication, the conduct of the defendant after publication, any 
contributory negligence by the plaintiff, the defendant’s motive for publishing 
or intrusion, the age of the plaintiff and the extent of distress and hurt to the 
plaintiff. 
 
If the defendant has made money from the plaintiff’s personal information, 
the plaintiff may require all profits deriving from defendant’s unlawful 
conduct to be released. The plaintiff also may apply for property confiscation 
or destruction orders; to require the defendant to surrender damaging 
documents to the plaintiff.  
 
                                                          
68
[2008] EWHC 1777 (QB) Eady J at [197]. 
69
Lee Ewe Poh, at [19]. 
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A claimant also may apply for a declaration of breach of privacy or open 
apology by the defendant. A declaration may be useful in situation where, as 
part of the vindication of his or her rights, a person wants the breach to be 
acknowledged. However, these two remedies are not as popular as damages 
and injunction, but they are alternative remedies that may be sought in privacy 
cases.  
 
J Limitation of action  
 
12. A privacy action under this Act is an action founded in tort 
for the purpose of section 6 of the Limitation Act 1953. 
 
Section 12 provides that an action for a breach of privacy must be brought 
within six years from the date on which the cause of action occurred. This is 
in line with other civil claims provided by s 6 of the Limitation Act 1963.
70
 If 
the victim does not take action against the infringement within the stipulated 
time, he or she loses the right because they have consented to the breach. To 
bring a privacy action under this Bill, the date of the cause of action shall be 
the date upon which the breach of privacy was first discovered by the 
plaintiff, or reasonably discoverable by the plaintiff in a particular case.  
 
K Personal data protection principles 
 
13. This Act operates in addition to and not in derogation 
from the protection of personal data under the Personal Data 
Protection Act 2010. 
 
Section 13 provides for the application of this Bill in respect of matters related 
to personal data which are uncovered by the Personal Data Protection Act 
2010. As discussed in Chapter Four, the PDPA was introduced to regulate and 
                                                          
70
Section 6(1)(a) provides that actions founded on a contract or on tort shall not be brought 
after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued. 
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protect the misuse of personal data through commercial transactions. Thus, it 
only safeguards confidentiality in the handling of an individual’s personal 
data and prevents misuse of the data in relation to commercial transactions. 
Given its breadth, wider range of remedies is provided in cases where 
personal data protection principles are breached, but no remedies are available 
in the PDPA.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Four, one of the shortcomings of the PDPA 2010 is 
the absence of remedy for the individuals whose data has been misused. No 
provision exists in the PDPA for compensation, injunction or appropriate 
remedy for the breach.
71
 Though correction of inaccurate information is 
granted under the PDPA,
72
 its main focus is on sanctions for breach.
73
 This 
may provide some deterrence, but does not compensate the victim. Thus, the 
provision for remedies provided by the Privacy Bill would make up for the 
insufficiency of protection provided under the PDPA. In other words, the Bill 
has no intention to contradict the personal data legislation rather it adds new 
dimension to it. It does not amend the PDPA nor derogate from it. 
 
L Other laws 
 
14. Nothing in this Act operates in derogation from the 
provisions of the Official Secrets Act 1972, or of the 
Public Order (Preservation) Act 1958. 
 
Section 14 relates to the relationship between this Act and other legislation. 
Nothing provided under the Act shall derogate from the provisions of the 
                                                          
71 See Zuryati Mohamed Yusoff “The Malaysian Personal Data Protection Act 2010: A 
Legislation Note” [2011] 9 NZJPIL 119. 
72
Section 34 of the PDPA on the right to correct personal data. 
73
Section 5(2) of the PDPA. 
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Official Secrets Act 1972 (OSA) 74  or the Public Order (Preservation) Act 
1958.75  
 
For example, the establishment of a general right to privacy under the Bill 
does not in every situation prevent a search and seizure to be executed under s 
6 of the OSA. Similarly, the provisions of the Bill have no effect on penalties 
for spying76 prejudicial to the safety or interest of Malaysia. Neither do the 
provisions of the Bill prevent the Chief Police Officer or the Officer in Charge 
of a Police District to exercise their powers for the maintenance of public 
order.77 
 
IV Summary 
 
The proposed law for the protection of privacy recognises a general right to 
privacy in Malaysia. The law reflects and is informed by relevant 
developments of the right to privacy in the UK and New Zealand. As 
acknowledged by courts in both jurisdictions, Parliament is the appropriate 
authority to introduce and develop privacy law and its remedies. The Bill 
provides a framework for the kind of privacy protection that would work for 
Malaysia. The recommendations and suggestions from Law Reform 
Commission Report of other jurisdictions particularly Australia which 
strongly support the enactment of a statutory cause of action for a serious 
invasion of privacy provide useful insights for the development of this Bill. 
 
                                                          
74
The Official Secrets Act 1972 is an Act to revise and consolidate the law relating to the 
protection of official secrets.  
75
The Public Order (Preservation) Act 1958 is an Act relating to the maintenance and 
restoration of public order. 
76
Section 3 of the Official Secrets Act 1972. 
77
Part III of the Public Order (Preservation) Act 1958. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
 
Infringements of personal privacy are a growing problem in Malaysia. A law 
should respond to these problems by providing appropriate protection of the 
right to privacy and its interests as defined in this thesis. Chapters Three and 
Four showed that the existing legal framework does not adequately protect 
these interests, thus, the need to address the existing situations. Malaysia 
needs a law on privacy that covers intrusion as well as informational privacy. 
References and developments from other jurisdictions can contribute to the 
formulation of the proposed law.  
 
As discussed in Chapters Five and Six, the development of privacy law in the 
United Kingdom and New Zealand informs the development of privacy law 
for Malaysia. However, the English courts’ approach of extending the 
doctrine of confidentiality to cases involving wrongful publication of private 
information may not be appropriate in Malaysia. Chapter Three made it clear 
that courts in Malaysia have taken a more conservative approach to breach of 
confidence. In all breach of confidence cases, Malaysian courts have followed 
the three elements in Coco. These elements have been applied strictly and no 
avenue so far exists to reformulate them so that the doctrine of confidentiality 
may provide protection for privacy.  
 
On the other hand, the NZ approach of developing common law torts may be 
followed in Malaysia; indeed steps in this direction have already been taken, 
in, for example, the recent case of Maslinda Ishak. There the court decided 
that an invasion of privacy is actionable although it did not discuss the details 
of the cause of action. Further development is likely to be slow and piecemeal, 
dependent, as it is, on incremental case by case development.    
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Given the remote probability of Malaysia’s adopting the approach taken in the 
UK or NZ, this thesis submits that specific legislation for a Malaysian tort of 
privacy is desirable. This is, firstly, because the courts in Malaysia still rely on 
the law in Ultra Dimension which followed Kaye, and do not take into 
account changes to the English common law brought about by the HRA 1998, 
art 8 of the Convention, Douglas methodology and Campbell. This means that 
the long-abandoned principles in Kaye are still referred to by Malaysian 
courts. Secondly, recognising an explicit right to privacy in the Constitution 
will not be easy. This is because of the nature of the Constitution, and the 
amendment process that requires adherence to complicated and onerous 
procedures. Although Indian jurisprudence has, to a certain extent, influenced 
Malaysian decisions on human rights issues (especially the right to life and 
personal liberty), political, economic, religious and societal differences make 
it difficult to follow fully the Indian approach to constitutional privacy 
protection. Thirdly, to have a common law tort similar to that developed in 
New Zealand in Hosking and Holland would largely depend on the court’s 
exercise of its powers when confronting a relevant case at some unknown 
time in the future.  
 
It is not possible for Malaysia to adopt English and New Zealand approaches 
in their entirety but each development has significantly contributed to many 
aspects of the formulation of a statutory tort of privacy. This thesis concludes, 
therefore, that the best way for Malaysia to protect individual privacy is to 
have a general Act on privacy which is informed by relevant developments in 
the UK and New Zealand. Such an Act would provide guidance to courts on 
how the tort would determine the balance between privacy and freedom of 
expression and on appropriate remedies. It is necessary to place all aspects of 
privacy protection in a specific law which provides a firm foundation for 
subsequent judicial developments.   
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This thesis focuses on two key aspects of the privacy interest: the protection 
of individual privacy in respect of information, and the physical body. The 
proposed law protects these two vital aspects of the privacy interest and 
provides a basis for the future extension of privacy protection in Malaysia.  
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APPENDIX  
 
This is the proposed law of privacy for Malaysia discussed in Chapter Seven. 
The wordings in this Bill are sourced from other legislative models and 
reform proposals particularly the Ireland Privacy Bill 2006, the Australian 
Law Reform Commission, the New South Wales Law Reform Commission 
and the Victorian Law Reform Commission. However, necessary amendments 
to the wordings are made in conformity with Malaysian legislation.  
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LAWS OF MALAYSIA 
PRIVACY BILL 2014 
 
An Act for the protection of the privacy of every individual and matters 
connected thereto. 
     [     ] 
 
ENACTED by the Parliament of Malaysia as follows: 
 
PART I  
PRELIMINARY 
 
Short title  
1. This is the Privacy Act 2014. 
 
Interpretation 
2.  In this Act- 
“disclose” means make information and other material concerning an 
individual known to the public or to a section of the public; 
“individual” means a living natural person; 
“interference” means the act of interfering or actions taken leading to 
the process of interfering;  
“personal information” means information which relate to an 
identifiable individual; 
“physical intrusion” means intrusion into the physical space or solitude 
of an individual;  
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Purpose  
3.   (1) The purpose of this Act is to provide for the protection and respect 
of the dignity of individuals in their private and public lives both in terms of 
protection of personal information and freedom from physical intrusion. 
(2) To that end, this Act - 
(a) establishes a general right to privacy and provides for its 
protection; 
(b) recognises that the right to privacy is not absolute and provides a 
framework within which to balance that right with other human 
rights, and with other public interests; and 
(c) provides for redress when there has been a breach of the right to 
privacy. 
 
PART II 
CAUSE OF ACTION 
 
Right to privacy 
4.  (1) Every individual has a general right to privacy. 
  (2) The right to privacy is the right to the degree of privacy which is 
reasonable in all the circumstances having regard to the rights of others and of 
the public at large. 
(3) The right to privacy in this Act complements the right to life and 
personal liberty under article 5 of the Federal Constitution and is to be read 
consistently with freedom of speech, assembly and association granted under 
article 10 of the Federal Constitution. 
 
Breach of privacy 
5. (1)  A breach of the right to privacy occurs if inter alia- 
(a) there has been unwanted access to personal information; or 
(b) there has been unwanted access to the physical body or space 
of an individual; or 
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(c) an individual’s correspondence or private written, oral or 
electronic communication has been interfered with, misused 
or disclosed; or 
(d) sensitive facts relating to an individual have been disclosed. 
(2) For the purpose of establishing liability for a breach of the right to 
privacy, a claimant must show that in the circumstances of the breach there is 
a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
(3) For the purpose of establishing a reasonable expectation of privacy, 
all relevant circumstances must be taken into account including- 
(a) the nature of the activity; 
(b) the place of occurrence of the incident; 
(c) the nature and purpose of the intrusion; 
(d) the attributes of the claimant; 
(e) the effect on the claimant; 
(f)  the absence of consent.  
 
Claims 
6. (1) An individual whose right to privacy has been breached may bring an 
action for relief in accordance with the procedures for civil claims.   
(2) A breach of the right to privacy is actionable - 
(a)  without proof of damage;  
(b)  if the breach was either intentional or negligent. 
(3) Any action brought under this Act is in addition to but not in 
derogation from the common law, subject only to the rule that the same relief 
may not be granted more than once in respect of the same breach. 
(4) The bringing of a claim under this Act has no effect on any criminal 
prosecution in respect of the same facts. 
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PART III 
DEFENCES 
 
Defences 
7. It is a defence to an action under this Act for the defendant to prove that 
the act in respect of which the action was brought - 
(a) was done for the purpose of lawfully defending or protecting a 
person or property; or 
(b) was authorised or required by law or by a court; or 
(c) was done by a public servant in accordance with s 8 - 
(i) acting in the course of his or her duties, or 
(ii) in circumstances where he or she had reasonable grounds for 
believing that he or she was acting in the course of his or her 
duties, or 
(d) was an act of newsgathering, where disclosure of material obtained 
as a result of such act was - 
(i)  done in good faith; or 
(ii) for the purpose of discussing a subject of public interest; or 
(iii) for the public interest, and 
(iv) fair and reasonable in all of the circumstances; or 
(e) was done with the consent of the claimant. 
 
Exemption from liability 
8. No claim can be made for interference with the right to privacy where a 
public authority acts - 
(a) in accordance with the law, and 
(b) as is necessary in a democratic society- 
(i) in the interest of national security; 
(ii)  for public safety or the economic well-being of  
Malaysia; 
(iii)  for the prevention of disorder or crime; 
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(iv)  for the protection of health and morals; or 
(v)  for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others. 
 
PART IV 
PROCEEDINGS 
 
Procedural Orders 
9. Where a claim is brought under this Act, the High Court shall make 
such orders as it thinks fit for anonymity and the protection of the privacy of 
any individual. 
 
Appeals 
10. Any party who is not satisfied with or is aggrieved by the decision of 
the High Court may appeal to the Court of Appeal. 
 
PART V 
REMEDIES 
 
Remedies 
11. (1) The remedies available in respect of a breach of the right to privacy 
include- 
(a) Temporary and perpetual injunctions in accordance with 
section 51 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 and mandatory 
injunctions specified under section 53 of the Specific Relief 
Act 1950; 
(b) Damages;  
(c) An account of profits; 
(d) Property confiscation or destruction orders; 
(e) A declaration of breach of privacy; 
(f) Apology. 
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(2) The court may award any or all of these remedies as it sees fit in 
relation to the specific facts of the case. 
(3) The court shall have power to order costs to be borne by either party. 
 
 
PART VI 
MISCELLANEOUS 
 
Limitation of action 
12.  A privacy action under this Act is an action founded in tort for the 
purpose of section 6 of the Limitation Act 1953. 
 
Personal Data Protection Principles 
13. This Act operates in addition to and not in derogation from the 
protection of personal data under the Personal Data Protection Act 2010. 
 
Other laws 
14. Nothing in this Act operates in derogation from the provisions of the 
Official Secrets Act 1972, or of the Public Order (Preservation) Act 1958. 
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